| Anchor: Good day.
This is the Ekho Moskvi radio station, and our guest is Alexei
Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Defence Committee of the State
Duma.
Arbatov: from the Yabloko faction.
Anchor: from the Yabloko faction.
Arbatov: Good day.
Anchor: We need you Alexei first of
all as a defense expert. The US will officially withdraw from
the ABM Treaty today. And they will also conduct the first testing
of the system today or tomorrow. At first everybody said that
the withdrawal was dangerous for Russia and directed against it.
Then, after the talks between Putin and Bush, either Bush convinced
Putin or Putin convinced himself that there was no danger in the
US secession from the ABM Treaty. What do you think about this?
A: I think the US withdrawal from
the ABM Treaty was performed in accordance with its provisions,
and Article 15 allows a withdrawal with a notice six months in
advance, which is what they did. Today marks six months since
they issued that notice on December 13 last year. This withdrawal
is an extremely negative event historically. It will have far-reaching
consequences. These consequences -- 10 and even 15 years from
now -- will still have an effect, as it was possible to preserve
the treaty by amending it. This would have facilitated the creation
of a limited defense from pariah states that Washington allegedly
fears. On the other hand, it would have made it possible to preserve
strategic stability between Russia and the US, when neither country
has a missile defense against each other.
Q: If everything was that simple,
by amending the Treaty the US and its administration -- by the
way first the Clinton administration and then the Bush administration
said they would withdraw. So what is it, just a whim or disagreement
with the experts' point of view?
A: In this field, as in any other field where the vital
national security interests and the most lethal weapons are involved,
there is always the logic of hard bargaining when each side is
ready to make concessions on matters of defense only if the other
side concedes, and in no other way. The Clinton administration
asked us to discuss with them possible amendments that would allow
them to create a limited system of national missile defense. We
declined partly because it was the year 2000 when the administration
was about to end its tour of duty, and the Republican opposition
made it clear that it would not support any agreement signed by
Clinton. In addition the US Congress was controlled by the Republicans,
and it was obvious that they would not support it either. Then
when the new administration came, there were negotiations on amendments.
But then Russia balked, apparently hoping that it would stand
its ground and say: no amendments, no changes to the ABM Treaty,
and its American allies, liberals in the US, and also China would
exert influence on the administration and prevent its secession
from the ABM Treaty. But this did not work. But that time Russia
had very weak bargaining chips in its hands to conduct the hardest,
most pragmatic negotiations devoid of any romanticism, negotiations
that have been proceeding on these matters for 30 years.
Q: You know it reminds me of the story
with poultry and steel. If you probably remember, some time ago
the leadership of Russia, I don't know whether it was under Yeltsin
or Putin, and it's not really important, said that we would respond
to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty asymmetrically. Then
there was poultry and there was steel. We responded with the poultry.
I have noticed that politicians have been saying more and more
often lately that we would then raise the issue of the Bering
Straits and its division. So this is also some sort of response.
Besides it is near Alaska where new bases are being built.
A: That is simply ridiculous. I think
we could also demand Alaska back for that matter. Especially since
some legal subtleties were not observed last century, actually
the century before last.
Q: By the way America is building
some of its missile defense bases there.
A: They are building the first base
there because this is required by the rules of ballistics. If
North Korea creates long-range missiles, and this is the number
one target for the American missile defense system: its missiles
will fly through this area, and it is easier to intercept them
from Alaska. A ballistic missile flies along a certain trajectory,
it cannot zigzag like a plane. So it is quite easy. The Clinton
administration planned to create only two limited bases: one in
Alaska, because North Korea was the prime candidate and it has
actually already launched space satellites, which means that it
has access to intercontinental capabilities, again owing tothe
law of ballistics. The second candidate is Iran. To protect themselves
from Iran, they needed a base somewhere in North Dakota. This
is where they planned to build the second base. But the new administration
does not want to bind itself to these conditions. It is going
to build a broader missile defense system that will also include
air and naval components, interception at the initial stage, at
the middle stage, etc. In other words, they do not want to be
bound by anything and this is why they withdrew from the ABM Treaty
and stopped discussing any amendments with us after we assumed
this position.
