The leader of Yabloko about that neither of the sides in the war between the Kremlin and Washington will have mercy on Russian citizens

Grigory Yavlinsky’s web-site, 27.08.2018

Sanctions have already been imposed on Russia: personal sanctions , those against certain companies and products, sectoral sanctions against the military-industrial complex and oil and gas enterprises, and territorial in Crimea. Sanctions have been imposed because of corruption, theft and murder of [lawyer] Sergei Magnitsky, because of the annexation of Crimea and lies about the referendum on the peninsula, because of the war in Donbass, because of interference in the elections in the US… Now here go sanctions because of poisoning [of the Skripals] in Salisbury. Since neither calls nor statements nor demands, neither external nor internal affect the Kremlin, the words were backed up by practical measures – sanctions, so that it was clear that all this was not just rhetoric, that it was necessary to change the politics: to stop the war in Donbass, solve the problem of Crimea on the basis of international law, withdraw from Syria and not cover the crimes of Bashar al Assad, stop false propaganda and engaging in provocations around the world… But since Vladimir Putin’s policy have not changed, and all the persons who are “subject to sanctions” remain in their posts and do the same, then the new sanctions, which come into effect on 27 August, symbolise the beginning of a qualitatively different stage. Now it will be sanctions against everyone.

The technical difference between the Trump administration’s sanctions dated 27 August is that their implementation is divided into two stages. At the first stage, a ban is imposed on the supply of goods and technologies to Russia for the defence sector, a ban on the provision of foreign aid to Russia and the issuance of loans to the government of the Russian Federation. Three months later it is planned to develop this: there will be an almost complete ban on mutual trade, lowering of the level in diplomatic relations between the two countries, and possible cessation of direct air communication between Russia and the United States. After that, at the end of the year, there are plans to impose much more sensitive sanctions, they are contained so far in the draft law, but they have considerable chances for approval in the Congress.

The main difference between the new sanctions [from the previously applied sanctions] is in the change of the object. The previous sanctions were mostly pointed and targeted against specific people and related companies, the new American sanctions that are supposed to be introduced in the next six months or twelve months will target the entire Russian economy and almost the entire population of Russia will fall under them.

Western politicians apparently agreed with the Russian television propaganda and made conclusions about the low efficiency of the previous sanctions packages. It became clear: Russia is politically arranged in such a way that the entire ruling group is vitally interested in preserving the current system of power and administration. Any manifestation of opposition to Putin’s policy in the establishment, and even the slightest disagreement, leads not only to the loss of “everything acquired by ‘unbearable’ unrighteous labor”, but, most likely, directly to prison. As was the case of Alexei Ulyukayev or Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Therefore, the naive dreams of the West that someone in the Russian elites will oppose the current policy are absolutely unrealistic. American and European politicians failing in achieving the desired result within four years have reached this point in an empirical way. Now, the object and purpose of their pressure is not so much the Russian government in its current personal composition or the system that developed for elaboration of its political line, but the place and role of the Russian state in the world, as an acting and even as a potential subject of the world politics. In other words, the old principle is applied to Russia: what turns out to be irresponsible, i.e., does not lend to influence and limitations, and is a threat – must be neutralised.

The stake has been made and will be made that a country that lacks the practical ability to seriously affect the world around it (because of the fundamental weakness of the economic potential and the need to constantly focus on solution of a great number of endless momentary problems) becomes less dangerous, more “sterile” in the global and the regional plan, even if the existing political regime is preserved in it.

This approach means that political groups that are determined to confront Russia and, roughly speaking, earn on it, have come to the forefront in the United States and in many Western countries, due to the policies pursued by Putin. And vice versa, those for whom it was beneficial to cooperate with us, are leaving the political scene. That is, today those who do not believe in the prospects of reconciliation and are betting solely on countermeasures are taking the upper hand (see the article “Le mort saisit le vif *. On the issue of sanctions”, November 2017 ). This is almost the biggest and the longest failure of Putin-Lavrov’s diplomacy.

In addition, we should not forget about the force of inertia. The more the Russian economy operates in the “anti-sanctions” mobilisation mode against external threats, the more difficult and even problematic it will be to return to a normal mode, to the regime of peaceful growth. True, the authorities have been trying to restrict the efficiency of this pressure, somehow responding to it, accusing the West of “double standards”, etc. But there is no one to appeal for justice and no one to appeal to. But we who have less than 2% of the world economy have nothing to really oppose such pressure on the part of the country which has 28% of the world GDP (and together with the EU makes 46%) (see the article “A Conscious Choice?”, February 2015). It is clear that the pressure will increase, the sanctions will become tougher, the situation of the population will worsen, and the stability of the current Russian regime will be reducing. Moreover, the system of Putin has already lost strategically, it was predetermined by the conscious and purposeful construction of the mafia state in Russia. The question now is only how and when Russia will emerge from this deep political and economic hole.

Also it is necessary to take into account that in the conditions of a deepening crisis, there is and there will be no help, no sympathy for Russia and the fate of its economy. India and China have their own interests. Even Belarus and Kazakhstan politically do not support Russia. They have their own interests, their own position in the post-Soviet space. But, most importantly, they categorically do not want to share with Russia its current position of the object of international pressure and sanctions (see the article “A conscious choice?”, February 2015).

And in this context we must clearly understand that the worse is the situation for the population, the more confusion is there in the vertical of power, the more significant will be the influence of the only more or less branched structure which is efficient in its own way – the organised crime, which merged with the law enforcement long ago. And if this structure comes to power, after changing the personalities [on the top] of the current regime, the same political structure that we have today will come about. Apparently, the Americans, trying to neutralise the influence of Russia, do not think about the likely consequences of the collapse of the system in the situation of accelerated weakening of the economy, impoverishment of the population, and degradation of public policy.

And there is one more very important aspect: the nature of Putin’s system is such that being driven into a corner it may well try to use nuclear weapons, and it has already made such direct threats several times. In this respect, there should be no illusions. This power is not just irresponsible and cynical in the fullest sense of these words, but also illiterate, since it really allows the possibility of victory in the so-called “limited tactical” nuclear war.

Sanctions represent a symbol of a futile conflict with the world. This conflict can not be resolved by some “supreme judge”, or some “authority of justice” – there is no one to appeal to. To behave like a superpower and participate on an equal footing in world affairs, determine the fate of the world economy and financial system – one must become such a power, which means having, first of all, an economy corresponding to this scale. In international global affairs, this is the only criterion. We do not meet this criterion today (see the article “New Sanctions – New Wars”, July 2017).

This means that the key meaning of the entire Russian policy should be rejection of geopolitical adventures and construction of a modern competitive economy. It is well known what is necessary to do for this, but there is no understanding of this or such political will of the country’s leadership.

By granting Putin’s system the mandate to govern the state [at the presidential elections of] 18 March, the Russian people plunged the country into a deep hybrid (corresponding to the modern post-modern) crisis. The way out of this crisis involves getting rid of the mafia state and at the same time preserving the country. A very complex task.

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