MK, 9.02.2026

Photo: Alexei Arbatov / Photo by the Yabloko Press Service

On 5 February, the New START Treaty expired – the last remaining agreement between Russia and the United States that had limited strategic offensive weapons. Shortly afterwards, US President Donald Trump expressed support for the idea of concluding a new, more modern agreement, noting the need to revise the terms and involve other nuclear powers.

The Russian side had earlier proposed extending the existing limitations for at least a year, emphasising the importance of preserving mechanisms of strategic stability. However, the parties continue to have differences in their approaches – including on the question of third countries’ participation and the scope of future limitations.

MK spoke with Acad. Alexei Arbatov, Director of the Centre for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences and member of Yabloko’s Federal Political Committee, about possible variants of the negotiation process, the difficulties connected with it, and ways out of the current legal vacuum.

MK: Both Russia and the US have already made quite optimistic statements regarding the development of a new agreement. At the same time, it has been noted that the main condition from the US side is China’s participation in the treaty, whilst for Russia the participation of France and Britain is important. Meanwhile, China and France themselves have already made it clear that they will not participate in the process. Can one say that the stated approaches will inevitably lead negotiations on an agreement into a dead end?

Alexei Arbatov: Well, one cannot say that in advance, because these are the most general positions. As far as I know, specific negotiations between Russia and the US on a new agreement have not begun; it has only been said that the parties are striving for this. Of course, the US is raising the question of China, Russia is raising the question of Great Britain and France. But this does not mean that they must participate directly in the negotiations.

Russia and the US will develop some other, more complex formulae for involving these countries. For example, the United States could determine a position on bilateral negotiations with China, in which both Russia’s position and China’s position would be certainly taken into account. It is not necessary to limit all strategic forces immediately.

When negotiations between the Soviet Union and the US began in 1969, they did not cover all strategic forces either. They then related only to those types of weapons that could be included in the negotiation process. The Americans and Chinese could use this approach as well.

The same applies to Great Britain and France. They will not participate directly in the negotiations between Russia and the US, but Russia must work out a definite formula for negotiations with these two European countries. One should proceed from the same principle that it is possible to agree to cover initially only part of the strategic forces with limitations – that which can be controlled, that which is of greatest interest and can be limited.

In other words, negotiations in a five-party format are unambiguously impossible. Great Britain and France have nothing to discuss with the US. Russia and China also have nothing to discuss here. We are not opponents in a system of mutual nuclear deterrence relations. But to conduct these negotiations in an expanded format through several channels is probably possible.

One simply needs to think seriously about this, rather than try to find simple schemes. Because third nuclear powers, such as France, Great Britain and China, will naturally pose the question in such a way: “Reduce to our level, then we shall agree on equal limitations.” Will Russia and the US accept this? Of course not. But they have their own logic in this. If we tell these countries: “Look, let us fix you, freeze you at your lower level, whilst we ourselves shall be limited at a much higher level,” then they will refuse.

MK: Another question on the deadlock. Donald Trump, speaking about why a new treaty is needed, mentioned that the previous one had largely failed to be implemented, that there had been almost some kind of deception and so on. It is clear that this is not self-criticism by the US President. And if so, is there not a deliberate discrediting of Russia as a partner in this?

Alexei Arbatov: No. Donald Trump simply understands all this very poorly; he has some very approximate ideas about the subject. He probably meant that after Russia had suspended its participation in New START for well-known reasons in 2023, the exchange of information, on-site inspections and other control measures had ceased to operate.

This had happened, certainly, not in accordance with the articles of the treaty, but this did not mean that someone had been violating it. We simply could no longer control, using those measures that had been provided for by the treaty, many of the most important parameters, for example the number of nuclear warheads on missiles. But Trump was told that Russia had refused control and had thereby violated the treaty as well. And he picked this up, like a magpie picking up silver foil, and carried it off, saying that Russia had been violating.

Well, this is Donald Trump; we ought to have become accustomed over a year to his distinctive manner of conducting foreign policy at press conferences and conducting negotiations without leaving the White House.

MK: If Trump, as some commentators believe, is really rigidly focused on ensuring US superiority within the framework of this treaty, can this be considered a successful position for rapidly achieving mutual understanding and resolving the problem?

Alexei Arbatov: There will be no rapid resolution of the question in any case. Even besides the topic we have discussed, even if we set aside third nuclear powers, we have very large disagreements with the Americans in our initial positions even bilaterally.

We want it to be mandatory that the interrelationship of offensive and defensive systems be recorded. Donald Trump has put forward the idea of a “Golden Dome” – a space defence system which will certainly clash with this requirement of ours. We have put forward requirements that not only nuclear but also conventional weapons systems be limited, which with their range and accuracy can acquire strategic potential. Will the Americans agree to this? No, they are counting on these weapons and are investing very large amounts of money in them.

The Americans, for their part, besides China’s participation, have stated that it is necessary to take account of tactical nuclear weapons, in which Russia has a large superiority, and include these weapons within the limits of reductions. Will Russia agree to this? No, it will not agree; this has already been said. Putin expressed our attitude to these proposals, saying: “Not a chance.” So here too there are still very large disputes ahead.

As regards ensuring superiority. This is a primitive way of posing the question: “Trump wants superiority, therefore negotiations are doomed in advance”. Those who say this simply do not imagine the full complexity of this matter. We have been conducting negotiations on this issue for 50 years. At each stage, each side has tried to stipulate certain advantages for itself. There was diplomatic bargaining, and ultimately a compromise was worked out.

It is another matter that a unanimous conviction that America must deter two equal adversaries – Russia and China – has virtually developed in the US. What does this mean? That they want to have in total as much as Russia and China? Or do they want to compensate for this lag of theirs in some type of weapons that will not be covered by agreements by virtue of the fact that the US is alone whilst there are two nuclear superpowers against them?

All this is a subject for negotiations, clarifications, and elucidation of intentions. And one should not be too taken in by these first statements that we are not extending, we have refused continued observance of New START ceilings, we are beginning new negotiations and shall conclude a new treaty. This still means nothing yet.

This has simply been stated because the US refusal to extend observance of the ceilings has provoked very vigorous protest, very powerful indignation both in the US and in Europe and in third countries such as China, India and others. Even those who very much dislike Russia and speak harshly against it in the US and Europe have condemned Trump’s unwillingness to extend observance of this treaty for at least a year. So he is now trying somehow to reduce the intensity of criticism and is beginning to reassure everyone: “It doesn’t matter that we didn’t extend it; we’ll conclude an even better treaty”.

But this is the same as with Ukraine for him. Who said, “I’ll return and achieve peace within 24 hours,” or “I’ll agree on everything within a month”? Trump said this. But what do we see in reality? The same thing will happen with strategic weapons. Although all that has been said does not mean that the statement of a desire to resume negotiations and seek compromises is not a positive phenomenon.

MK: The period of work on a new treaty will be long, and nuclear powers and candidate states for this status will consequently find themselves for a lengthy period in a situation when this sphere not only will lack operating norms but even current reference points…

Alexei Arbatov: Yes, we have entered a period when we shall be conducting negotiations without having solid support in the form of an existing agreement from which one can proceed, when there are neither existing limitations nor existing control systems. We shall have to conduct negotiations in a certain strategic vacuum. This will make everything very much more difficult.

True, previously we used to begin negotiations on the next agreement even before the expiry of the current one. This helped greatly. And therefore we have concluded ten treaties since 1972, which have had an enormous positive influence both on overall strategic stability and on the state of security in the world.

True, today all this will be much more difficult, and this is bad. But what can one do? Nobody promised it would be easy; we shall have to conduct negotiations in such conditions.