Congresses and Docs

Memorandum of Political Alternative, an updated version of 1.03.2019

Memorandum of Political Alternative

YABLOKO's Ten Key Programme Issues


YABLOKO's Political Platform Adopted by the 15th Congress, June 21, 2008

The 18th Congress of YABLOKO

RUSSIA DEMANDS CHANGES! Electoral Program for 2011 Parliamentary Elections.

Key resolutions by the Congress:

On Stalinism and Bolshevism
Resolution. December 21, 2009

On Anti-Ecological Policies of Russia’s Authorities. Resolution of the 15th congress of the YABLOKO party No 253, December 24, 2009

On the Situation in the Northern Caucasus. Resolution of the 15th congress of the YABLOKO party No 252, December 24, 2009


YABLOKO’s Political Committee: Russian state acts like an irresponsible business corporation conducting anti-environmental policies


Overcoming bolshevism and stalinism as a key factor for Russia¦µ™s transformation in the 21st century


On Russia's Foreign Policies. Political Committee of hte YABLOKO party. Statement, June 26, 2009


On Iran’s Nuclear Problem Resolution by the Political Committee of the YABLOKO party. October 6, 2009


Anti-Crisis Proposals (Housing-Roads-Land) of the Russian United Democratic Party YABLOKO. Handed to President Medvedev by Sergei Mitrokhin on June 11, 2009

Brief Outline of Sergei Mitrokhin’s Report at the State Council meeting. January 22, 2010


Assessment of Russia’s Present Political System and the Principles of Its Development. Brief note for the State Council meeting (January 22, 2010) by Dr.Grigory Yavlinsky, member of YABLOKO’s Political Committee. January 22, 2010


Address of the YABLOKO party to President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev. Political Committee of the YABLOKO party. October 9, 2009


The 17th Congress of YABLOKO




The 16th Congress of Yabloko

Photo by Sergei Loktionov

The 12th congress of Yabloko

The 11th congress of Yabloko

The 10th congress of Yabloko

Moscow Yabloko
Yabloko for Students
St. Petersburg Yabloko
Khabarovsk Yabloko
Irkutsk Yabloko
Kaliningrad Yabloko(eng)
Novosibirsk Yabloko
Rostov Yabloko
Yekaterinburg Yabloko
(Sverdlovsk Region)

Krasnoyarsk Yabloko
Ulyanovsk Yabloko
Tomsk Yabloko
Tver Yabloko(eng)
Penza Yabloko
Stavropol Yabloko

Action of Support





Programme by candidate for the post of Russian President Grigory Yavlinsky. Brief Overview

My Truth

Grigory Yavlinsky at Forum 2000, Prague, 2014

YABLOKO-ALDE conference 2014

Grigory Yavlinsky : “If you show the white feather, you will get fascism”

Grigory Yavlinsky: a coup is started by idealists and controlled by rascals

The Road to Good Governance

Risks of Transitions. The Russian Experience

Grigory Yavlinsky on the Russian coup of August 1991

A Male’s Face of Russia’s Politics

Black Sea Palaces of the New Russian Nomenklatura


The Hidden Cause of the Great Recession (And How to Avert the Nest One)

by Dr. Grigory Yavlinsky

On the results of the Conference “Migration: International Experience and Russia’s Problems” conducted by the Russian United Democratic Party YABLOKO and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (the ALDE party)

Moscow, April 6, 2013

International Conference "Youth under Threat of Extremism and Xenophobia. A Liberal Response"
conducted jointly by ELDR and YABLOKO. Moscow, April 21, 2012. Speeches, videos, presentations

What does the opposition want: to win or die heroically?
Moskovsky Komsomolets web-site, July 11, 2012. Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky by Yulia Kalinina.

Building a Liberal Europe - the ALDE Project

By Sir Graham Watson

Lies and legitimacy
The founder of the Yabloko Party analyses the political situation. Article by Grigory Yavlinsky on radio Svoboda. April 6, 2011

Algorithms for Opposing Gender Discrimination: the International and the Russian Experience

YABLOKO and ELDR joint conference

Moscow, March 12, 2011

Reform or Revolution

by Vladimir Kara-Murza

Is Modernisation in Russia Possible? Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky and Boris Titov by Yury Pronko, "The Real Time" programme, Radio Finam, May 12, 2010

Grigory Yavlinsky's interview to Vladimir Pozner. The First Channel, programme "Pozner", April 20, 2010 (video and transcript)

Overcoming the Totalitarian Past: Foreign Experience and Russian Problems by Galina Mikhaleva. Research Centre for the East European Studies, Bremen, February 2010.

