Congresses and Docs

Memorandum of Political Alternative, an updated version of 1.03.2019

Memorandum of Political Alternative

YABLOKO's Ten Key Programme Issues


YABLOKO's Political Platform Adopted by the 15th Congress, June 21, 2008

The 18th Congress of YABLOKO

RUSSIA DEMANDS CHANGES! Electoral Program for 2011 Parliamentary Elections.

Key resolutions by the Congress:

On Stalinism and Bolshevism
Resolution. December 21, 2009

On Anti-Ecological Policies of Russia’s Authorities. Resolution of the 15th congress of the YABLOKO party No 253, December 24, 2009

On the Situation in the Northern Caucasus. Resolution of the 15th congress of the YABLOKO party No 252, December 24, 2009


YABLOKO’s Political Committee: Russian state acts like an irresponsible business corporation conducting anti-environmental policies


Overcoming bolshevism and stalinism as a key factor for Russia¦µ™s transformation in the 21st century


On Russia's Foreign Policies. Political Committee of hte YABLOKO party. Statement, June 26, 2009


On Iran’s Nuclear Problem Resolution by the Political Committee of the YABLOKO party. October 6, 2009


Anti-Crisis Proposals (Housing-Roads-Land) of the Russian United Democratic Party YABLOKO. Handed to President Medvedev by Sergei Mitrokhin on June 11, 2009

Brief Outline of Sergei Mitrokhin’s Report at the State Council meeting. January 22, 2010


Assessment of Russia’s Present Political System and the Principles of Its Development. Brief note for the State Council meeting (January 22, 2010) by Dr.Grigory Yavlinsky, member of YABLOKO’s Political Committee. January 22, 2010


Address of the YABLOKO party to President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev. Political Committee of the YABLOKO party. October 9, 2009


The 17th Congress of YABLOKO




The 16th Congress of Yabloko

Photo by Sergei Loktionov

The 12th congress of Yabloko

The 11th congress of Yabloko

The 10th congress of Yabloko

Moscow Yabloko
Yabloko for Students
St. Petersburg Yabloko
Khabarovsk Yabloko
Irkutsk Yabloko
Kaliningrad Yabloko(eng)
Novosibirsk Yabloko
Rostov Yabloko
Yekaterinburg Yabloko
(Sverdlovsk Region)

Krasnoyarsk Yabloko
Ulyanovsk Yabloko
Tomsk Yabloko
Tver Yabloko(eng)
Penza Yabloko
Stavropol Yabloko

Action of Support





Programme by candidate for the post of Russian President Grigory Yavlinsky. Brief Overview

My Truth

Grigory Yavlinsky at Forum 2000, Prague, 2014

YABLOKO-ALDE conference 2014

Grigory Yavlinsky : “If you show the white feather, you will get fascism”

Grigory Yavlinsky: a coup is started by idealists and controlled by rascals

The Road to Good Governance

Risks of Transitions. The Russian Experience

Grigory Yavlinsky on the Russian coup of August 1991

A Male’s Face of Russia’s Politics

Black Sea Palaces of the New Russian Nomenklatura


The Hidden Cause of the Great Recession (And How to Avert the Nest One)

by Dr. Grigory Yavlinsky

On the results of the Conference “Migration: International Experience and Russia’s Problems” conducted by the Russian United Democratic Party YABLOKO and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (the ALDE party)

Moscow, April 6, 2013

International Conference "Youth under Threat of Extremism and Xenophobia. A Liberal Response"
conducted jointly by ELDR and YABLOKO. Moscow, April 21, 2012. Speeches, videos, presentations

What does the opposition want: to win or die heroically?
Moskovsky Komsomolets web-site, July 11, 2012. Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky by Yulia Kalinina.

Building a Liberal Europe - the ALDE Project

By Sir Graham Watson

Lies and legitimacy
The founder of the Yabloko Party analyses the political situation. Article by Grigory Yavlinsky on radio Svoboda. April 6, 2011

Algorithms for Opposing Gender Discrimination: the International and the Russian Experience

YABLOKO and ELDR joint conference

Moscow, March 12, 2011

Reform or Revolution

by Vladimir Kara-Murza

Is Modernisation in Russia Possible? Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky and Boris Titov by Yury Pronko, "The Real Time" programme, Radio Finam, May 12, 2010

Grigory Yavlinsky's interview to Vladimir Pozner. The First Channel, programme "Pozner", April 20, 2010 (video and transcript)

Overcoming the Totalitarian Past: Foreign Experience and Russian Problems by Galina Mikhaleva. Research Centre for the East European Studies, Bremen, February 2010.

