Congresses and Docs

Memorandum of Political Alternative, an updated version of 1.03.2019

Memorandum of Political Alternative

YABLOKO's Ten Key Programme Issues


YABLOKO's Political Platform Adopted by the 15th Congress, June 21, 2008

The 18th Congress of YABLOKO

RUSSIA DEMANDS CHANGES! Electoral Program for 2011 Parliamentary Elections.

Key resolutions by the Congress:

On Stalinism and Bolshevism
Resolution. December 21, 2009

On Anti-Ecological Policies of Russia’s Authorities. Resolution of the 15th congress of the YABLOKO party No 253, December 24, 2009

On the Situation in the Northern Caucasus. Resolution of the 15th congress of the YABLOKO party No 252, December 24, 2009


YABLOKO’s Political Committee: Russian state acts like an irresponsible business corporation conducting anti-environmental policies


Overcoming bolshevism and stalinism as a key factor for Russia¦µ™s transformation in the 21st century


On Russia's Foreign Policies. Political Committee of hte YABLOKO party. Statement, June 26, 2009


On Iran’s Nuclear Problem Resolution by the Political Committee of the YABLOKO party. October 6, 2009


Anti-Crisis Proposals (Housing-Roads-Land) of the Russian United Democratic Party YABLOKO. Handed to President Medvedev by Sergei Mitrokhin on June 11, 2009

Brief Outline of Sergei Mitrokhin’s Report at the State Council meeting. January 22, 2010


Assessment of Russia’s Present Political System and the Principles of Its Development. Brief note for the State Council meeting (January 22, 2010) by Dr.Grigory Yavlinsky, member of YABLOKO’s Political Committee. January 22, 2010


Address of the YABLOKO party to President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev. Political Committee of the YABLOKO party. October 9, 2009


The 17th Congress of YABLOKO




The 16th Congress of Yabloko

Photo by Sergei Loktionov

The 12th congress of Yabloko

The 11th congress of Yabloko

The 10th congress of Yabloko

Moscow Yabloko
Yabloko for Students
St. Petersburg Yabloko
Khabarovsk Yabloko
Irkutsk Yabloko
Kaliningrad Yabloko(eng)
Novosibirsk Yabloko
Rostov Yabloko
Yekaterinburg Yabloko
(Sverdlovsk Region)

Krasnoyarsk Yabloko
Ulyanovsk Yabloko
Tomsk Yabloko
Tver Yabloko(eng)
Penza Yabloko
Stavropol Yabloko

Action of Support





Programme by candidate for the post of Russian President Grigory Yavlinsky. Brief Overview

My Truth

Grigory Yavlinsky at Forum 2000, Prague, 2014

YABLOKO-ALDE conference 2014

Grigory Yavlinsky : “If you show the white feather, you will get fascism”

Grigory Yavlinsky: a coup is started by idealists and controlled by rascals

The Road to Good Governance

Risks of Transitions. The Russian Experience

Grigory Yavlinsky on the Russian coup of August 1991

A Male’s Face of Russia’s Politics

Black Sea Palaces of the New Russian Nomenklatura


The Hidden Cause of the Great Recession (And How to Avert the Nest One)

by Dr. Grigory Yavlinsky

On the results of the Conference “Migration: International Experience and Russia’s Problems” conducted by the Russian United Democratic Party YABLOKO and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (the ALDE party)

Moscow, April 6, 2013

International Conference "Youth under Threat of Extremism and Xenophobia. A Liberal Response"
conducted jointly by ELDR and YABLOKO. Moscow, April 21, 2012. Speeches, videos, presentations

What does the opposition want: to win or die heroically?
Moskovsky Komsomolets web-site, July 11, 2012. Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky by Yulia Kalinina.

Building a Liberal Europe - the ALDE Project

By Sir Graham Watson

Lies and legitimacy
The founder of the Yabloko Party analyses the political situation. Article by Grigory Yavlinsky on radio Svoboda. April 6, 2011

Algorithms for Opposing Gender Discrimination: the International and the Russian Experience

YABLOKO and ELDR joint conference

Moscow, March 12, 2011

Reform or Revolution

by Vladimir Kara-Murza

Is Modernisation in Russia Possible? Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky and Boris Titov by Yury Pronko, "The Real Time" programme, Radio Finam, May 12, 2010

Grigory Yavlinsky's interview to Vladimir Pozner. The First Channel, programme "Pozner", April 20, 2010 (video and transcript)

Overcoming the Totalitarian Past: Foreign Experience and Russian Problems by Galina Mikhaleva. Research Centre for the East European Studies, Bremen, February 2010.

Grigory Yavlinsky: Vote for the people you know, people you can turn for help. Grigory Yavlinsky’s interview to the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper, October 8, 2009

Grigory Yavlinsky: no discords in the tandem. Grigory Yavlinsky’s interview to the Radio Liberty
September 22, 2009

A Credit for Half a Century. Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky by Natalia Bekhtereva, Radio Russia, June 15, 2009

Sergei Mitrokhin's Speech at the meeting with US Preseident Barack Obama. Key Notes, Moscow, July 7, 2009

Mitrokhin proposed a visa-free regime between Russia and EU at the European liberal leaders meeting
June 18, 2009

by Grigory Yavlinsky

European Union chooses Grigory Yavlinsky!
Your vote counts!