Grigory Yavlinsky: Vote for the people you know, people you can turn for help. Grigory Yavlinsky’s interview to the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper, October 8, 2009

Grigory Yavlinsky: no discords in the tandem. Grigory Yavlinsky’s interview to the Radio Liberty
September 22, 2009

A Credit for Half a Century. Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky by Natalia Bekhtereva, Radio Russia, June 15, 2009

Sergei Mitrokhin's Speech at the meeting with US Preseident Barack Obama. Key Notes, Moscow, July 7, 2009

Mitrokhin proposed a visa-free regime between Russia and EU at the European liberal leaders meeting
June 18, 2009

by Grigory Yavlinsky

European Union chooses Grigory Yavlinsky!
Your vote counts!

Reforms that corrupted Russia
By Grigory Yavlinsky, Financial Times (UK), September 3, 2003

Grigory Yavlinsky: "It is impossible to create a real opposition in Russia today."
Moskovsky Komsomolets, September 2, 2003

Alexei Arbatov: What Should We Do About Chechnya?
Interview with Alexei Arbatov by Mikhail Falaleev
Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 9, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky: Our State Does Not Need People
Novaya Gazeta,
No. 54, July 29, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky: The Door to Europe is in Washington
Obschaya Gazeta, May 16, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky's speech.
March 11, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky's Lecture at the Nobel Institute
Oslo, May 30, 2000



Yabloko: Liberals in Russia

By Alexander Shishlov, July 6, 2009

Position on Some Important Strategic Issues of Russian-American Relations

Moscow, July 7, 2009

The Embrace of Stalinism

By Arseny Roginsky, 16 December 2008

Nuclear Umbrellas and the Need for Understanding: IC Interview With Ambassador Lukin
September 25, 1997

Would the West’s Billions Pay Off?
Los Angeles Times
By Grigory Yavlinsky and Graham Allison
June 3, 1991

Grigory Yavlinsky: Sanctions and Prospects

The leader of Yabloko about that neither of the sides in the war between the Kremlin and Washington will have mercy on Russian citizens

Grigory Yavlinsky’s web-site, 27.08.2018

Sanctions have already been imposed on Russia: personal sanctions , those against certain companies and products, sectoral sanctions against the military-industrial complex and oil and gas enterprises, and territorial in Crimea. Sanctions have been imposed because of corruption, theft and murder of [lawyer] Sergei Magnitsky, because of the annexation of Crimea and lies about the referendum on the peninsula, because of the war in Donbass, because of interference in the elections in the US… Now here go sanctions because of poisoning [of the Skripals] in Salisbury. Since neither calls nor statements nor demands, neither external nor internal affect the Kremlin, the words were backed up by practical measures – sanctions, so that it was clear that all this was not just rhetoric, that it was necessary to change the politics: to stop the war in Donbass, solve the problem of Crimea on the basis of international law, withdraw from Syria and not cover the crimes of Bashar al Assad, stop false propaganda and engaging in provocations around the world… But since Vladimir Putin’s policy have not changed, and all the persons who are “subject to sanctions” remain in their posts and do the same, then the new sanctions, which come into effect on 27 August, symbolise the beginning of a qualitatively different stage. Now it will be sanctions against everyone.

The technical difference between the Trump administration’s sanctions dated 27 August is that their implementation is divided into two stages. At the first stage, a ban is imposed on the supply of goods and technologies to Russia for the defence sector, a ban on the provision of foreign aid to Russia and the issuance of loans to the government of the Russian Federation. Three months later it is planned to develop this: there will be an almost complete ban on mutual trade, lowering of the level in diplomatic relations between the two countries, and possible cessation of direct air communication between Russia and the United States. After that, at the end of the year, there are plans to impose much more sensitive sanctions, they are contained so far in the draft law, but they have considerable chances for approval in the Congress.


The main difference between the new sanctions [from the previously applied sanctions] is in the change of the object. The previous sanctions were mostly pointed and targeted against specific people and related companies, the new American sanctions that are supposed to be introduced in the next six months or twelve months will target the entire Russian economy and almost the entire population of Russia will fall under them.


