| MOSCOW--The political and financial furor in Russia sparked
by the arrest
over the weekend of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, chairman of Yukos Oil, vividly
highlights the stakes in Russia's forthcoming parliamentary elections.
The
future direction of Russia's still-fragile democracy is in balance in the
December polls, which will be much more than a routine exercise in Russia's
peculiar brand of managed democracy.
A resounding victory for parties aligned with the Kremlin would allow
President Vladimir Putin to further tighten his authoritarian grip on
Russia and expand the already vast powers of the presidency, possibly
beyond a second term. The grim alternative is stagnation and upheaval,
as
Russia's politicians position themselves for the post-Putin era, and its
businessmen scramble to protect their assets. Either way, the stability
brought about by Putin will fray at the edges.
Despite Putin's contentions to the contrary, the arrest of Khodorkovsky
is
undoubtedly politically motivated and marks a significant deterioration
in
the political environment in Russia. In many ways, it is the natural
progression of Putin's successful efforts to tighten his control over
any
form of political debate.
During his first four years in office, Putin succeeded in downgrading
the
Duma, the lower house of Parliament, to little more than a discussion
club
with benefits - a situation that he hopes to prolong after the December
elections. Early in his presidency, Putin established his dominance over
the Duma by helping so-called centrist parties (which in reality are
exercises in cynical pro-Kremlin political pragmatism) win seats on the
back of his personal popularity. Consequently, in sharp contrast to the
brinkmanship and gridlock that characterized the assembly during the
Yeltsin era, the Duma acquiesced to the Putin government's program of
tax,
land, pension, administrative, judicial and other reforms.
The dark side of his domination of the Duma has been Putin's success
in
expanding the powers of his office, through centralizing the organs of
government, reducing freedom of expression and bringing in legions of
former law-enforcement colleagues to fill important posts in all areas
of
the government. The Yukos scandal is another manifestation of Putin's
fixation on expanding the power of the presidency in both the political
and
economic arenas.
A key undercurrent of the looming elections, thus far largely ignored,
is
whether Putin will be able to convince the newly elected Duma deputies
to
amend the constitution to extend the president's term in office beyond
four
years, and/or allow the president to remain in office for more than two
terms.
Putin will almost inevitably win a second term in presidential elections
scheduled for March 2004, and has publicly denied an interest in staying
on
beyond a second term. But he appears to have grown to like power and is
unlikely to surrender the presidency without at least trying to change
the
rules of the game, which would require the approval of two-thirds of the
Duma. Even if he wanted to walk away from the Kremlin after his second
term, Putin's vast entourage - led by the siloviki, the favored Kremlin
faction comprised of former KGB and law-enforcement officials - would
probably pressure him to remain in power to give them more time to convert
political influence into personal wealth.
In addition to determining whether Putin would succeed in a bid to extend
his stay in the Kremlin, the Duma elections are effectively a referendum
on
Putin's programs and policies. An electoral result in favor of pro-Kremlin
parties would amount to a mandate for Putin to continue to tighten his
grip
on the levers of power, while giving him the tools to do so.
On the other hand, a poor performance by United Russia, the Kremlin's
banner-carrier, would represent a black eye for Putin and underscore the
limitations of his ability to parlay his personal popularity - his personal
approval rating stands at more than 70 percent - into electoral success
for
his chosen party standard.
If strong lobbyist factions - primarily those supported by some of Russia's
oligarchs - carve out a voice for themselves, the Kremlin will have a
much
more difficult time managing the Duma. A strong showing by the liberal
Yabloko faction (which has received financial support from Khodorkovsky)
could interfere with the Kremlin's plans.
As much as 40 percent of the new Duma, including some candidates belonging
to major parties, such as the Communists and United Russia, could
effectively be lobbyists for a range of financial and industrial groups.
(Ironically, the Kremlin's efforts against Khodorkovsky and Yabloko may
have the unintended effect of bolstering the party's fortunes, by
increasing its support among the so-called protest electorate.)
As the Kremlin pulls out all the stops to try to get the results it
desires
in the Duma elections, it is displaying the authoritarianism that will
increasingly characterize the Russian political environment if Putin gets
his way. The Kremlin has not hesitated to use so-called administrative
resources for electoral ends, in violation of laws prohibiting the
involvement of the executive branch in parliamentary elections. The
electoral watchdog, a Putin loyalist, has greeted these violations with
a
resounding silence.
In a maneuver with chilling Soviet-era overtones, the Kremlin has broadcast
debates between Duma candidates on state television, but only after the
discussions had been carefully edited to remove criticism of the president,
his economic policy, the conduct of the current Duma campaign and other
sensitive issues.
The Kremlin is also trying to shape the Duma in its own image through
underhanded attempts to derail the opposition. It has quietly supported
the
creation of offshoot parties - such as the recently founded Motherland
Party, headed by Sergey Glaziyev, one of the few bright stars of the
Communist Party - to splinter the opposition. (Ironically, recent opinion
polls suggest that supporters of these bogus competitors have migrated
from
United Russia, rather than the Communist Party - and that other Kremlin
political fabrications have had a similar effect.)
The ongoing government investigation of Yukos, and the arrest of
Khodorkovsky in particular, is widely believed to be a roundabout way
of
discouraging his political ambitions, and to disrupt his attempts to fund
Duma candidates and parties.
The failure of the Kremlin's efforts to engineer a pliable Duma - and
recent opinion polls suggest that the Kremlin has its work cut out for
it -
could put a damper on Putin's escalating authoritarianism. But the
alternative scenario, in which Putin is unable to extend his term in office
(or unwilling to risk defeat in attempting to do so), would engender a
succession struggle, beginning as early as 2005 or 2006.
Duma deputies - particularly those willing to shift positions in the
name
of political expediency - would ignore the lame duck Putin. Political
intrigue would assume center-stage at the expense of substantive
legislation. Even if Putin makes it clear that, regardless of the
composition of the Duma, he will not try to extend his term in office
beyond 2008, instead opting for a Chinese-style selection of a loyal
successor, the din of politicking will drown out anything of substance.
But even an electoral defeat for the Kremlin's forces on Dec. 7 would
not
necessarily mean that Putin will have to resign himself to retiring from
the presidency after two terms. A new Duma that is not initially to Putin's
liking could still be molded to be comply with the Kremlin's wishes. The
opposition - as typified by the Communist Party and the so-called Liberal
Democrats, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky - has become too enamored of the
trappings of power to want to risk losing them by coming into conflict
with
the Kremlin.
The dangers of heightening authoritarianism are clear. Increasing
government control over the news media and the electoral process, the
ongoing war in Chechnya, the attack on big business and the growing role
of
former security officers are just a few recent vivid examples. Voters
need
to think hard about what it would mean to sacrifice what passes for
democracy in Russia, in favor of a further strengthening of authoritarian
rule.
Alexander Bim is a political analyst at IMAGE-Contact Consulting Group
in
Moscow. Kim Iskyan is a former securities analyst for the Russian equity
market.
See also:
Elections to the
State Duma, 2003
YUKOS Case
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