Reforms that corrupted Russia
By Grigory Yavlinsky, Financial Times (UK), September 3, 2003

Grigory Yavlinsky: "It is impossible to create a real opposition in Russia today."
Moskovsky Komsomolets, September 2, 2003

Alexei Arbatov: What Should We Do About Chechnya?
Interview with Alexei Arbatov by Mikhail Falaleev
Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 9, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky: Our State Does Not Need People
Novaya Gazeta,
No. 54, July 29, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky: The Door to Europe is in Washington
Obschaya Gazeta, May 16, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky's speech.
March 11, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky's Lecture at the Nobel Institute
Oslo, May 30, 2000



Yabloko: Liberals in Russia

By Alexander Shishlov, July 6, 2009

Position on Some Important Strategic Issues of Russian-American Relations

Moscow, July 7, 2009

The Embrace of Stalinism

By Arseny Roginsky, 16 December 2008

Nuclear Umbrellas and the Need for Understanding: IC Interview With Ambassador Lukin
September 25, 1997

Would the West’s Billions Pay Off?
Los Angeles Times
By Grigory Yavlinsky and Graham Allison
June 3, 1991

Crimean Recoup

ukr_0Sergei Mitrokhin’s blog at the Ekho Moskvi web-site, 24.03.2014
That’s the title of the report I presented before a large number of politicians, diplomats, academics and journalists in Vienna last Friday.
The system is above all!

I would like to begin my remarks with one reminiscence.

In 2000, I was among representatives of the YABLOKO faction of the State Duma at the meeting with Putin in the Kremlin. Then I remembered one phrase of his. “I am not going to sit here until retirement”, from which it can be concluded that then he was a virtually a politician of the European type.

Much has changed since then.

Vladimir Putin received an oligarchic economy as Boris Yeltsin’s legacy, and in the past 14 years built his own system of political domination on this basis, and in this system he is the major and indispensable element. And today he connects his perspectives only with the existence of this system and only as its head.

Therefore, it is unlikely that “retirement” is now in these plans…

Likewise, all of Russia’s economic and political elite extracting their huge profits out of the country’s economy and at the expense of the rest of the population of Russia, make their plans accordingly.

The elite clearly understands that the collapse of the system will lead not only to a drop of their incomes, but also to possible threats related to the interest of society to the origins of such huge profits, with all the consequences. So, the elite is clinging to Putin, viewing him as the main guarantor of the maintenance of the system.

Putin’s main fear

This is the threat of an “orange revolution” like those that swept similar authoritarian and oligarchic regimes in other countries. He does not want to share the fate of Hosni Mubarak, Muammar Gaddafii, and now Viktor Yanukovych. But some of these options is inevitable if the system collapses.

This fear has been a major driving force in the evolution of the regime since 2004, when the first such revolution occurred in Ukraine. This was followed by Arab Spring, and now there is a new, even more radical revolution in Ukraine. Mass-scale rallies in Moscow in 2011-2012 showed that such scenarios could be very real in Russia. In order to strengthen the system, Putin’s regime has begun since 2004 developing a comprehensive action program for preventing the “orange” scenario for Russia.

As part of the preventive program the policies of “tightening of the screws” were held, this was manifest in curbing of civil rights and liberties, repressions against NGOs and selective reprisals against the opposition, etc.

Escape from Europe

Simultaneously there emerged an ideology stipulating that Russia did not have to develop within the framework of the Western civilization but had its own “Eurasian” way based on orthodox values.

Replacing the European vector of development for the “Eurasian” vector Vladimir Putin got rid of the need to justify his policies before the West.

The regime needs confrontation with the West and with the outside world in general for its domestic use, and it finds a strong positive response in the majority of the Russian society disillusioned with counterproductive reforms of 1990s, so it is possible for the regime to get there a huge resource for its preservation and gaining of popularity.

For this reason, such a confrontation is useful for the regime for suppression of domestic opposition, which is considered as a “fifth column” of hostile forces obsessed the “orange revolution”.

The revanche in Crimea

Putin and his ciricle consider Ukraine, Belarus and the Central Asian countries as a sphere of vital interests and virtually a part of their system. Viktor Yanukovych’ regime met such interests. That is why its collapse was perceived as a challenge not only to foreign policy interests, but also the entire system.

In 2004, such a reaction was impossible, because the system had not yet been formed, it was in its infancy. Since then, it has grown stronger and “matured”, it obtained its clear interests and an ideology.

In this new capacity, the system could not “swallow” the crushing defeat of its satellite, as it could be seen by all as a failure and a prologue to its future collapse.

