Congresses and Docs

Memorandum of Political Alternative, an updated version of 1.03.2019

Memorandum of Political Alternative

YABLOKO's Ten Key Programme Issues


YABLOKO's Political Platform Adopted by the 15th Congress, June 21, 2008

The 18th Congress of YABLOKO

RUSSIA DEMANDS CHANGES! Electoral Program for 2011 Parliamentary Elections.

Key resolutions by the Congress:

On Stalinism and Bolshevism
Resolution. December 21, 2009

On Anti-Ecological Policies of Russia’s Authorities. Resolution of the 15th congress of the YABLOKO party No 253, December 24, 2009

On the Situation in the Northern Caucasus. Resolution of the 15th congress of the YABLOKO party No 252, December 24, 2009


YABLOKO’s Political Committee: Russian state acts like an irresponsible business corporation conducting anti-environmental policies


Overcoming bolshevism and stalinism as a key factor for Russia¦µ™s transformation in the 21st century


On Russia's Foreign Policies. Political Committee of hte YABLOKO party. Statement, June 26, 2009


On Iran’s Nuclear Problem Resolution by the Political Committee of the YABLOKO party. October 6, 2009


Anti-Crisis Proposals (Housing-Roads-Land) of the Russian United Democratic Party YABLOKO. Handed to President Medvedev by Sergei Mitrokhin on June 11, 2009

Brief Outline of Sergei Mitrokhin’s Report at the State Council meeting. January 22, 2010


Assessment of Russia’s Present Political System and the Principles of Its Development. Brief note for the State Council meeting (January 22, 2010) by Dr.Grigory Yavlinsky, member of YABLOKO’s Political Committee. January 22, 2010


Address of the YABLOKO party to President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev. Political Committee of the YABLOKO party. October 9, 2009


The 17th Congress of YABLOKO




The 16th Congress of Yabloko

Photo by Sergei Loktionov

The 12th congress of Yabloko

The 11th congress of Yabloko

The 10th congress of Yabloko

Moscow Yabloko
Yabloko for Students
St. Petersburg Yabloko
Khabarovsk Yabloko
Irkutsk Yabloko
Kaliningrad Yabloko(eng)
Novosibirsk Yabloko
Rostov Yabloko
Yekaterinburg Yabloko
(Sverdlovsk Region)

Krasnoyarsk Yabloko
Ulyanovsk Yabloko
Tomsk Yabloko
Tver Yabloko(eng)
Penza Yabloko
Stavropol Yabloko

Action of Support





Programme by candidate for the post of Russian President Grigory Yavlinsky. Brief Overview

My Truth

Grigory Yavlinsky at Forum 2000, Prague, 2014

YABLOKO-ALDE conference 2014

Grigory Yavlinsky : “If you show the white feather, you will get fascism”

Grigory Yavlinsky: a coup is started by idealists and controlled by rascals

The Road to Good Governance

Risks of Transitions. The Russian Experience

Grigory Yavlinsky on the Russian coup of August 1991

A Male’s Face of Russia’s Politics

Black Sea Palaces of the New Russian Nomenklatura


The Hidden Cause of the Great Recession (And How to Avert the Nest One)

by Dr. Grigory Yavlinsky

On the results of the Conference “Migration: International Experience and Russia’s Problems” conducted by the Russian United Democratic Party YABLOKO and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (the ALDE party)

Moscow, April 6, 2013

International Conference "Youth under Threat of Extremism and Xenophobia. A Liberal Response"
conducted jointly by ELDR and YABLOKO. Moscow, April 21, 2012. Speeches, videos, presentations

What does the opposition want: to win or die heroically?
Moskovsky Komsomolets web-site, July 11, 2012. Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky by Yulia Kalinina.

Building a Liberal Europe - the ALDE Project

By Sir Graham Watson

Lies and legitimacy
The founder of the Yabloko Party analyses the political situation. Article by Grigory Yavlinsky on radio Svoboda. April 6, 2011

Algorithms for Opposing Gender Discrimination: the International and the Russian Experience

YABLOKO and ELDR joint conference

Moscow, March 12, 2011

Reform or Revolution

by Vladimir Kara-Murza

Is Modernisation in Russia Possible? Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky and Boris Titov by Yury Pronko, "The Real Time" programme, Radio Finam, May 12, 2010

Grigory Yavlinsky's interview to Vladimir Pozner. The First Channel, programme "Pozner", April 20, 2010 (video and transcript)

Overcoming the Totalitarian Past: Foreign Experience and Russian Problems by Galina Mikhaleva. Research Centre for the East European Studies, Bremen, February 2010.

