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| The Chairman of the Military Committee of
the European Union may become one of the main foreign partners
of the Russian Defence Minister. Now this post is occupied
by a Norwegian Gustav Haglund. (Sergei Ivanov - left, Gustav
Haglund -right). |
The unfolding drama of the war in Iraq has pushed less sensational
problems to the background, even though these problems may be extremely
important in the long term. They include a higher profile for relations
between Russia and leading Western European countries, which is
the only positive corollary (against a host of negative ones) from
the Persian Gulf crisis.
However, military cooperation, to say nothing of integration,
is still on the fringes of political attention in Russia and abroad.
The Iraqi crisis and the dismantling of NATO
There are lots of grounds for scepticism, all of them in the
foreground. The deplorable state of the Russian army and military-industrial
complex is well known. The same holds true for the archaic military
command structure and the inertia of its composition. The low
level of combat readiness of the army, catastrophic technical
state of decline and moral corruption (apparently even the Head
of the General Head-Quarters acknowledges this fact) make Europeans
uncertain about the future of Russia-s democratic development
and its economic reforms.
The situation in Western Europe is certainly much better. However,
Europe also faces problems. The proper European institutions that
should service European security after the end of the Cold War
are still at an "embryonic" stage. The absence of a
habitual single leader, international discord, and financial restrictions
are impeding developments. The existing structures, programmes
and expenses within NATO remain a heavy burden that most countries
have to bear out of inertia. The Iraqi crisis may well accelerate
the partial dismantling of NATO on both sides of the Atlantic
and the construction of a truly European defence system in its
place.
However, it is still clear that military cooperation between
Russia and the European Union still lacks a solid foundation.
Its Eastern component is in a ruined and distressed state; whereas
there is no Western component - it is a draft project and lacks
any real organisational or material basis.
Nevertheless, there are objective prerequisites for such cooperation.
Moreover, in military terms Russia and the European Union are
potentially mutually complementary to the same extent as they
are economically. To a certain extent neither Russia nor the European
Union are capable of independently ensuring their security - despite
Western scepticism and Russian inane statements about self-sufficiency.
Let us consider possible directions and forms of cooperation,
ranging from simple to complicated and short term to long term.
Partners and Competitors
You have some arms trade, for example, deliveries of Russian
spare parts for weapons and military equipment left in Europe
by the late Warsaw Pact and the sale of anti-aircraft missiles,
helicopters, and other items to Greece and Turkey. However, in
general arms trade between Russia and leading EU countries is
insignificant in terms of industrial scope and the demands of
the armies. The military-industrial complexes of Russia, France,
Great Britain, Germany, and Italy are more competitors than allies
in the global arms trade and don't want to allow foreign military
hardware onto their domestic markets for both commercial and political
reasons.
In the meantime, there are reasons and motives for cooperation
at a higher level. First, it is becoming more and more difficult
for Russian and West European firms to compete on their own in
the global market with the United States and newly emerging Asian
rivals. Secondly, it is becoming more difficult to cover the cost
of sophisticated weapons with national budgets and national scientific
and technical capacities. The European Union has been already
pursuing cooperation in the creation of some weapons systems (for
example, the Eurofighter). Russia involves its traditional contractors
from the post-Soviet space in some forms of cooperation, but the
funds [allotted by the national budget] for the defence order
are catastrophically low even for Russian enterprises (their production
facilities are operating at only 25% capacity: the figure is even
lower for design bureaus and research institutes).
This is already insufficient to remain at the foreground of military
equipment competition with the USA and other emerging military
leaders of the 21st century. There is only one way to maintain
positions on the international arms markets and equip one-s own
army: military-technological and production cooperation between
Russia and the leading states in Western Europe. This opens up
a really huge field for cooperation, provided that a number of
political, economic and legal problems are resolved.
For example, Russia is still manufacturing the best fighters
(SU-27 and modifications), naval and ground tactical missiles,
artillery systems, armored vehicles, and small ships. The Western
Europe may contribute electronics, informational systems, fire
control and communications systems, advanced maintenance facilities,
etc. Russia and France have already tried a limited form of cooperation
(the SU-27 with French avionics) but this is more of an experiment
than anything else.
The lack of strategic mobility for rapid reaction collective
forces is the universally recognized flaw of the military integration
plans of the European Union. Russia (together with Ukraine) can
fill in the gap and offer Europe the best heavy transport aircrafts
in the world (Ruslan or Mria types). In this case the rapid reaction
collective forces will be able to reach across the Balkans into
Africa and the Middle East. And using Russian bases, it may even
reach into Central and South Asia, South-East Asia, and Far East.
Another well-known defect of the EU relates to the underdevelopment
of its military space complex and its dependence on the United
States. You cannot prepare and deploy modern armed forces (including
long-range high-precision weapons systems) without reconnaissance
satellites, satellites for command and control, communications,
navigation, and weather reports, as demonstrated by the wars in
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Russia has surplus capacities available to create space carriers
and other good spacecrafts. However, owing to a shortfall in financing
the space military group and its ground infrastructure are in
ruins. The Russian Aviation and Space Agency and its branches
have functioned largely owing to launches of American satellites
and depend to a great degree on such cooperation (cooperation
at a small level exists with France, and there are plans with
Italy and some other countries). Therefore military partnership
with the EU can involve, at the first stage, an abrupt increase
in the deployment of Russian carriers for the launch of European
satellites, and further integration for the support, development,
control and deployment of military space systems and dual-purpose
satellites.
Without such cooperation neither Russia nor the European Union
will be able to introduce high-precision weapons which make it
possible to conduct "non-contact wars" and reduce their
losses and corresponding damage in the military theatre to a minimum,
although the recent Iraqi war has demonstrated that weapons alone
cannot fill in for a shortage of political foresight and responsibility
of their leaders.