Grigory Yavlinsky: Vote for the people you know, people you can turn for help. Grigory Yavlinsky’s interview to the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper, October 8, 2009

Grigory Yavlinsky: no discords in the tandem. Grigory Yavlinsky’s interview to the Radio Liberty
September 22, 2009

A Credit for Half a Century. Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky by Natalia Bekhtereva, Radio Russia, June 15, 2009

Sergei Mitrokhin's Speech at the meeting with US Preseident Barack Obama. Key Notes, Moscow, July 7, 2009

Mitrokhin proposed a visa-free regime between Russia and EU at the European liberal leaders meeting
June 18, 2009

by Grigory Yavlinsky

European Union chooses Grigory Yavlinsky!
Your vote counts!

Reforms that corrupted Russia
By Grigory Yavlinsky, Financial Times (UK), September 3, 2003

Grigory Yavlinsky: "It is impossible to create a real opposition in Russia today."
Moskovsky Komsomolets, September 2, 2003

Alexei Arbatov: What Should We Do About Chechnya?
Interview with Alexei Arbatov by Mikhail Falaleev
Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 9, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky: Our State Does Not Need People
Novaya Gazeta,
No. 54, July 29, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky: The Door to Europe is in Washington
Obschaya Gazeta, May 16, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky's speech.
March 11, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky's Lecture at the Nobel Institute
Oslo, May 30, 2000



Yabloko: Liberals in Russia

By Alexander Shishlov, July 6, 2009

Position on Some Important Strategic Issues of Russian-American Relations

Moscow, July 7, 2009

The Embrace of Stalinism

By Arseny Roginsky, 16 December 2008

Nuclear Umbrellas and the Need for Understanding: IC Interview With Ambassador Lukin
September 25, 1997

Would the West’s Billions Pay Off?
Los Angeles Times
By Grigory Yavlinsky and Graham Allison
June 3, 1991

The Pipe is No Longer Playing the Emperor’s Tune

The collapse came out of the blue, although it was visible from afar

Grigory Yavlinsky’s web-site, 21.04.2020

The economic crisis is growing. Despite Russia’s deal with OPEC, world oil prices continue falling. According to the terms of the deal, from May 1, Russia should reduce oil production to 8.5 million barrels per day. On average, the production of crude oil itself (without gas condensate) in Russia is about 10.4 million bps, that is, Russian oil companies have to reduce production by 1.9 million bps. This reduction is 6.5 times higher than the level of decline in production by Russia (0.3 million bpd), which the other parties to the deal insisted in early March and which the Russian negotiators refused. The new reduction is about 33% of Russian oil exports. Such a sharp rollback from the initial claims is due to a serious miscalculation of the assessment of the impact of the epidemic on the global economy and the global drop in demand, i.e., the “force majeure circumstances” – it is simply nowhere to store the excess volumes, and the reduction will have to be carried out by way of established fact.

As a result, the price of gasoline in the Russian wholesale market fell below cost: oil companies sell every ton with a loss of several thousand roubles.


Russia has problems not only with oil, but also with gas. For the entire first quarter, gas production in the country decreased by 6% on an annualised basis, and in March the collapse simply hit a record: 12.3% less gas was produced than in the same period last year. The reasons were: a warm winter, a decline in production caused by quarantine, and US supplies of liquefied natural gas. European gas storages are full, and Russian gas is sold in Europe today at a price of USD 80 per 1,000 cubic meters, which is a about 30% less than at the beginning of the year. To compensate for the loss of Gazprom due to falling gas prices on the international market, the Russian government decided to increase the gas tariff for Russians from July 1: by 3% for the population and by 2.99% for other categories of consumers. The increase in gas tariffs in the midst of an epidemic and crisis, as well as the sale of gas at a loss to producers, indicate, firstly, the inadequacy of decisions made in the government, and secondly, the depravity and exhaustion of the economic model based solely on the fuel and energy sector .