Grigory Yavlinsky: Vote for the people you know, people you can turn for help. Grigory Yavlinsky’s interview to the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper, October 8, 2009

Grigory Yavlinsky: no discords in the tandem. Grigory Yavlinsky’s interview to the Radio Liberty
September 22, 2009

A Credit for Half a Century. Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky by Natalia Bekhtereva, Radio Russia, June 15, 2009

Sergei Mitrokhin's Speech at the meeting with US Preseident Barack Obama. Key Notes, Moscow, July 7, 2009

Mitrokhin proposed a visa-free regime between Russia and EU at the European liberal leaders meeting
June 18, 2009

by Grigory Yavlinsky

European Union chooses Grigory Yavlinsky!
Your vote counts!

Reforms that corrupted Russia
By Grigory Yavlinsky, Financial Times (UK), September 3, 2003

Grigory Yavlinsky: "It is impossible to create a real opposition in Russia today."
Moskovsky Komsomolets, September 2, 2003

Alexei Arbatov: What Should We Do About Chechnya?
Interview with Alexei Arbatov by Mikhail Falaleev
Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 9, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky: Our State Does Not Need People
Novaya Gazeta,
No. 54, July 29, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky: The Door to Europe is in Washington
Obschaya Gazeta, May 16, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky's speech.
March 11, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky's Lecture at the Nobel Institute
Oslo, May 30, 2000



Yabloko: Liberals in Russia

By Alexander Shishlov, July 6, 2009

Position on Some Important Strategic Issues of Russian-American Relations

Moscow, July 7, 2009

The Embrace of Stalinism

By Arseny Roginsky, 16 December 2008

Nuclear Umbrellas and the Need for Understanding: IC Interview With Ambassador Lukin
September 25, 1997

Would the West’s Billions Pay Off?
Los Angeles Times
By Grigory Yavlinsky and Graham Allison
June 3, 1991

Bad Inheritance of Sanctions

Economist Grigory Yavlinsky talks about the people whose lives will be ruined by the politics of today

12 November 2017, Vedomosti  

Grigory Yavlinsky for Vedomosti 

Photo by Andrei Gordeyev/ Vedomosti: Russia’s political ambitions need to be buttressed by an economy that is far larger than the one we have today


The topic of sanctions has become a walking anecdote in the Russian media, especially the pro-Kremlin outlets, the subject of jokes and idle talk on the failure of the architects of these sanctions to comprehend the nature of Russia’s politics and economy. The main allegations are first and foremost that the sanctions are patently having no impact on the political decisions of the Russian powers-that-be, who never do anything under pressure, and secondly that they will fail to deal a significant blow to the Russian economy. Both these assertions are only partially valid and only for the short term.

In actual fact the measures that have already been approved and announced are not capable of triggering an economic disaster in Russia. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that they will have a significant impact on the economic dynamics in recent years – the Russian economy’s need for external financing to maintain its current activities is low (in 2014 all the borrowed funds accounted for just a third of the total investments of Russian enterprises. Since then investment plans have been adjusted downwards, regardless of the sanctions). Meanwhile the proceeds from commodity exports are sufficient to maintain the required level of gold and foreign currency reserves and at the same time guarantee the repayment of previous foreign loans. In addition, the sanctions are incapable of changing the worldview and political thinking of Russia’s leadership and equally of encouraging any factions there to take any actions to change course or the specific individuals who determine it.


However, in the long-term everything is far less clear. As they say, certain nuances have to be taken into account.


