2023 

When my article “Just Stop!”, in which I called for an immediate ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine, was published at the start of February 2023 on the pages of Novaya Rasskaz-Gazeta (and here one should pay credit to the boldness and farsightedness of the publication’s editor), the publication and I were hit not by a wave of criticism, but rather by a tsunami of degrading calumny. All manner of accusations were hurled by advocates of the continued killing of Ukrainian and Russian citizens: I was accused simultaneously of working as an agent for the Kremlin and aiding and abetting the Ukrainian authorities.  It is notable that the overwhelming majority of the critics who demanded “victory on the battlefield” were themselves some thousands of kilometres away from the front line.

Two years have passed, and the topic of a ceasefire has not simply entered the mainstream: it has become the only issue that is being discussed seriously at all levels as the way to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Now literally everyone is talking about the need for a ceasefire, both in Russia, Ukraine, the United States of America and the European Union.  It is another matter that every single party is putting forward their own conditions for a ceasefire — some of them are more realistic, other less so, while still others are utopian.

However, after three years of military actions, finally people — albeit far from everyone — have all the same started to realise: this confrontation cannot be resolved on the battlefield. This was already clear in the autumn-winter of 2022. Furthermore, it was evident not only from a humanitarian and political standpoint, but also from a military and technical perspective.  And this understanding should have been communicated to everyone. In order to get through to people and open their eyes to the ultimate tragedy of what was happening and relay this message to the political leadership, all that needed to be done was to stop fudging the issue and instead support the only possible first step to the resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict — an immediate ceasefire agreement.

How many thousands of lives have been lost due to the refusal to even countenance an end to the military actions two years ago? How many cities and villages have been destroyed during this time? How many millions of lives have been mutilated owing to calls to continue the fighting?

In my article at the very start of February 2023 I wrote:

“Continuation of the military actions in any form — via offensive or positional warfare — will not yield any positive outcome either for Russia or Ukraine, or for Western countries.  Any continuation is an endless and irreparable tragedy. The dream of some people — to end the dispute once and for all “on the battlefield” — is not possible. Nothing will stop Putin’s regime. Russia will not become powerless as a result of this war. It will remain one of the two biggest nuclear powers in the world. However, it is entirely possible to deprive Ukraine of its future. Such an escalation must be prevented.”

“If everything continues in the current vein, — I stressed in the original article  — as the magnitude of the destruction increases, there will be an inevitable decline in the flow of foreign assistance to Ukraine, which appears unlimited at present.” And it had already become clear by summer 2023 that this critical moment for Ukraine would come any time soon. This understanding was merely reinforced by expectations that Donald Trump might return as the President of the United States of America.

The impossibility of either party to achieve a military victory was also declared in November 2022 by General Mark Milley himself, who was at the time Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Milley said live on air to CNN on 16 November 2022: “When there’s an opportunity to negotiate, when peace can be achieved, seize it.” He noted that “military victory is probably — in the true sense of the world — is maybe not achievable through military means, and therefore you have to turn to other means.”

The process of stopping military actions could and should have been launched in autumn 2022 — winter 2023. It is not hard to guess why this was the best time — one merely needs to sufficient to recall what happened on the front line in the Kherson, Mykolaiv and Kharkiv Regions.

The moment that was missed two years ago became the geopolitical crossroads.

At the start of 2023 any negotiations on a subsequent settlement of the conflict after a ceasefire would have been conducted, proceeding from realities that are completely different to the ones that exist today. A “Just Peace”, something that the Ukrainian authorities talk about so frequently today, was far closer back then.

If the military actions had ceased in Ukraine in 2023, this might also have had a positive impact on the European economy, while the political landscape of contemporary Europe might also look slightly different today.

However, now we are observing a completely different picture. Notwithstanding the dilettante forecasts and expectations, for the time being the Russian economy has stood its ground, coping with the numerous Western sanctions packages. The Russian army is advancing slowly, but is still advancing, and is continuing military actions. At the same time, leading European countries are facing serious political and economic problems, which have also been exacerbated by the policy of the new US administration which is confrontational towards the European Union.