Over the past twenty years, despite all the talk, government lamentations and presidential statements, Russia’s dependence on commodity exports and world prices has not only fail to decrease, but even increased. Even according to the Federal State Statistics Service, the share of extraction of mineral resources in Russia grew from 34.1% in 2010 to 38.9% in 2018, and the share of manufacturing industries, on the contrary, shrank. All these years, the Russian authorities have behaved like a drug addict who has a pipe with gas in one hand, oil in the other, and economic hallucinations in his head. It is because of these “hallucinations” that strategic miscalculations were made when making key decisions. And in the end, Russia remained with the “pipe economy”.


Already in the foreseeable future, oil can no longer serve as the main source of Russia’s welfare. In the short term, this is due to falling oil demand and overstocking. Thus, on April 20, by the end of exchange trading, sellers began to pay USD 40 per barrel to buyers of American WTI oil (due to a collapse in prices by more than 300% – to minus USD 39.44 per barrel). The price of Russian Urals oil also became negative and amounted to minus USD 2 per barrel, which is 112.7% less than the previous price of USD 15.75. It is obvious that a 10 million bpd reduction in production, which Russia and OPEC allegedly managed to agree on, will not eliminate the existing surplus and will not solve the problem of price collapse.


The next two to three months will show whether the cartel agreement is able to keep prices in the region of at least USD 20 per barrel. In the meantime, it is obvious that the previous volumes of oil will not be in demand for a long time (against the backdrop of the global economic downturn and the problems of the Chinese economy), and by the time they are needed, there will be a lot of cheap Saudi oil on the market, solar panels, wind generators, and other “green” energy sources.


After the pandemic is over, the economy will recover and the price of oil will start rising slightly. At this point, many manufacturers will have incentives to quickly increase production and sales in order to somehow compensate for their losses during the recession. In this situation, it is highly likely that the OPEC+ cartel, if it is preserved by that time, will go out of control, and this, in turn, will be a deterrent to price increases. So even in the medium term, one should not count on a rapid rise in oil prices. This may last for years, as happened after the collapse of the oil cartel in the early 1980s.


We should not forget about the geopolitical vulnerability of Russia. The United States, for example, can easily push Russia out of the world market if they wish, by imposing an embargo on Russian oil exports, as they did with Venezuela. Recently, Washington has accused the Venezuelan President and fourteen of his associates in drug trafficking and began to transfer military equipment to the borders of Venezuela. President Maduro faces life imprisonment for participation in drug trafficking. Having sensed that the odds are against them, Rosneft got rid of all its Venezuelan assets by “selling” them to the Russian state, and now all the Russian oil extracting industry may fall under American sanctions.


In addition, there are other, more significant circumstances that will impede the growth of prices for “black gold”. Thus, oil (after coal) will be increasingly going by the wayside. A “three-level market” of oil will be gradually formed: 1) Saudi Arabia; 2) global companies, including Russian; 3) non-standard manufacturers, whose marginal costs will act as a price limit. Such a structure is self-regulating and theoretically can be effective. It does not require “manual control,” and if someone (as the “great strategists” from Russia recently) decides to radically change it with the help of a price war, such an attempt would be doomed to failure from the very beginning. In the long run, an attempt to raise prices above the limit level will not lead anywhere either, since “non-standard producers” which are final in this three-tier structure and necessary for satisfaction of the demand will lose profitability above this level. And taking into account the development of alternative energy, this marginal level will continue to decline.


Nobody knows the speed of this process, but the meaning of politics is to understand the patterns and market logic of the upcoming developments and make decisions in accordance with this. In the next ten years, the efficiency of the Russian oil sector will be steadily declining due to the increasing complexity of production conditions, the remoteness of the location of reserves, growing costs, and also due to falling demand for oil. This will require fundamental changes in the concept of the entire budget and financial system of Russia – a rejection of the decisive dependence of the budget on the exports of natural resources. The key requirement is as follows: true diversification of the Russian economy and creation of a modern competitive system to replace the current state capitalist system. This is possible only if one abandons the [economic] model based on raw materials and the corporate mafia political system. Without this, Russia has no prospects for successful and peaceful development in the 21st century.




See also:

“What will happen to the economy and why did the oil price fall?” published on 15.03.2020


Grigory Yavlinsky

Is Chairman of the Federal Political Committee of the Russian United Democratic Party YABLOKO, Vice President of Liberal International, PhD in Economics, Professor of the National Research University Higher School of Economics.