Western politicians apparently agreed with the Russian television propaganda and made conclusions about the low efficiency of the previous sanctions packages. It became clear: Russia is politically arranged in such a way that the entire ruling group is vitally interested in preserving the current system of power and administration. Any manifestation of opposition to Putin’s policy in the establishment, and even the slightest disagreement, leads not only to the loss of “everything acquired by ‘unbearable’ unrighteous labor”, but, most likely, directly to prison. As was the case of Alexei Ulyukayev or Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Therefore, the naive dreams of the West that someone in the Russian elites will oppose the current policy are absolutely unrealistic. American and European politicians failing in achieving the desired result within four years have reached this point in an empirical way. Now, the object and purpose of their pressure is not so much the Russian government in its current personal composition or the system that developed for elaboration of its political line, but the place and role of the Russian state in the world, as an acting and even as a potential subject of the world politics. In other words, the old principle is applied to Russia: what turns out to be irresponsible, i.e., does not lend to influence and limitations, and is a threat – must be neutralised.


The stake has been made and will be made that a country that lacks the practical ability to seriously affect the world around it (because of the fundamental weakness of the economic potential and the need to constantly focus on solution of a great number of endless momentary problems) becomes less dangerous, more “sterile” in the global and the regional plan, even if the existing political regime is preserved in it.


This approach means that political groups that are determined to confront Russia and, roughly speaking, earn on it, have come to the forefront in the United States and in many Western countries, due to the policies pursued by Putin. And vice versa, those for whom it was beneficial to cooperate with us, are leaving the political scene. That is, today those who do not believe in the prospects of reconciliation and are betting solely on countermeasures are taking the upper hand (see the article “Le mort saisit le vif *. On the issue of sanctions”, November 2017 ). This is almost the biggest and the longest failure of Putin-Lavrov’s diplomacy.


In addition, we should not forget about the force of inertia. The more the Russian economy operates in the “anti-sanctions” mobilisation mode against external threats, the more difficult and even problematic it will be to return to a normal mode, to the regime of peaceful growth. True, the authorities have been trying to restrict the efficiency of this pressure, somehow responding to it, accusing the West of “double standards”, etc. But there is no one to appeal for justice and no one to appeal to. But we who have less than 2% of the world economy have nothing to really oppose such pressure on the part of the country which has 28% of the world GDP (and together with the EU makes 46%) (see the article “A Conscious Choice?”, February 2015). It is clear that the pressure will increase, the sanctions will become tougher, the situation of the population will worsen, and the stability of the current Russian regime will be reducing. Moreover, the system of Putin has already lost strategically, it was predetermined by the conscious and purposeful construction of the mafia state in Russia. The question now is only how and when Russia will emerge from this deep political and economic hole.


Also it is necessary to take into account that in the conditions of a deepening crisis, there is and there will be no help, no sympathy for Russia and the fate of its economy. India and China have their own interests. Even Belarus and Kazakhstan politically do not support Russia. They have their own interests, their own position in the post-Soviet space. But, most importantly, they categorically do not want to share with Russia its current position of the object of international pressure and sanctions (see the article “A conscious choice?”, February 2015).


And in this context we must clearly understand that the worse is the situation for the population, the more confusion is there in the vertical of power, the more significant will be the influence of the only more or less branched structure which is efficient in its own way – the organised crime, which merged with the law enforcement long ago. And if this structure comes to power, after changing the personalities [on the top] of the current regime, the same political structure that we have today will come about. Apparently, the Americans, trying to neutralise the influence of Russia, do not think about the likely consequences of the collapse of the system in the situation of accelerated weakening of the economy, impoverishment of the population, and degradation of public policy.


And there is one more very important aspect: the nature of Putin’s system is such that being driven into a corner it may well try to use nuclear weapons, and it has already made such direct threats several times. In this respect, there should be no illusions. This power is not just irresponsible and cynical in the fullest sense of these words, but also illiterate, since it really allows the possibility of victory in the so-called “limited tactical” nuclear war.


Sanctions represent a symbol of a futile conflict with the world. This conflict can not be resolved by some “supreme judge”, or some “authority of justice” – there is no one to appeal to. To behave like a superpower and participate on an equal footing in world affairs, determine the fate of the world economy and financial system – one must become such a power, which means having, first of all, an economy corresponding to this scale. In international global affairs, this is the only criterion. We do not meet this criterion today (see the article “New Sanctions – New Wars”, July 2017).


This means that the key meaning of the entire Russian policy should be rejection of geopolitical adventures and construction of a modern competitive economy. It is well known what is necessary to do for this, but there is no understanding of this or such political will of the country’s leadership.


By granting Putin’s system the mandate to govern the state [at the presidential elections of] 18 March, the Russian people plunged the country into a deep hybrid (corresponding to the modern post-modern) crisis. The way out of this crisis involves getting rid of the mafia state and at the same time preserving the country. A very complex task.