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Let me start with a short observation about the assessment of
the Russian economic reforms as discussed many times under the
framework created by the Bertelsmann Foundation. As you know perfectly
well, Russian economic reforms and the reforms in Eastern Europe
were discussed in many institutions in the world and many think
tanks. And I have had a chance to take part in many of these think
tanks. I have been involved in these discussions, especially when
I was preparing data about Russian economic theory, which was
published in Princeton and mentioned just a minute ago. Let me
assure you that over the past ten years the framework organized
by the Bertelsmann Foundation was the best framework in terms
of openness and intellectual preparations. The Carl-Bertelsmann-Prize
delivered last year simply underlined the impact of the analysis
performed by the foundation during the past ten years under this
framework and the think tank in general. This was a very impressive
project on transformations in the world. It differed from the
others in that it was first and foremost intellectually honest.
Secondly, in my opinion it was very professional, and most importantly,
something which was not evidenced in other think tanks, it was
based on real values. All the things discussed during these seminars
and these different forums and different events, on what we would
have tomorrow, all the things were discussed from the point of
view of major values, which are the basic concepts for democracy
and a market economy. That is why it is so important that tomorrow
we will discuss an issue that is only discussed in this framework
as part of the Bertelsmann Foundation, the quality of democracy.
Everybody discusses only democracies, but it is already well-known
that while almost every country has democratic procedures, this
doesn't mean that they are democracies. So, as a first step it
should be noted that the word democracy doesn't mean a lot. And
I think that a lot of people, who are just here from all over
the world, understand what I mean. So, international involvement
in such a liberal and tolerant discussion process make it possible
to listen to different opinions and different people. That is
why a number of advisors from this environment were able to create
real solutions. Maybe not for the largest things in the world,
but at least their solutions were useful for the countries. But
we are discussing here developments in Russia. I want to return
to the discussions that I have had with this audience for many
years. Your views differ from interpretations in the major European
newspapers. If you look at articles in the most important European
newspapers five years ago, eight years ago and items published
by the Bertelsmann Foundation, you will perceive very important
differences. So the main question raised here that I found very
interesting was - why were the reforms successful in Poland, the
Czech Republic and Hungary? I think this is a key question for
all transformations in Russia. If we manage to answer this question,
we will be making progress in finding the answers to the most
important questions. In my opinion the reforms were successful
in those countries because democratic revolutions occurred in
1990 and 1991 in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In Russia
it was a "nomenclature termidor", and that was the key
answer which was not provided at that time. Hungary had been moving
towards a democratic revolution since 1956, the Czech Republic
since 1968 and Poland since the mid-1970s: Russia had no experience
at all. Russia took everything for granted owing to simple events
caused by the political activity of Mr. Gorbachev. He had a two-day
revolution, on 19 and 20 August: we had a termidor on 21 August.
Over ten years of Russian reforms we have had seven prime ministers
who were all members of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union or representatives of the KGB. Phase
B. We had a president who was a member of the Politbureau of the
Communist Party. Now we have a president who represents another
sister institution of the Communist Party, as you know well. This
"termidor" - this very important issue - was the one
thing that all the crowds of consultants didn't understand. They
came to Russia, as if Russia had already been transformed into
Switzerland. They thought that everything happened in one day,
when Yeltsin climbed on top of a tank and made a speech from the
tank and the next day everybody thought all over the world that
everything had been done, finished after eighty years of communism,
even though it was the same mentality and same people in the offices.
They only changed the portraits, changed their jackets and changed
the words about a five-year plan, Lenin or whatever on democracy,
privatisation, liberalisation. Some of them learnt it in English
and that was key for consultants, as the consultants were paid
by their own countries. So they have a very important role to
consume the salaries they receive. But speaking seriously, I want
to express on behalf of the Russian people my gratitude to everybody
who has tried sincerely to help my country. And I will never forget
this fact and my people will never forget the efforts made by
governments and different institutions to help. But as a result
the major consultants didn't understand what had happened in Russia.