It is a well-known fact that there are no ifs in history, but it is highly likely that the situation in the European Union today would be more positive if it had managed to stop the biggest military European conflict to happen since 1945.

And we should also recall here missed opportunities. At the end of October 2023 I met in the Kremlin with President Putin. It goes without saying that I articulated in detail my position on the need for a ceasefire to the President. Putin listened attentively, but did not respond to my proposal. However, in February 2024 the news agency Reuters, citing its sources, reported that

at the end of 2023 — start of 2024: “Russian President Vladimir Putin’s suggestion of a ceasefire in Ukraine to freeze the war was rejected by the United States after contacts between intermediaries.”

According to Reuters, the Russian President let the United States know publicly and privately that he was ready to consider the issue of a ceasefire in Ukraine. However, Reuters wrote:  “the Americans told Moscow, via the intermediaries, they would not discuss a possible ceasefire without the participation of Ukraine and so the contacts ended in failure.” In other words, the USA rejected the Russian proposal.

Another year has passed since then. Historians will tot up how many lives this refusal cost.

 

TRUMP

It has to be acknowledged that the return of Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025 has played a defining role in the political processes that we have been observing recently. For the time being his intentions to end the wars in the Middle East and in Ukraine as quickly as possible have only been reflected in high-profile and ambiguous statements.

However, we have also seen some practical steps: it goes without saying that the official meetings of the Russian and American delegations in Saudi Arabia and Turkey represent the direct result of the policies of the new American administration. For the time being, in words at least, Trump has embarked on a course of rapprochement with Russia: statements have been made on the restoration of relations, the possible lifting of sanctions and future cooperation. Against the backdrop of intense competition with China and the escalating confrontation with Europe, Russia could become a key partner for Trump.

Trump’s approach to the policy is reminiscent of business: the key here is the benefit and income. As a rule, Trump is appointing as his negotiators prominent businessmen capable of conducting harsh business negotiations and concluding good deals. The word “deal” is key in the political lexicon of the new US President. For example, what is particularly notable in the Trump era and what is indicative of this new global political reality?

Namely, that the key values of human life, rights and freedoms, dignity and respect are no longer priorities in today’s politics.

In the situation with Ukraine Trump is also starting from the perspective of concluding  a deal — a pragmatic one which is beneficial in his opinion to the corporation known as the United States of America. And even though Trump himself frequently talks about the vast number of human lives lost — both Russian and Ukrainian — his political business model does not imply wars and the loss of human lives, first and foremost, because this is not practical, and not because this is inhumane. That is why the politics may differ, but Trump has a business plan where Ukraine is merely one of the sub-points.

In actual fact, it was already clear in summer 2021 that Ukraine was only the battlefield for confrontation between Russia and the West (I literally talked about this in an interview in July 2021). And this conflict could not be resolved without the direct participation of Western countries. However, neither the USA, nor European countries, were able to understand and assess the real threats back then and would not have been able to engage in political dialogue with Russia. And everything continued in this vein until recently. That is why the attempts to establish contacts between Trump and Putin must be welcomed.

There is no political alternative to the establishment of dialogue between the leaders of the two biggest nuclear powers which were recently just one step away from direct military confrontation. Yes, there is a great deal about these leaders that we know and understand, but no alternatives are available at present. Moreover, if we are talking in general about today’s international leaders, in recent decades, at the same time as the development of information technologies and the increase in the political ochlocracy, not only have Putin and Trump ascended to the pinnacle of power: so too have Xi Jinping in China — a harsh authoritarian leader in a country with exceptionally wide-ranging opportunities, Narendra Modi in India — ideologist of a specific form of Hindu nationalism and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey — an individual who has transformed the system of power in the country into his own personal fiefdom. For the time being there is no convincing answer to the question as to the long-term prospects of such systems and such leadership by virtue of the complexity and contradictory nature of the topic.

