| A 70-page document entitled "The Public Part of the
Military Doctrine" was circulated among participants at a meeting
yesterday attended by President Vladimir Putin, military commanders, and
members of the public.
According to its preamble, the document released yesterday is a corollary
of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by presidential
decree in April 2000. Ivan Safranchuk of the Center for Defense Information
(Washington) says, however, that some provisions of the document conflict
with the postulates of the Military Doctrine: "Inter alia, it makes
no mention of a multipolar world as the main trend, and does not refer
to the expanded NATO as a major threat to Russian security."
Alexei Arbatov (Yabloko),
deputy chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, says this document is far
too controversial to be regarded as a military doctrine. It is instead
being used to acquaint the public with the views of the military command.
"On the one hand, the document mentions that a global war is less
likely. On the other hand, analysis of the lessons of modern wars do not
leave any room for doubt - the matter concerns readiness for a war against
NATO," noted the legislator. For example, the authors of the document
emphasize the need to prevent non-contact warfare (bombing) in favor of
contact warfare. However, this means that Russia needs weapons to use
against the high-precision weapons that only the United States possesses.
To accomplish this goal, Russia will have to double or even triple its
Armed Forces, says Arbatov, while the document plainly states that troop
strength should amount to 1 million.
Military analyst Yevgeny Putilov considers that "incompatibility
with the economic capacities of the state" is the main problem of
the document. Inter alia, the document doesn't include a forecast of the
future military-political situation: "The survival of NATO as an
alliance with an offensive military doctrine will require a dramatic reorganization
in the construction of the Russian Armed Forces and changes to Russia's
nuclear strategy." Putilov asked: "Who needs a doctrine that
doesn't stipulate changes for this particular turn of events and essentially
acknowledges its shortcomings if NATO survives"?"
Judging by the document, nuclear deterrence remains the basis of Russia's
military policy. The document emphasizes, however, that nuclear deterrence
is "not effective without modern general application forces".
These forces are supposed to be able to fight two localized wars at the
same time, Ivanov said yesterday.
Putilov believes that this is an attempt to ape the American military
doctrine of the Clinton era, an attempt that is doomed to failure owing
to the current state of the Russian Armed Forces.
Safranchuk says that some provisions in the document are quite risible
v such as the assumption that a rise in civilian oversight for the military
can be seen from the increase in the number of lawsuits against the Defense
Ministry in civilian courts from 2,746 in 2000 to 3,507 in 2002.
Arbatov and Safranchuk agree, however, that the decision to publish
the document is certainly good news as it provides a pretext for a public
discussion on the future of the Armed Forces. On the other hand, Ivanov's
statement that the military reforms are over is bad news indeed.
See also:
The
Russian Army
Russia and
NATO
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