| By Alexei Melnikov
The thesis in liberal political circles that there is insufficient
democracy in Russia is something that is obvious in itself.
But the main problem, on the contrary, is the absence of aristocratism
and elitism, the blending of genres, persons, and institutions.
Everything is subordinated to a kind of uniform standard
based on the power of money. On this altar scientific conscientiousness,
the talents of journalists, and political reputations are
sacrificed. And when some kind of moneybags ascends on the
political horizon, a significant part of the political community
begins to shake its little wings in excitement, in the hope
that the golden dust will settle on them.
In point of fact, it was in this that the main content of
the "Prokhorov phenomenon" and other similar appearances
of big money in Russian politics lay. This is why the general
picture is painted in a single colour with different hues
-instead of freely flourishing complexity, we have the emulation
of plebeianism in the very worst sense of this word.
With the exception of individual colourful persons and a
scattering of expert organizations that are seriously studying
the phenomenon of power, the institution of political culture
is entirely absent. In its place is a quivering substance
in which yesterday's expert easily passes into the hypostasis
of a propagandist of this or that political party, and then,
without shaking down his soiled feathers, once again paints
himself as a respectable representative of the community for
which the main interest is the truth. As if, after a bout
of drunkenness, he had straightened his tie over his stale
shirt, wiped his spectacles with his handkerchief, smoothed
down his tousled hair with his five fingers, and gone back
into decent society.
Examples are numerous. It is possible, for example, to offer
to the public today, with a serious air, the cinders and exhaust
gases of the bureaucratic system in the form of so-called
Just Russia as an opposition to this same system, festooning
this propaganda thesis with names and events. In such a way
that it resembles some kind of strange antique trophy. That
is to say, to sell one's political bias to the public in the
guise of expertise and independent analysis, and on the following
day, to return to the writing of expert articles about the
regional and other elections. Moreover, in the same publication,
on the neighbouring page.
Another similar shoddy institution for Orwellian proles is
the TV political talk show. This is not journalism, it is
not a conversation of experts, and nor is it an argument between
politicians and experts; rather, it is something glossy and
inane, with a predetermined result and inevitable applause
from the studio audience.
There may be different varieties -a glamorous grandmother-type
lady and a Putinian journalist discuss a "fantastically
political" something-or-other; a stocky, short-haired
little peasant with the manners of the hero of criminal Odessa
from the TV series "Liquidation" talks almost like
a kid; an anchor with the eyes of a drunken herring "acts
as judge and jury," dividing his guests beforehand into
the bad and the good. Or, for example, now we see a director
from an amateur theatrical group writhing in hysterics "like
a witch on the Sabbath," now it is a political scientist
doing the same, now it is a fragment of the Soviet past on
"trial" with votes cranked up via call centres.
What are these programs capable of teaching? The problem
is not even that solo performances are given on them by "specialists
in all subjects," which means specialists in nothing.
The problem is that even the interesting academics who find
themselves in this format are forced to swim in the limitless
liquid porridge of political pop culture.
And what is achieved in such a case? The example of what
kind of freedom can the "elite" show to the democratic
lower strata? None at all! They are absolutely one and the
same thing - the upper and lower strata are created from uniform
democratic material, of which there is indeed no shortage.
The problem lies in its abundance, in the fact that this material
knows everything, that it is ready to interfere in everything
and to organize everything in the best way. And what it has
organized can be seen in the example of Russia -here the mob
reigns everywhere and in everything; here the ideal of an
ochlocracy has been realized.
On the Culture channel the other day, the philosopher Fedor
Girenok said, in connection with the works of (philosopher,
historian, and essayist) Georgy Fedotov, that freedom cannot
be universal -that it is always private, always for the few.
This is an idea that, at any rate, is interesting, and that,
in its topicality, is absolutely repugnant to the radical
Russian demos, which regards itself as free only by dint of
its frondism (Ed. carping criticism, selfish opposition, rebelliousness,
general malcontentedness).
But even if you believe that freedom is the privilege of
the few, that it is elitist and aristocratic, it must be actively
affirmed in opposition to the Demos that is "crudely
thrusting itself forward," like Aristophanes' centaurs
(noted for their animal lust and uncivilized behaviour). Unfortunately,
there is not so much of this in Russia as is needed. And this
is why the main task of political changes in Russia is to
disparage the plebeianism of the people and the flesh of their
flesh -the authorities, and to affirm models of culture and
complexity. From democracy to freedom.
Alexei Melnikov is member of the YABLOKO party
See also:
The
original publication
Elections
to the State Duma 2011
Freedom
of Speech
|
