With "managed democracy" on the rise, the authorities
are not so concerned about election results as they are about presenting
a facade of decorum. This, however, becomes more problematic as elections
increasingly become an instrument for legitimizing a choice that has already
been made behind the scenes, rather than offering voters a real choice;
as a consequence of which, voters are losing interest in elections.
The gubernatorial elections already held this year should have served
as warning signals. If one compares the results of the 11 regional elections
(not counting Chechnya) -- in Taimyr autonomous district, Mordovia, Karachayevo-Cherkessia,
Magadan, Belgorod, Sverdlovsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Novgorod, Leningrad region
and St. Petersburg -- with the results of the previous round of elections
in those regions in 1999-2000, certain trends become manifestly apparent:
Voter turnout dropped on average by one-fifth, while the number of people
voting against all candidates almost doubled.
It could, of course, be partly put down to "cumulative" voter
fatigue caused by regional heads' long periods in office in the majority
of regions. But such fatigue could equally well apply to the upcoming
State Duma elections. It may be just a coincidence, but in recent months
the drop in turnout has been getting greater: from 5 percentage points
in Belgorod this May, to 12 to 13 percentage points in Novgorod and Leningrad
last month, to 18 percentage points in St. Petersburg.
Pollsters have been quite upbeat in their turnout forecasts for the
Duma elections, predicting a 55 to 60 percent turnout -- which is quite
respectable, even if lower than in 1999.
The problem, however, is that in a whole handful of regions significantly
less than half the electorate may turn out to vote. While in 1999 only
Leningrad region's turnout was below the 50 percent mark, this year St.
Petersburg, Sverdlovsk, Sakhalin, Kemerovo, Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk may
follow suit.
Four years ago, all of these regions were hovering in the 50 to 55 percent
range. The majority of these regions are considered to be "democratic"
and bastions of liberal forces. If the turnout drops below 50 percent,
the "party of power" will lose more face than it will votes.
And compensating for these losses with the help of the "managed"
Bashkortostan, Tatarstan or Mordoviya (virtually the only region where
turnout this year was higher than four years ago) is not really a solution.
The authorities are genuinely concerned about a low turnout, as is confirmed
by the fact that the Duma elections were moved forward to a more convenient
date, and by the Central Elections Commission's campaign to get the vote
out.
United Russia's inclusion of some 30 governors on the party's regional
lists should make a not insignificant contribution to "administrative
mobilization." The Kremlin's thinking is that the governors, with
their reputations on the line, will do everything within their power to
deliver the "necessary" result. It is surely no accident that
the most influential and popular regional heads have been selected.
The problem is that low turnouts and voter disenchantment are only symptoms
of a deeper malaise. They are symptoms of a growing gulf between the authorities
and the public, and the authorities' diminishing legitimacy. If the alarms
ringing out in recent regional elections are not heeded by the authorities,
then the bell will surely toll at the Duma elections -- for the system
of elections and for Russia's young democracy, period.
Nikolai Petrov, head of the Center for Political and Geographical
Research, contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.
See also:
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State Duma elections 2003
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