And there is another issue that it is important to understand when it comes to US politics.

Whoever holds sway in the White House — republicans or democrats, Trump himself or his successor — when it comes to foreign policy, Americans do as a rule only what is “understandable and beneficial” to them.

Nicholas Brady, United States Secretary of the Treasury under George H.W. Bush, admitted to me that this was the case in October 1991.  We had this conversation in Bangkok where I was representing the USSR and Russia as the head of the delegation at a meeting with the IMF and the World Bank. My conversation with the US Secretary of the Treasury continued for almost the whole night. Brady asked me about the Russian economy and its prospects. And when we parted, Brady told me: “Bear in mind, the USA only does what it understands and what is beneficial for us. We don’t understand what is going on in your country and we will do what we believe to be beneficial for us.” This is the reason why the United States stopped supporting USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev at a time when he had been counting on the country’s help. Virtually the same thing happened to the economic reforms in Russia at the start of the 1990s: the US administration was positive about the “500 Days” programme and discussed its implementation at the highest level.  However, in the end the US administration imposed a different programme on Russia — the one that they “could understand” and the one that they considered beneficial specifically for the USA, as was clarified  recently. So Boris Yeltsin and Egor Gaidar implemented in Russia the IMF programme which led to hyperinflation of 2,600% (this was followed by the criminal privatisation and everything else which has led to where we are today).

Incidentally, the Americans have also been behaving in virtually the same way with the President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelenskyy: they promised to support him “as much as necessary”, then gradually reduced the aid materially in different forms (and after the public spat between Zelenskyy and Trump in the White House, America even stopped the aid and was ready to break off all relations). And this does not even have anything to do with Trump — American aid started to contract under President Biden. This is how American politics is structured. And this is not a complaint about America — this is just how Americans see the world.  You simply need to grasp what politics actually entail and national specifics to avoid making mistakes.

 

MUNICH

In February 2025, at the end of the third year of full-scale military actions in Ukraine, a landmark event occurred in the centre of Europe. At the Munich Security Conference the leaders of Western countries to all intents and purposes refused to discuss the issue of a ceasefire in the war between Russia and Ukraine, thereby demonstrating not simply that they had underestimated the ongoing tragedy, but also that they had no understanding whatsoever of the prospects and helplessness of European politics before escalating threats:

instead of seeking a way to stop the war, the leaders of European countries engaged in discussions amongst themselves, proceeding from the premise that it should continue.

Yes, when it comes to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, everyone understands who started it — there are different opinions as to the underlying causes of the conflict and who is right and who is wrong.  It goes without saying that this is all important and will be analysed for many years to come. However, now we should focus first and foremost on the need for a ceasefire as soon as possible, in order to stop the continuing loss of lives.

I sent officially my considerations on a plan to achieve a ceasefire in Ukraine to the participants of the Munich Security Conference on 14 February 2025. In this plan, I proposed that they start this work, proceeding from three underlying recommendations:

  1. A ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine, with the creation of incentives for both sides to observe the ceasefire, an agreement on the exchange of all prisoners and an initial project of a demilitarised zone with clear borders;
  2. Post-war security guarantees for both Ukraine and Russia;
  3. New concept and measures to stabilise Russian-Western relations.

Unfortunately, in Munich the participants focused instead on making empty declarations, arguing, raising grievances and squabbling. However, there is no escape from a ceasefire, and these recommendations or others with a similar meaning must become key not only as we embark on the path to achieving peace in Ukraine, but also central to the creation of a new security system throughout Europe. It is hard to even call the perverse views of a number of today’s European leaders that a continuation of the fighting in Ukraine is good for Europe stupid. For example, the Prime Minister of Denmark Mette Frederiksen, after arriving in Kyiv on 24 February this year, went so far as to declare that “peace in Ukraine could actually be more dangerous than war”. Such a position reeks of criminal political irresponsibility and this concerns not only the individuals at the frontline and in the rear dying every hour and every day, this is also irresponsible in respect of European citizens, who are thereby being gradually, but irreversibly drawn into a real war.