Q: If we return to the asymmetrical
response. A decision has been made. They have withdrawn and they
are already testing. Do you know if an asymmetrical response is
possible? And should there be a response at all?
A: Asymmetrical responses are possible.
It is important that we can afford this response because Russia's
financial possibilities are much more modest than those of the
US. I would say by several times. But it should also be a correct
response. What the Defense Ministry and general staff officials
are saying now sounds nice and soothing. But in fact it does not
reflect reality, as in order to come up with an asymmetrical response,
it is necessary to change the development programme of our strategic
nuclear forces. I believe the decisions that were made a year
and a half ago were a very big mistake. They were not attributable
to considerations of strategic expediency but rather infighting
within the Defense Ministry. The general staff wanted to liquidate
strategic rocket forces as an armed service. To this end it made
plans for radical cuts in these forces and the curtailment of
their modernization. This affects the Topol-M missiles that are
known to the whole country now. This seriously weakened our position
in the talks with the US because they did not care at all during
the entire 30 years of negotiations about naval strategic forces
or strategic aviation, where they have always been stronger than
Russia. But they were always interested in the limitation of the
land-based component of strategic forces. And we cut them on our
own. It is only natural that the Americans lost any interest.
This takes us back to the question that all emotions should be
set aside, as hard negotiations are under way. The talks that
were conducted between Russia and the US before the May summit
were quite unique, as the Americans did not put forth any requests
on what they would like Russia to do to limit and reduce its forces.
Not even one.
Q: In your view what does this mean?
A: This means that the programme we
had drafted made them lose all interest in any serious negotiations
because there was nothing they could ask of us. We had done ourselves
what they were trying to obtain during the previous decades of
talks but couldn't, and we had done even more. So these negotiations
turn into a public relations campaign.
Q: So it was not a question of money
but a question of wrong strategy. Is that right?
A: Moreover, assessments made by many
specialists, including myself and many military and civilian institutions,
say that the current modernization programme of the Russian strategic
nuclear forces is extremely costly. If we implement it in the
way it is written, we will assume heavy costs but obtain little
result, as we do not concentrate on something we can do better
than others, something that benefits us more than others, particularly
the Topol-M. Instead we spread our resources very thinly.
Q: But the Duma and your committee
authorize the allocation of resources, you vote and decide to
finance a certain programme. Perhaps ordinary taxpayers do not
know about this, but you get the full picture.
A: I would like to pay credit to our
committee and say that the prevailing opinion in the committee
on this issue was that the decision was wrong. We had very many
contacts with the President, the Security Council and the Defense
Minister, numerous memoranda were written and the committee decided
to revise the decision. However, it was not revised, and the budget
failed to defend these priorities, as the committee does not allocate
money alone, it does so together with other committees, including
committees that are fully controlled by pro-presidential parties.
So the committee failed to defend its point of view, especially
as the Defense Committee must think not only about the Topol-M
programme, but also about the salaries of officers, their housing
and many other problems.
Q: But then it seems that this is
not just a wrong strategy, but that there is simply a shortage
of money.
A: This is not the case. I am trying
to explain to you that this is not the case. If the money allocated
for the strategic nuclear forces was spent on other systems, for
example Topol-M, we could achieve more results for the same amount
of money.
Q: You speak of the Topol-M as if
it were some kind of panacea, as if we deployed Topol-M missiles
and the Americans could understand that they should not secede
from the ABM Treaty.
A: We've missed the bus. Now by accelerating
the deployment of Topol-M missiles we can only make Americans
resume negotiations on new restrictions on the future missile
defense system. This will not save the ABM Treaty, but will lead
us to a new treaty that could restrict it to such an extent that
we will no longer fear each other, but will at the same time be
capable of creating defense against threshold countries, pariah
states. By the way, Russia needs this defense no less than the
US and maybe even more. We simply don't have any money for that.