Let me offer one more conclusion. The mentality of the people
- who were not really devoted to democracy - and values were perpendicular
to the developments of the country itself. Russia paid an enormous
price over ten years, owing to the mentality of our prime ministers
and presidents and leaders. Russia waged two wars, one of which
is still under way. We have two economic crises and two defaults:
one was enormous in 1998. We faced inflation in 1992, which amounted
to 2,600%, where we have almost witnessed the beginning of a civil
war in 1993. That was the price that we had to pay. Something
very painful happened at the end of the 1990s. The people's energy
for reforms disappeared. This was really very unfortunate. Consequently
it proved so simple to transfer power to Mr. Putin. And that is
why it was so difficult to fight him during the presidential elections.
I was in this room on 11 September last year. I may have made
my first speech after this event in the seminar. During this speech
I asked - what is going on in Russia? I talked about management
of democracy, the Potemkin village of Russian democracy, about
the situation with the media, manipulation of the elections, the
situation in the legal system, when it is not at all independent
and is used as a political tool to fight your competitors. At
this time Russia's foreign policy was to put it mildly rather
strange. You may recall the visit of a president of North Korea
to Russia, who was travelling through Russia on a bullet-proof
train for two months. There were the visits of the leaders of
Libya or invitations to Belarus and also to Russia, the visit
to Cuba: this was a very strange period of time. So on 11 September
last year it was almost difficult to see any light at the end
of this tunnel? I have a feeling that the situation was moving
into a difficult period. What has happened since then? What has
happened over the past six months? This is what I want to share
with you. Most unexpectedly, on 11 September, while I was here
and President Putin was able to find President Bush, he called
him and supported him. On 24 September, he organised a special
meeting among the leading politicians of Russia. There were 21
people in the room. And he asked for everybody's opinions on Russia's
next moves. He received the following response. One individual
said that Russia should provide military support for the Taliban:
18 people of the 21 said that Russia should remain neutral and
not allow anybody to use Russian possibilities for a coalition.
Only two politicians said that it was necessary to support the
United States and the anti-terrorism coalition immediately and
unconditionally. Putin took his own decision. His decision was,
as you well know, to be a part of this coalition and to take a
real step forward to support this fight. He had very serious practical
reasons for doing so. People interested in politics know that
the Russian Security Council announced in the middle of the summer
in 2000 that Russia was prepared to launch a military onslaught
on Afghanistan, as the camps of the El Qaida were preparing the
terrorists for the war in the Northern Caucasus. So it was the
first time in history when Russia was able to use somebody's force
and ability to resolve Russia's security problems. This had never
happened before. Russia was used many times in history, but never
was able to use anybody for that. So it was a very smart move
by Putin, although he had no political support in his inner circle.
However, later on it became clear that he was looking not only
for tactical alliances, but also for alliances which can be similar
to the alliance in the Second World War, that he was looking for
something more strategic. It was a real surprise in Russia that
Putin was making a real step in that direction. What was the main
problem which was also never recognised by the consultants, but
was discussed on many occasions by the Bertelsmann Foundation?
Russia was always viewed by the West as a very strange country
with people who were not ready prepared for democracy and for
a market economy. And the main task was to have a friend in the
Kremlin. So the policy of the West was always based on personal
relations. If you have a good personal relation with Yeltsin,
that is all you need in Russia. You would help Yeltsin, he would
have a strong hand and keep those Russians, who don't understand
democracy and a market economy in this strong hand. It always
felt that the West viewed Russia as a possible ally that would
be needed, but also turned away from Russia, if it was not needed
at a particular moment in time, and because it was deemed dangerous
and unpredictable: consequently it was necessary to constrain
Russia and exploit the country where necessary. Certainly, if
you look at this strategic possibility, such a view on Russia
must be overcome. It is necessary to make steps. But we have to
accept that in order to create a strategic relation with the West,
Russia has to do a lot of homework, as the domestic changes in
the country are key to strategic relations for Russia. This is
attributable to the fact that relations between Russia and the
West should not be based only on security issues, but also on
sharing common values. This is the task that Russia must accept
and recognise that today's domestic policy in Russia is unacceptable
from a democratic point of view. It is a very bad situation with
the media. It could be said that there is no freedom of speech
at the moment. There is an enormous manipulation of elections.