Why must everything start with a ceasefire? Because this is the only way to bring a halt to the loss of lives. And also because serious negotiations even about a truce, let alone peace, are impossible if the fighting continues.

In actual fact, one should consider the growing tension in the relations between Russia and the West and the position adopted by Russia as evidence of the impending danger that has existed since the mid 2000s and respond appropriately. This reaction must be based on an understanding that after the collapse of the USSR all the reforms failed in Russia and to all intents and purposes a system was formed, which practically inevitably led to instability, chaos and aggression.  Accordingly, the prevention of armed conflict should have become the underlying principle governing relations between the West and Russia. In February 2001 Putin made an official proposal on the creation of a joint Russian-European anti-missile defence system. Given the reality of the situation, it should have been the goal of Western diplomacy in respect of Russia to respond to Putin’s proposal and start a dialogue. In addition, after Putin expressed in 2007 at the Munich Security Conference his categorical disagreement with NATO’s expansion to the east, the West should have discussed these topics with Russia. Similarly the Minsk Accords of 2014-2015 should not have been drafted in a rush — as a result, subsequently they were not implemented, and everyone acknowledged that it was all a fake (see Angela Merkel’s recollections).

Recently, throughout 2021, the Kremlin stated that the deployment of NATO forces in Ukraine was inadmissible. And here it was also vital that the West start holding extensive negotiations on this matter. That is why diplomacy exists. However, Western leaders did not pay attention either back then or subsequently to developments and refused to engage in substantive political dialogue either out of arrogance or stupidity. The West decided instead to respond to the Kremlin’s politics by mirroring their confrontational nature, escalating the conflict and purporting to exert pressure. Everybody knows what happened as a result.

The issue is not who is right or who is guilty, but that one must know first and foremost how to make sure that a war doesn’t happen. True justice against the backdrop of a nuclear threat is to prevent the outbreak of a war and the killing of people.

It would not be advisable to draw parallels with Munich 1938. At the time, the real threat of the use of nuclear weapons did not hang over the world as they simply did not exist back then. However, now we have to adopt a fundamentally different approach, for if we fail, we will no longer be able to correct anything.

Over the past 20 years we have witnessed the utter failure of Western diplomacy and politics. Today it should already be crystal clear to everybody that the European security system created after the end of World War II is no longer functional. And now the reality is such that the establishment of a new security system in Europe will be contingent on the following discussion:

  • The refusal of NATO to admit Ukraine and Georgia and a ban on the deployment of NATO troops in these countries;
  • Security along the entire contact line (2,600 kilometres) between Russia and NATO countries;
  • The balance of conventional armed forces in Europe and control of long and medium-range missiles on the continent;
  • The new deployment of weapons (including nuclear weapons) and military bases in Eastern Europe;
  • Admissible forms of and approaches to containment in order to prevent future conflicts;
  • The security and rules governing navigation in the Baltic, Black and Azov Seas.

It is clear that all the parties involved should participate in the discussion of all these issues — Russia, the USA, all the European countries, including Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Belarus. It is also clear that these discussions will take more than one year.

 

PROSPECTS

If we are talking about what is most important in our lives and politics today — naturally this is a ceasefire. The USA managed by mid-March 2025 to literally strongarm Ukraine’s leadership and secure a formal declaration on the country’s readiness to agree to a 30-day ceasefire.

The Ukrainian authorities would like some real weighty security guarantees and economic support at the very least in some perspective. Nobody intends to give Ukraine anything of the kind: the Americans don’t want to, while Europeans acting on their own in the coming years can hardly offer anything militarily.

For the time being Russia has not said it won’t agree to a ceasefire or 30 days. At the same time, Putin has declared that certain “nuances” must be discussed. It is unclear how long such a discussion will take and what will be resolved in actual fact. The crux of the matter is that unless there is a clearcut and understandable immediate ceasefire agreement, the fighting cannot end until Ukraine’s total and definitive defeat.