The annexation of Crimea was as important for the consolidation of Vladimir Putin’s system, as the invasion in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 for the Soviet system.

The Ukrainian opposition and the new government in Kiev greatly contributed to the fact that the revenge took the form of “protection of the Russian-speaking population”. The errors of the Ukrainian opposition, and further of the new government in Kiev became a gift for the Russian leadership. The main mistake was their alliance with the nationalists.

Ukrainian democrats inability to dissociate from the nationalists gave Russia a pretext to accuse the new government of fascism and oppression of Russians, and became one of the factors that triggered the Crimean revanche.

The imperial PR

Vladimir Putin requires annexation of Crimea for the following reasons:
1) this is a revanche of his system, he has demonstrated that he can win over the supporters of the “orange revolution” in their own territory, not to mention Russia;
2) the “imperial PR” creates the image of Putin as the “gatherer of the Russian lands” and solves the problem of consolidation of power;
3) it hits another blow to the domestic opposition. All the dissenting with the annexation of Crimea – the media, political parties, social movements, groups and opinion leaders – have been already declared “traitors of the Motherland”;
4) it dramatically increases the degree of confrontation with the outside world, which also raises the rating.

Consequently, all this anti-Western paradigm is filled with something much more specific than “commitment to traditional values​​” and “the revival of Orthodox civilization”.

Putin has openly stated that under his leadership Russia will implement a new imperial project: reunion of Russians throughout the territory of the former USSR. Not only the eastern regions of Ukraine but also Transnistria, and then, perhaps, Kazakhstan and Belarus are on the agenda.
Such attacks do not necessarily have to occur immediately and at all. But they can now be considered for the future as an effective means for solution of the tasks of preservation of the system and the personal power. For this reason, they are quite likely.

The threat of seizure of a foreign territory has been firmly established in the arsenal of defensive weapons of the regime.

Putin and his elite do not mind that the imperial project openly violates international law, turns Russia into a country with a zero reputation, a rogue state.

Apparently, the experience of North Korea, Cuba and other countries has taught him that international isolation is an inevitable condition for retaining the power.

Project risks

The “imperial project” is fraught with enormous risks and therefore can not last long. External sources had already added to the internal sources of instability of Putin’s system (unfair distribution of property and income).

This is the risk of destabilization in different directions. The most unpleasant of them is associated with the reaction of the Islamic world and Islamic extremists on the situation with Crimean Tatars. There emerges a threat of broadening of the Islamic coalition so that to activate a terrorist war against Russia, and this war has been already underway with the help of the Wahhabi underground in the North Caucasus. [Such risks also include] possible territorial claims against Russia, which may also arise “from scratch” likewise Russia’s claims to Ukraine. The Crimean precedent can be used by a broad variety of countries, though not immediately, but in the moment when the regime will show the first signs of weakness.

There also certainly come the sanctions. But they are double-edged as of their nature. Putin will use them for further injection of anti-Western hysteria and suppression of the opposition.
In addition, there will be enormous expenditures for the budget, which will serve as a burden on the economy and the population. Instead of solving numerous Russia’s problems, infrastructure development and modernization, the “new empire” will spend money to appease the annexed territories, and without any effective return: the corrupt state is unable to develop its “old” lands, not to mention the new ones.

How to change the system

All these risks could lead the country to a disaster. Therefore, the task we have stated – a peaceful non-violent constitutional dismantling of the present criminal oligarchic of the regime – is very urgent at present.

As demonstrated once again by the developments in Ukraine, violence in a regime change usually leads to disastrous consequences, such as disintegration and divesting of territories. And the experience of Russia in 1917 shows that a violent change of power can lead to the establishment of even a more bloody regime than the one that was overthrown.

The second lesson of the Ukrainian revolution is that the change of power can not be exercised in cooperation with radicals, both right and left-wing. Their role is to engage democratic forces in various adventures, simultaneously undermining their reputation and weakening their capacity.
Therefore, separation from nationalists and other radicals should occur “on the shore”.
Nationalists and radicals should not be taken on boat when crossing turbulent flows from the authoritarian to the democratic regime.

“Only peaceful protest consolidated on the basis of the European development vector, guarding against the influence of ultra-radicals and subversives, can become a powerful factor for democratic regime change in the interests of Russian society as a whole rather than new-sprung dictators and oligarchs,” runs the statement of the Political Party of the YABLOKO party.

What do we expect from the West?

Not sanctions that will hit common people and the opposition, but is counting on an extremely honest position, based on European values and free from double standards.
Thus, with the support of democratic forces in Ukraine, the West should not turn a blind eye to the unacceptable aspects of their policies, such as the alliance with the nationalists or discrimination of national minorities (for example, the law on languages).

And also we are waiting for effective assistance in building a stable democracy in Ukraine. The sooner the Russian citizens will see progress of democracy in Ukraine, the more chances our country will have to return to the European vector of development, without which it has no future.

That is where the West should target most of its efforts today, rather than sanctions.
Vienna, 21.03.2014
The original publication: