Yuri Levada, head of the Al-Russia Public Opinion Research
Centre (VTsIOM), announced ten days ago that his team had voluntarily broken
up.
The VTsIOM isn't just being broken up; it will be incorporated, but
in such a way that nothing will remain after this incorporation. According
to the official version, the 100% state-owned VTsIOM polling agency has
become a burden to the Labour Ministry. However, VTsIOM hasn't been taking
any funding from the state budget; it is self-financing.
There is also an unofficial story about the reasons behind the crackdown
on the most authoritative polling agency in Russia. VTsIOM, the largest
polling agency of its kind, has produced political ratings. Moreover,
it has been doing so in the lead-up to the elections. The authorities
haven't liked the ratings it has produced; in the opinion of the authorities,
the ratings have been incorrect in some way. Moreover, the authorities
didn't like the fact that VTsIOM was so authoritative; however, it could
not be faulted professionally.
All these circumstances combined to endanger the outcome of the elections
- the results which Central Electoral Commission chief Alexander Veshnyakov
is supposed to announce in December. And so it was decided: VTsIOM is
a burden.
This newspaper has been publishing those very same ratings which the
authorities didn't like and which now mean that VTsIOM is on the verge
of liquidation.
One important figure from the opinion is this: only 5% of those polled
believe that the United Russia party represents the interests of all social
groups. All the other parties rate even lower; but this is a pathetic
result for United Russia, which is supposed to be the election favourite.
Even more importantly, 37% of respondents (this is the top score) think
the Communist Party (CPRF) represents the interests of the most numerous
social group: "ordinary citizens - state-sector workers, manual workers,
agricultural workers." On this point, United Russia's score was less
than half that of the CPRF. The gap between these two parties is even
greater on support for the interests of the poorest social group: 29%
for the CPRF and one-sixth of that for United Russia.
It's worth noting that the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)
scored an unexpectedly high result in this poll. It was third after the
CPRF and United Russia for a number of questions.
This is unlikely to mean that lots of people have started to trust
Vladimir Zhirinovsky. In the 1999
elections, Zhirinovsky's party barely made it across the 5% threshold.
The secret is that Zhirinovsky gets the protest vote: voting for the
LDPR is equivalent to voting against all candidates. The LDPR amazed everyone
with its results in the Duma elections ten years ago. That was the result
of the despair felt by voters after government troops opened fire on the
parliament building.
Finally, for three social groups (cultural and academic elite, the
middle class, and the intelligentsia), most respondents chose YABLOKO
as the party that best expresses the interests of those groups (16%, 19%
and 26% respectively). The middle class is a guarantor of social stability.
This means that all the efforts of United Russia to present itself as
the guarantor of stability have failed.
The Union of Right-Wing Forces (SPS) led the poll only for expressing
the interests of oligarchs and directors of enterprises (24% and 16%);
which means that YABLOKO's main rival (more conformist and less in opposition
than YABLOKO) is weaker.
Are You for the Bolsheviks or the Communists?
To make it clear what "weighting" particular social groups
have, and thus how many votes each party will receive, VTsIOM drew up
the following diagram.
As a rule, poll respondents take their own social group into account.
Half of them consider themselves ordinary citizens (52%); 14% say they
belong to the poorest group, and another 14% to the intelligentsia; 7%
consider themselves middle class; 4% say they are part of the wealthiest
groups; and 12% didn't name their social group.
Thirty-one percent of respondents across all social groups say they
accept the CPRF as "their" party, but only 20% intend to vote
for it. United Russia's situation is the reverse: 18% of respondents consider
it their party, but 19% intend to vote for it. For YABLOKO the corresponding
figures are 12% and 7%, for the SPS 10% and 2%, for the LDPR 11% and 6%.
In this respect the CPRF leads the poll on both acceptance and voting
intentions, followed by United Russia, YABLOKO, the LDPR, and the SPS.