During this period the number of dead and wounded would increase even more, the emigration of millions of Ukrainians would continue and the economic devastation would  be exacerbated. And in this case the ceasefire would happen after the actual defeat of one side and such a ceasefire would have a completely different meaning.

Are they any scenarios other than a ceasefire? There are. The Europeans manage to persuade the USA to continue helping Ukraine with them. The fighting would drag on  for years.  Russia will not weaken critically over the next few years and the Kremlin will not be stopped by any problems that arise. The Russian army would try to advance gradually and grab more and more territory: for example, enter Kherson again and then Mykolaiv and Odessa and separate Ukraine from the Black Sea. And Western military and financial aid would no longer be of assistance to the Ukrainians, because Ukraine would be utterly exhausted, while the human resources available in the country would be exhausted. Moreover, the conscription of 18-year old boys to the front line and much else besides would attest to this fact and the matter would no longer concern only weapons and money.

In other words, the result would be virtually the same as in the previous scenario — a ceasefire, but it would happen far later and result in far greater losses and destruction. And here a major issue is the form in which the Ukrainian state would be preserved.

There is also the extremely unlikely scenario of the direct participation of NATO countries and the USA in the fighting in Ukraine. However, this would rapidly lead to a nuclear war.  There is nothing to discuss here. The Europeans and Americans are well aware of this fact and would not even contemplate such an option.

Consequently, today, as was the case in the past, an immediate ceasefire is the only correct and real solution in the current situation. As I noted earlier, if the ceasefire had happened in autumn-winter 2022/23, this would have made it possible to preserve Ukraine as much as possible — both politically, economically and a sovereign nation.  Now, we are talking about Ukraine’s survival in principle. There is already nothing to add here: an immediate ceasefire is required, followed by protracted and complicated negotiations on the future.

One could object that the ceasefire might turn out to be only temporary and that the fighting might resume with even greater intensity. Yes, that is also probable.  And that is not the only probability.  And if one were to consider serious political issues, instead of engaging in tragicomic online verbiage, then one should proceed for a start in the current circumstances on the likelihood that the most disturbing and truly dangerous scenarios might occur.

For example, in the case of Russia this might also be the tension arising after the inevitable demobilisation of tens of thousands of participants in the fighting,  and  ethnic and inter-religious conflicts, and rising crime after three years of the special military operation, and economic problems, in particular, related to the de-privatisation being implemented at present, and considerable other concerns and dangers. We will not list here the possible domestic and foreign problems facing Ukraine …

All these real and very serious dangers, including the resumption of combat operations after the ceasefire, may in principle only be overcome if the politicians adopting decisions and a significant proportion of the public have an understanding of the desired outcome.

In this sense today there is one positive scenario of the future both for Russia and Ukraine and for Europe as a whole. While it appears highly unlikely today, it is in actual fact the only real option. Let us recall the start of the 1980s — the war in Afghanistan, a Boeing South Korean passenger aircraft was shot down, the chairman of the KGB Andropov came to power in the USSR,  the police would stop people in the street, demand their passports and ask them why they were not at work… … Could anyone have imagined back then the changes, the freedom that Gorbachev’s perestroika would bring within a few years? And why did this happen? Because it was understandable what one should strive for.

First and foremost, the goal of building a fundamentally new policy between Russia and Europe is necessary today. The last 35 years have demonstrated that the existing political model for relations between Russia and the West requires radical revisions: the two sides must enter into serious and in-depth dialogue, develop and implement a totally different form of politics. What type?

In 2021 I wrote in an article entitled “On the Historical Future of Russia and Ukraine”:

“The crux of this time is that as Ukraine recognises itself to be (and de facto is) a European state seeking to become part of the European Union, the issues of Russian-Ukrainian relations transcend bilateral frameworks. To all intents and purposes, this refers not only and not so much to Russia’s relations with Ukraine as to the problem of Russia’s relations with Europe. For Russia-European integration offers a solution not only to the problem of relations between Russia and Ukraine, but also provides a path to a safe and prosperous future for Russia itself and for Belarus.”