There is considerable manipulation of the legal system and the
courts. The war in the Northern Caucasus and in Chechnya is not
the same as developments in Afghanistan: this is a different story
by way, although there is a big terrorist element. So, without
understanding and improving such things, it will prove very difficult
to create these strategic relations. On the other hand I want
to say that the energy of the people, of the nation for these
democratic changes, was lost over the past ten years. So this
represented another lost opportunity And suddenly this opportunity
appeared. This opportunity represents a step towards the West
for Russia. It is an extremely important move for Russia today.
But in this sense it is also important for the West to recognize
some difficult things. First of all, I said that Russia is not
only one man in Kremlin.
Also Russia has the longest borders with the most unstable and
dangerous places in the world. If Russia was not strong enough
to enforce order at these borders, something terrible could happen.
Thirdly, it is necessary, finally, to say very openly and clearly
that Russia is part of Europe. Russia would be a full member of
all European institutions - security, politics, economy, military
- let's say 20 years from now. But this is the way and this is
a symbol. It must be announced today and not in a sense of Brussels
bureaucracy, but in terms of the spirit of politics, spirit of
everyday living. In that context Russia is part of Europe. So
if you take all this together, I want to say that - look around.
And after 11 September it would be clear that the world desperately
needs a new way of thinking about foreign policy. The world desperately
needs to address the core foreign policy issues in the global
system. That means that at the level of world politics it is necessary
to have a new quality of new international relations, a new quality
of international institutions and it is indicative of the bad
state of policy that at present no leading politician is formulating
any concepts here - this is an open way forward. Look! New quality,
I mean there must be something different in international relations
than NATO. And something very different from old fashioned treaties
on the nuclear weapons, which we had last century. There must
be a different kind of relation, because we need to resolve new
problems. What am I talking about? I am talking about the steps
taken by Russia to create the opportunity for a real political
and military alliance with the West as soon as possible. Not to
sit and discuss problems based on 19 plus one or something similar,
which is reminiscent of saying something, when you have nothing
to say. But it must be a qualitatively new kind of relations.
It would be interesting to know if there are real preconditions
for such things. And here I would say - look at the real political
picture. Russia is giving very clear signals that it is prepared
for that. All of a sudden Putin saw a problem with military bases
in Cuba and Vietnam. He was not even asked about this issue. It
was a clear message. Then there was a very reserved and limited
reaction from the President of Russia on the steps to be taken
by the United States on withdrawing from the 1972 ABM treaty.
Then the president of United States declared that Latvia would
join NATO. There was no hysteria in Moscow, there were no tough
words, there was a very limited reaction. Putin said publicly
that we oppose this move, but this is not a big deal. And he said
privately that he saw no problem. We saw what happened in September.
More members in NATO, more mess. Don't worry. Next step, next
step. United States declared that it would store nuclear warheads,
and not destroy them. In plain Russian language that means that
Russia is an enemy, as only Russia needs as many warheads as the
United States. Okay. There was a very muted reaction from Moscow:
Moscow said - this is intellectually wrong. We are going to discuss
this issue and will involve our partners in finding the solutions
required in this area. It will be far too dangerous for everybody
if we store all our nuclear warheads. Isn't that clear? Let us
turn to Georgia. The Russian political elite became almost hysterical
about the Georgian issue, when America said - we are going to
be in Georgia to train Georgians and so. Once again, this is a
very reasonable and smart reaction of the president who said that
this would be helpful, adding that if they are ready to fight
the terrorists there, we are happy with this. No problem with
this. And finally, let me repeat again that a year ago, in other
words half a year before 11 September, Mr. Putin presented Mr.
Robertson, the Secretary-General of NATO, with Russian proposals
on creating a Russian-European, Russian-European tactical anti-ballistic
defence system. So, he offered in his proposals the possibility
of using Russian territory, Russian military technologies and
Russian military abilities. Step by step Russia is providing such
signals. The question is: are any politicians listening? How long
can we continue in this direction? And what should the response
be? Over recent months we can see some response: the statement
by Mr. Powell that United States is ready to sign a mandatory
treaty on nuclear warheads and a statement from his deputy in
Moscow, about the possibility of a strategic partnership with
Russia. The last step from the United States was a very friendly
step: that Radio Liberty would not make presentations or programs
in Chechen, which was very, very sensitive issue. They were prepared
- you may not even know this fact - Radio Liberty, the radio of
America's Congress - they were prepared to make programs in Chechen.