Social Altruism
United Russia, the pro-Kremlin party, is the only party for which the
voting intention score is higher than the acceptance score; even so it
trails the CPRF by 1%. To understand this phenomenon of "social altruism",
VTsIOM examined the difference between "acceptance" and voting
intentions for United Russia among various social groups.
Revealingly, 41% of those in the wealthiest social groups consider
United Russia to be their party, but only 22% intend to vote for it. As
for the poorest social group, only 8% consider United Russia to be their
party, but 15% will vote for it.
In order to understand what this means, it is necessary to realize that the higher the social group, the broader the options for
choice of political party. The interests of the upper social groups are
not expressed by one party alone; two of the five parties are accepted
by those groups as "their" parties. But the poorest groups have
no real choice; only 0.7 parties out of five were accepted there.
Quo Vadis?
The figures quoted above also make it possible to estimate potential
changes in the parties' ratings in the time before the elections. It isn't
hard to see that for those parties that score higher on voting intentions
than acceptance, the only possible direction for the voting intention
score is down. But for those scoring higher on acceptance, the voting
intention score might well be raised.
Any successful PR efforts by a party can sway undecided voters to vote
for it; but no amount of campaigning can really increase its social support
base - that is, induce a greater number of voters to consider it "their"
party.
The SPS has the greatest scope for raising its rating (five-fold);
YABLOKO and the LDPR could double their ratings; the CPRF could raise
its rating by one-third; but the only prediction for United Russia is
a small decline.
Ballot papers on election day will include another option as well:
"against all candidates". It frequently happens in elections
that the "against all" option gets more votes than any actual
candidate. In predictions for the Duma elections, it is already clear
that there is some support for this option. And support could rise as
election day approaches, mostly due to undecided voters. VTsIOM has drawn
up a diagram showing support for the "against all" option among
various social groups, and the possibility of this support increasing.
There is also a connection here with the lack of any real choice for the
poorest social groups.
Comments
The parliamentary elections of 1999 were virtually unpredictable. The
newcomers were most successful: the aggressively bureaucratic Unity movement
and its liberal appendage, the SPS. Unity called itself the party of the
president, rested on the laurels of the campaign in Chechnya, recruited
well-known individuals into its ranks, and claimed that it would be "the
power for all times". Unity took its votes from the CPRF. The SPS
never did manage to figure out whether it was or wasn't part of the opposition,
but this party of the rich bourgeoisie was essentially pro-Putin as well.
The SPS took its votes from YABLOKO. The authorities were satisfied with
this situation, and would like to preserve the status quo.
The research done by VTsIOM smashes the picture which the regime is
trying to impose on the public.
United Russia - the party using Putin's name as a cover - is not the
unquestioned favourite. It transpires that the CPRF has better chances;
and we may well see a "red comeback", as in 1995. Back then,
it was a reaction to the badly-planned reforms carried out in the interests
of a small part of the rich bourgeoisie. Now, on the contrary, the pro-Kremlin
party is supporting the war against the oligarchs; yet the public still
doesn't believe this war is either real or necessary.
VTsIOM's calculations indicate that support for the opposition YABLOKO
is rising, despite all the claims that YABLOKO (the "helpless intelligentsia"
party) is finished. If we believe VTsIOM figures, it can't be ruled out
that those who are considered the opposition may win the Duma elections.
It has been a constructive opposition until now, constructive with respect
to Putin first of all; but once it has secured popular support, the opposition
may become less constructive and conformist.
VTsIOM has presented a picture which the president, the government,
and the Central Electoral Commission are very reluctant to accept. If
this was fifty years ago, the authorities could simply declare opinion
polls a "bourgeois pseudo-science", and that would be that.
But those times have passed, and we don't have those kind of leaders any
more; so far, they have restricted themselves to breaking up the polling
agency that "paints an inaccurate picture."
Of course, this is only research; but it is research that has been
carried out by competent and authoritative specialists. The election results
may differ from these forecasts, but only by a few percentage points.
Remember these figures - and know that if the election results turn out
to be substantially different, then you are being misled.
See also:
State Duma elections
2003
State Duma elections 1999
YABLOKO and the
SPS
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