Since summer 2021 a number of windows of opportunity have slammed shut, some of them forever. However, the crux of the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine concerns to a significant degree the problems of relations between Russia and the West. After the ceasefire, a route to the gradual restoration of the Russian-European dialogue will appear. The next step might be the gradual revival of Russian-Ukrainian relations. The launch of these processes — Russian-European and Russian-Ukrainian dialogues — will also have a positive impact on democratic changes within Russia. It is namely this sequence of the events — the ceasefire and dialogue with the USA, the European Union and Ukraine — which will preserve the chances for political change for the better.

At the same time, the isolationism of the new US President might soon acquire different practical forms, and in that case the decrease in America’s presence on European markets would objectively lead Europe to turn to Russia. This would likewise create opportunities to start establishing a real Eurasian project. Incidentally, this Eurasian context serves as the underlying objectively realistic path — and therefore the only true path — for the future of Ukraine as an independent and sovereign European state.

The only substantive and serious way of structuring Russia’s relations with a sovereign and independent Ukraine is to proceed towards the integration of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia with Europe. It is only the real immersion of Russia in the European context that will enable our country to embark on the path to freedom, human rights, an independent judiciary, honest and transparent elections, the inviolability of private property, etc. You might quite rightly object: look at Europe, it also has enough problems of its own. Yes, that is undoubtedly the case,

but Russia has no positive development path other than Europe. Russia is also Europe, although politically at present specifically its eastern part.

Consequently, if there is no European integration of Russia and if there is no construction of a joint Russian-European system of law, economy and security, which is relevant for the second half of the 21st century and complies with the new realities and digital technologies and also takes account of the interests of all European countries — if this does not happen, then a normal Russian future, and also it is important to note here, a normal European future, is impossible.

There are also historical examples. In 1951, only six years after the end of a monstrous war, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, notwithstanding their numerous differences, signed the treaty on the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, thereby laying the foundations for the future European Union. Politicians, who had survived the destructive disaster of World War II, understood: a new war could only be avoided by creating common rules for living and common values.

European politics are gradually coming around to this understanding. In this sense, the recent declaration of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte is very telling. He advocated the normalisation of relations with Russia after the end of the war in Ukraine. Rutte declared in an interview to Bloomberg TV: “Longer term Russia is there. I mean, Russia will not go back. And I think that is normal if the war would have stopped or Europe to somehow group step by step and also for the US step to be step to restore normal relations with the Russians”.

It is clear that in the case of Russia’s problems, we will have to undergo in Russia protracted and extremely hard work. However, new objective and very material circumstances have appeared. Now it is critically important to consider the role that new technologies are playing and will play in particular in the changing political realities. The appearance in big politics of such individuals as the US Vice President J.D. Vance (and he is the protégé of Peter Thiel, Californian billionaire and co-founder of PayPal) or Ilon Musk (incidentally, he recently called Vance the “future President of the United States”), is no accident, and reflects the trend where these new technologies interfere in our lives.

It is specifically Thiel who said that freedom and democracy were incompatible. Thiel believes that online technologies will already be able to change in the near future the existing social and political structure of a modern state. Such statements by the new oligarchy represent dangers and threats for most of mankind who may end up in virtual slavery to the individuals who control the new technologies and digital structures. There are real risks that human values may be crushed by the new technologies.

Consequently, if there are no fundamentally new political transformations in Russia which comply with the 21st century and are capable of responding to the challenges, in light of the impending confrontation between freedom and democracy, human rights and modern   information technologies (including artificial intelligence), one should not expect any political normalisation either in our country, or in Ukraine or Europe.

It is hard to estimate how slowly, or on the contrary, how rapidly these processes take. However, in the context of two-three decades, it would be advisable to talk about the unconditional subordination of the new technologies to human values, and not vice-versa, and   on the need to create a fundamentally new European integration of the 21st century — from Lisbon to Vladivostok.