Fear of Dependence
Anti-missile defence is another important sphere. Western Europe
has not been very responsive to America's suggestions in mid-1990s
or to Russia's suggestions this decade to set up a joint anti-missile
theatre defence system (i.e., against small- and medium-range
ballistic missiles). This is due to the fact that Europeans do
not see any imminent threat and therefore do not believe it is
worth all the expense, political effort and particularly increased
dependence on the United States and Russia. However, the situation
may change, and a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
in Asia and North Africa (in particular, as a result of the war
in Iraq) will certainly put this particular threat into the foreground
of European security.
No single European country nor the European Union in general
have the capacity to create a modern anti-missile theatre defence
system. Obviously, such a modern system, which guarantees the
physical survival of every country involved, requires close relations
between allies and partners and firm mutual obligations in security.
These kinds of relations have been established with the United
States within NATO, but the Iraqi crisis has compromised the viability
of the Alliance and Europe's readiness to rely on Washington,
whose single-handed military forays may make its European allies
targets of revenge strikes. Moreover, for purely geographical
reasons the anti-missile theatre defence system will always be
of secondary importance for the United States, as its territory
is beyond the reach of all small and medium-range ballistic missiles.
Only intercontinental missiles can threaten the USA, which necessitate
a strategic anti-ballistic missile system for defence.
On the contrary, Russia and the European Union face a common
threat of small and medium-range ballistic missiles that may be
launched from North Africa, Mid-East, and Asia. Russian radars,
in addition to space systems (which are potentially joint systems)
provide immediate warning on the launch of missiles from those
directions. Russian anti-aircraft complexes (S-300s, S-400s, modifications
and new generation complexes), coupled with European electronics
and informational systems, could create the world's best anti-missile
theatre defence system both from a technical and geostrategic
point of view. Cooperation with the European Union (unlike cooperation
with the United States via NATO) would not generate the problems
of extending the system to Washington's allies in the Far East
and would not make China suspicious.
The same holds true for anti-aircraft defence, as aircraft may
be used not only as ballistic weapons, but also as a delivery
means. In addition, close cooperation in anti-aircraft defence
is urgently needed to avert aircraft terrorism in Europe (like
"black September" in New York and Washington).
Finally we come to the most delicate and least developed sphere
of potential cooperation - nuclear weapons. Until now, national
British and French nuclear forces have only played their role
under the umbrella of the powerful strategic nuclear forces of
the United States and its obligations under NATO and only targeted
the territory of the USSR/Russia. The split and marginalization
of NATO, disappearance of the threat from Moscow, new common interests
in foreign policy and the security of Russia and the EU can finally
change the situation here.
For certain objective reasons the French and British nuclear
forces will for the foreseeable future l remain quite limited
in quantity and composition (in theory, about 600 warheads for
each country, and up to 1,000 warheads in all). Due to financial
and technical problems, Russian strategic forces will be down
to 1,000 warheads or fewer ten to fifteen years from now (far
fewer actually functioning warheads), regardless the fate of the
May 2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Potential Reductions.
Facing New Threats
On their own the national strategic forces of the three aforementioned
countries will not amount to too much against the American potential,
but that will be acceptable, as long as relations with Washington
are not hostile. However, the possible development of the nuclear
potential of third-party countries (North Korea, Iran, Pakistan,
Israel, India, China, and possibly Japan, Taiwan, South Korea,
Libya, Syria, etc) may force Russia, Great Britain, and France
to reconsider the sufficiency of their nuclear deterrent forces.
Certainly cooperation here is particularly delicate. Cooperation
even within the confines of NATO has only involved the United
States and Great Britain, and within the CIS Russia and Ukraine
(and Belarus to a limited extent). However, the emergence of a
common threat, security requirements and the inability to rely
on a strong patron any longer may bring down existing barriers
sooner or later. First, integration between Great Britain and
France, then within the broader framework of the European Union,
and finally with Russia, may become the only possible way to offer
a guaranteed deterrent in all directions of the multi-polar nuclear
world. At first, cooperation may proceed along the lines of compatibility
of early warning systems, "hot lines", then the provision
of broader information, then coordination of operational plans,
lists of targets, tactic of targeting (certainly not each other),
the compatibility of control systems and finally assume the form
of cooperation in the production of nuclear weapons and support
systems.
As well as science and technology cooperation, the European financing
of all military projects, investments in Russian industry (which
will be easier to make in joint military research and technology
programmes), as well as purchases of weapons and military equipments,
will be of prime importance for all the aforementioned directions
of cooperation. It differs from current attempts to simply attract
buyers of Russian equipment from Europe or attract investors to
the holding companies of the Russian military-industrial complex
on conditions that are unattractive from the viewpoint of Western
corporate law.
It has transpired that the European Union cannot be fully integrated
in terms of military capacity and cannot become a global centre
of military might in the 21st century without Russia. On the other
hand, without the European Union and its help Russia cannot resolve
its key goals: radical improvement in the welfare of the Russian
military (and transition from conscription to the contract-based
formation of the army), preservation of the strategic deterrent
potential, and comprehensive technical refurbishment of the army
to defend the country in the south and east).
It will prove impossible to achieve political recognition of
objective common demands and fully exploit the capacities of Russia
and the European Union without radical positive changes in Russia
and the European Union, radical progress in economic and social
cooperation, as well as partnership in foreign policy. However,
this would appear to be a fantasy. Although judging from experience
in the past decade, life in terms of dramatic change sometimes
goes far beyond the most unreal fantasies
See also:
Russia
- EU Relations
Russia's
ABM Initiatives
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