It is obvious that Russia’s current leadership is not that worried about the sanctions against Russia. As the main goal of foreign policy is to demonstrate the country’s importance and equal standing with the United States, the sanctions do not represent an obstacle to the attainment of these goals: on the contrary, they offer proof of the success that has been achieved, if you like, they get a medal for merit. The inconvenience for Russian companies, not to mention specific businessmen, is merely the flip side of success on this key direction, and they can and must resolve on their own any problems they encounter as a result. In the worst case scenario, any related losses and expenses, if they are deemed justified, will be reimbursed by the state.  As for the long-term losses of the economy as a whole they simply don’t count, as the economy is not perceived by the country’s leadership as either a goal or independent value. It is solely a tool and means to achieve “glory” for oneself and the country, and Russia’s powers that view “glory” in the same way as medieval monarchs as victories in military campaigns, the subjugation of neighbours to their will, a successful demonstration of strength with richer and more successful ones.


It is meaningless to argue about values. And all the people other than the privileged few, who consider the tough guy stance of the country’s leadership to offer sufficient compensation for their own poverty and lack of rights, are probably entitled to do so. However, whoever is thinking about the future of the country in broad terms should bear in mind that the current trend of newer and newer sanctions adopted by the West may in the long term become a very serious challenge for both the Russian government with its current ambitions, and for the country in general.


In actual fact the role of a global power sought by the Russian authorities is an extremely costly asset: it cannot be ensured simply by threats of destabilisation and use of military force. If you want to extend your sphere of interests and exert an influence further than a round of ammunition across the border, you have to pay with all kinds of resources. Military presence, political presence, the maintenance of foreign clientele – all this necessitates considerable expenses. And in order to play a global role like the USA, Russia needs an economy ten times bigger than the current one.


Meanwhile the sanctions (in the broad sense of the word, including the actual consequences of decision-making that appear to be targeted) are closing down the country’s opportunities to grow rapidly. Miracles don’t happen: small economies simply cannot grow rapidly without attracting external resources, primarily the financial and technological resources of the developed part of the world. If we don’t have access to significant external financing, major foreign investments and a similar level of substantial technology transfers, Russia won’t be a global power, whatever our country’s leadership may claim. Without a large and powerful high-income economy, Russia will simply be transformed into North Korea, albeit on a bigger scale: the country’s nuclear weapons guarantee that the US will not try to apply direct military force in order to replace an anti-American dictator with a pro-American one, but this is the only benefit of such a weapon.


In addition, the underlying nature and meaning of the sanctions regime have been changing irreversibly. Whereas three years ago a number of countries in the West regarded sanctions as a way to force the Kremlin to change its policies or at least to refrain from taking steps that were feared at the time, hardly any of these politicians are still around today.


Furthermore it is possible that the imposition of new sanctions and retention of the old ones is driven by the desire of politicians in the West who consider reconciliation and agreements with the Kremlin unnecessary and harmful to hamper the plans of anyone holding that such steps are essential. And you will find such people in the West, and in considerable numbers at that: while they may not harbour any sympathy for the Kremlin, they nevertheless believe that it is in the interests of the West to reach agreement with Russia on a mutually acceptable code of conduct and to adhere to such a code. However, the parties opposed to reconciliation are now taking the upper hand and are banking solely on confrontation.


And in this case the thesis that the “bad rulers” are bad, but the “people are good” is inevitably being jettisoned due to politics. The entire country is seen as an adversary, while the consequences of such confrontation should affect everyone.


Finally, blind faith in the power of nuclear parity with the United States is also illusory. There is nothing permanent, immutable and absolute in the world. Life does not stand still, new technologies and new opportunities will appear, including in the military sector. Already today we can perceive the emergence of new technologies that are capable, given the respective costs on their completion, if they don’t physically destroy the enemy, of curbing fatally a country’s development, even without the global disaster of a nuclear war. This concerns space, the methods that can be used to affect remotely the operability of technical systems, and technologies using cyberspace. Today’s Russia is clearly not in a position to engage in an endurance race on such a wide range of technologies, especially given that maintaining nuclear parity already necessitates greater expenditure. And in view of the above, the whole nation will have to pay, and not just today’s decision-makers. And let this be a question not for today, but for tomorrow or the day after tomorrow – new generations will find it even more galling that the current advocates of confrontation with the West on all fronts took this vital choice on their behalf. As is often the case in history, old people, who are dissatisfied with their own lives and the world around them, take the future away from the young in revenge, condemning them to a senseless race for semi-mythical past grandeur. As the French say, “le mort saisit le vif” – “the dead seize the living”. And it is this long-term vision, and not the ability to physically survive sanctions, which should determine today’s foreign policy decisions.


The author is an economist