| The Kremlin’s experiment aimed at creating
a strong party system in Russia is doomed to failure. Ironically,
Vladimir Putin’s soaring ratings are to blame. This also
means that the St. Petersburg liberals and top civil servants,
who rose to power on the back of Putin’s landslide election
victory in 2000, will, sooner or later, have to go through the
rigmarole of registering with the Justice Ministry, just like
all other political parties.
With less than a year left before the parliamentary elections,
the situation on the party political playing field is surprisingly
calm.
The SPS (the Union of the Rightist Forces) and Yabloko are still
trying to work out coalition agreements: United Russia is undergoing
changes in its spheres of influence; according to some reports,
the Communists are cooperating with tycoon Boris Berezovsky: and
according to others, they are not; while a completely new party
– SLON – has emerged, founded by ex-Yabloko man Vyacheslav
Igrounov.
However, all these developments have not changed the political
map of Russia radically. The media have long since lost interest
in party life, the reasoning being that real politics is carried
out in the corridors of power and behind the scenes.
And these so-called political ''parties'' are anything but; they
do not fulfill representative functions, do not facilitate communication
between the public and the authorities, and finally have no actual
influence on the powers-that-be.
On the contrary, the ''parties'' are more like an instrument
of state power, enabling it to imitate public politics and democratic
procedures. Russian parties are electoral machines and lobbying
corporations, which have nothing in common with traditional political
parties, other than their names.
There are other kinds of parties in Russia, however, that are
endowed with real authority. They are shadowy, closed parties.
Russian analysts call them ''elite groupings'' – ''the family''
[Boris Yeltsin’s ‘old guard’], ''St. Petersburg
power-wielders'' and ''St. Petersburg liberals''.
Those ''parties'' are incorporated in the power structure at
all levels. They have their leaders, their surrogate ideology,
financial resources, support groups, media outlets, but they lack
a social base.
So we have two types of pseudo-party: the public ones with their
ideologies, manifestos, leaders, electoral resources, although
they are not integrated in the power system. Then there are the
shadow parties, which have the real power resources, but no representation
in society.
''The torso'' and ''the head'' of the party system are separated.
And that discrepancy – that gap between the authorities
and the public – is the source of many problems in Russian
politics.
At the same time, this discrepancy fuels Putin’s popularity.
He plays the role of communicator between the public and power,
replacing political parties with himself.
Putin conveys the interests of society to the authorities. He
exercises the real power and in turn is able to transmit the power
impulses to the public.
Putin has covered up the yawning gap in the Russian political
system and has been duly rewarded. But it is impossible and unreasonable
to build the entire system solely on Putin’s rating. This
is a temporary measure. In the long run, without a normal party
system, Russia is doomed to political crises and catastrophes.
The only way to avoid these disasters is to inoculate ''the head''
and ''the torso'', to legalize the shadow parties and bring them
out into the public political arena.
In this sense, at the last [1999] parliamentary elections there
was an opportunity to form such parities on the basis of OVR and
Unity. The process was snuffed out by their merger into the United
Russia Party, however.
Consequently, existing parties have been degenerating into electoral
lobbying corporations. Party politics is becoming a sham, and
the entire system of power is based more and more on shadow and
administrative instruments.
The combination of a Byzantine monarchy with pseudo-democratic
institutions cannot, by definition, yield positive results or
contribute to the country's revival.
But the logic of the political process dictates that until a
new crisis occurs, any significant changes in the established
system are unlikely. Such a crisis may arise with the results
of the 2003 parliamentary elections, which could prove far less
predictable and ''calm'' for the Kremlin than they appear today.
See also:
Elections to the
State Duma 2003 | 