That was extremely sensitive in Moscow. For many reasons, there
is a big question - what can you explain in this language, but
this is a different matter, it was a symbolic issue. Two weeks
ago, America stated that would do this now. So, just take a look.
Two very big countries are moving to meet each other and there
is still a possibility. Why am I talking about this right now?
I am speaking about this owing to the visit of Mr. Bush. As we
are talking about the consequences of 11 September, there will
be a visit at the end of May to Moscow. And the question is whether
the two presidents will be ready to do anything substantial. Whether
they are prepared to sign a treaty, which would at the very least
open the way to create a political and military new kind of quality,
a qualitatively new international institution in this area, not
NATO and not simply counting the nukes. This will be something
that is slightly different. Certainly, it would be difficult,
because it is very complicated for Western countries to assume
such risks. It is very complicated to provide such guarantees
to Russia. But this is a challenge. This is a difficult challenge,
as there are new challenges in general, there are new challenges
for the United States and new challenges for Russia. I think that
the main challenge to the United States at present is that the
United States is so strong. It is extremely strong, it is number
one, number two, number three, number four and number ten, and
maybe number eleven in all areas. And all the others come next.
In military, political and economic terms, it is very difficult
not to be arrogant in such a situation. And it is very difficult
to create a new framework for operations internationally, when
you feel that you are the senior partner. It is also a big challenge
for Russia: if the arrogance of power is a problem for the United
States, unpredictability is the big problem for Russia. As you
know, we also find domestic policy to be quite a challenge. And
the Russian political elite find it a big problem to be a junior
partner, maybe for the first time in many centuries. It is not
easy. So it is necessary to establish a new framework, which would
be based not only on security issues, but also on values. And
this is a very important moment. I also want to say that in terms
of personality problems, if you look and compare the two presidents,
the President of Russia and President of the United States, you
will see a lot of similarities. Both of them are based on an idea
of security and order. Both of them use war as a way of consolidating
society. Both of them never expected to be a president from the
very outset. Both of them prefer to avoid real solutions to the
major problems through consolidation and securities issues. So
there are some different difficulties. In Russia newspapers sometimes
joke that Bush and Putin were brought to office by their families,
Mr. Bush by his own family, Mr. Putin by the political family
of Mr. Yeltsin. So it will prove difficult to hold a discussion
in such a situation owing to reactions of the Russian and American
political elites. But look at the world map and the world of politics.
We have a lot of problems, which will never be solved without
this alliance. Let me name some of them. Balkans, Middle East,
India/Pakistan, Taiwan, Poland, the situation in Central Asia,
Caucasus, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, non-proliferation, ecology,
drug traffic, crimes. Without cooperation none of these problems
can be resolved, whether we are a difficult partner or easy partner,
whether the presidents are prepared or not. So this is the challenge
of recent politics. Tomorrow I will share some of my views with
you. I will make a speech tomorrow on European policy in this
context. However, today I will talk on only these two major issues.
In my opinion one major issue is related to our discussions here
half a year ago and now. Let me give you a formula, which I believe
in 100% - the stronger Russia is, less potential there is for
terrorism in the world. The weaker Russia is, the more terrorism
in the world. This is simply a law. It happens. So we are the
weakest chain and are squeezing terroristic forces from all other
countries: they may all be collected in our country, as we are
weakest chain and have everything they want. So all these factors
make me feel that we will face an extremely difficult situation,
if the presidents simply count the nuclear warheads, speak about
minor matters or make a declaration about a new era and new age,
but there is no real cooperation. Let me make two final observations.
This represents one of the main opportunities for Russia to come
back to real reforms. I am not only speaking about these opportunities
as they are very important for the world. That goes without saying.
I am referring to the energy which can come from Russia. The Russian
internal situation would change radically, if my political opponent,
Mr. Putin were to shake the West's hand. Let me make one final
observation. The role of Europe in this process can be extremely
important, especially, the role of Great Britain and Germany.
And I think this is one of the important issues for discussion
and for the possibilities of the Bertelsmann Foundation in the
near future. Thank you very much.
See also:
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
and
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/newsletter
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