The Kurils’ Deadlock
Grigory Yavlinsky’s web-site, 14.01.2019
Grigory Yavlinsky on the upcoming negotiations between Vladimir Putin and Shinzo Abe and the dispute over the Kuril Islands
Japan’s Foreign Minister Taro Kono arrived in Moscow to prepare the visit of Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. At the negotiations in late January, Shinzo Abe and Vladimir Putin will discuss the issue of concluding a peace treaty [between Russia and Japan, which the USSR and Japan failed to conclud after the Second World War]. The task is to agree on a formula for resolving a territorial dispute between Russia and Japan and come close to defining the specific framework of a future treaty. Real information – and often just hysterical – battles have developed around this issue recently.
The Japanese Prime Minister has been actively preparing public opinion in his country for a seemingly predetermined (as he interpreted it) deal based on the formula set forth in the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956, with the transfer of the Shikotan Island and the group of uninhabited Habomai Islands (that are part of the Kuril Islands) to Japan after signing the peace treaty. This has already caused a sharp reaction from the Russian Foreign Ministry.
At the same time, the Japanese leader is trying to get rid of at least some of the formal obstacles to such a deal: to remove the issue of compensation for property lost by Japan and guarantee in some way the demilitarised status of the islands under discussion.
On the Russian side, there have been only statements so far about the unconditional legitimacy of the territorial changes that occurred as a result of the Second World War. But this goes against the Japanese stance. There are no points of coincidence. Russian official news agencies say so, “No one expects the talks to become a friendly conversation – the degree of the political discussion has heated too much.”
However, neither side seems to be going to cancel the scheduled meetings and negotiations – either hoping to “press in” the partner on the way to the finishing tape, or knowing something that the society is not yet aware of. One way or another, but the emerging situation causes embarrassment and annoyance.
First, one must either openly say that Russia is looking for a compromise, which, however, is impossible without changing the actually existing border, or, if this is considered unacceptable, postpone the issue for another few decades. And it is a bad, unworthy policy talking for years about one thing, having something completely different in mind and explaining nothing about the estimated result to anyone (or perhaps not even realizing all this).
Second, if the issue is to be solved be means of a compromise, then this cannot be only a decision of the government, without explaining it to the people. The transfer of even the symbolic part of the territory actually controlled by the state is perceived very emotionally. It is necessary to go into long and detailed explanations of all this and widely discuss with the whole country the causes, goals and the desired effect of such a step. The Russian society is completely unaware of the Japanese side, and the Russian authorities have not presented their arguments in favour of any compromise solution.
Third, it is obvious that when discussing this topic with people, then neither legal casuistry (which the government itself doesn’t give a damn), nor tales about some cash flows that are to suddenly fall on the Far East and its inhabitants, are not enough. Only very large things that are important for all and related to fundamentally new Russian politics and Russia’s position in the world can be the arguments. However, these matters will not change for the better in the current situation and under our present authorities – neither with the treaty with Japan, nor without it. And the Kremlin’s games with weaving of short-term geopolitical intrigues, as usual, will end in shameful nothing.
Fourth, it is important to understand that in the final analysis this is not about relations between political persons, but about relations between nations. Any manifestations of dishonesty – be it backlash solutions, or crafty winks, or tactical reticence regarding the partners in the negotiations – ultimately spoil relations between nations. And this is serious and for a long time. Certainly, politics cannot do without elements of a game and all sorts of omissions. However, in a territorially-international dispute, the illusion of a tactical gain will result in strategic losses for decades.
Fifth, if one solves the issue strategically, for decades or even centuries, one has to understand that a reliable solution of territorial disputes is possible only if the situation evolves positively for all its participants in normal good-neighbourly relations. We observe the example of the Middle East, where territorial conflicts have not been extinguished for decades. In Western Europe there were no less historical disputes and mutual claims, but over the past 70 years, territorial disputes at least significantly lost relevance as a result of successful development and integration if not disappeared altogether (as in the heads of people such disputes live longer than in official diplomacy). And the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan lasting, in fact, since the end of the Second World War, can remain in the past only if such mutually successful development occurs.
Finally, the sixth, and very important. There is a big difference between talking about the fate of the islands as a place where people live and work, and discussing their legal background. Living conditions in the Kuriles are bad, to put it mildly. And it would be good if the Russian-Japanese agreements could somehow improve people’s lives. However, unfortunately, the endless facade agreements on the “beginning of consultations on cooperation” in the absence of basic understanding between Russia and Japan still do not promise real change for the better for the residents of the Kuril Islands.
Source: https://www.yavlinsky.ru/news/mir/kurili-tupik
Posted: January 16th, 2019 under Foreign policy.