Indeed these threshold countries are close to Russia, and within
10 years as they try to reach the US with their missiles they
will cover our territory.
Q: The Kremlin held six months ago
that the threat was coming not from the West but from the South.
Maybe this is the reason why the focus has been shifted from ballistic
missiles to shorter-range missiles.
A: Ballistic missiles can be long
and shorter range.
Q: I am afraid these are not overseas
missiles.
A: In other words, these are not intercontinental
missiles.
Q: That is right.
A: Under the 1997 treaty, Russia and
the US have scrapped all medium- and shorter-range missiles. Only
tactical missiles with a range of less than 500 kilometers are
left. But our main resourcdes - that these pariah states may have
in mind and may pose a threat - are intercontinental missiles
that may be even more effective on shorter-range missions. We
are not sure and nobody is sure that the deterrence system will
work against reckless and fanatical regimes that may not care
about their own people or not give a damn about the damage that
may be caused to their underdeveloped industry or their population.
In this sense the Russian and US logic of deterrence may prove
useless there. This is why the Americans insist that they need
not just deterrence but protection against them. Russia may also
need such a system, but it will be not strategic. It will be a
theatre missile defense system, because it will provide defence
not from intercontinental missiles but from medium-range missiles
that may reach our territory from Pakistan and some other countries.
Going back to the question of asymmetrical response, you are asking
if the Topol-M may be a panacea. Of course it's not. It's just
a weapon. But it's a weapon that has put us 20 years ahead of
the US, let alone the rest of the world. This missile may be deployed
in silos and on above-ground mobile launching systems. In other
words, it is invincible to attacks and guarantees retaliation.
They may be armed with multiple warheads capable of piercing any
missile defense. Nothing of the kind can be done from sea or air-based
systems. So if limited funds are concentrated on where we are
stronger than others, we will achieve better results. But if we
spread them to where we are weaker than others, you will simply
spend your money to little result. Our current programme of strategic
forces represents the latter.
Q: Since this programme is a mistake,
should the President interfere and have his say?
A: Yes of course, the President should
have his say on this issue.
Q: But he hasn't.
A: But he hasn't.
Q: Another question concerning today's
events. The US will soon carry out the first testing of its missile
defense system. Does this mean that the Americans withdrew from
the ABM Treaty a long time ago after preparing everything secretly?
A: No, it does not. I just want to
remind you that the ABM Treaty does not eliminate missile defense
to zero level.
Q: What is zero level?
A: This is when there is nothing at
all, nothing is tested, nothing is developed, and nothing is deployed.
The ABM Treaty allows each country to have a whole deployment
area where it can have up to 100 anti-missiles and a number of
large radars, everything that is needed for missile defense. This
is not zero option like the one we had when medium- and shorter-range
missiles were scrapped completely by Russia and America. You may
probably remember that we had the SS-20, and they had the Pershing.
So the ABM Treaty bans testing at undeclared sites. They have
declared a site on the Kwajalein Island in the Pacific. And we
have the Sary-Shagan testing range in Kazakhstan. Now they are
kept at another place. They could not do this if they were still
bound by the ABM Treaty.
Q: They couldn't do it today, but
they can do it tomorrow.
A: Technically, they could have done
it a long time ago, but legally, they couldn't conduct any testing
at a site that had not been declared. However they need to do
the testing there because their prime candidate is North Korea,
and Korean missiles will fly through Alaska. So they need to test
them in order to see how effective the system is. So of course
they prepared for this for a long time. By the way, the ABM Treaty
allows the testing of stationary land-based systems, not mobile
ones, at the declared sites. However, having withdrawn from the
ABM Treaty they will be free of any obligations and cannot do
the testing on Kwajalein, but can test in Alaska without violating
the treaty.
Q: The last question. Foreign Minister
Ivanov and Secretary of State Powell -- I am sure you know that
they are meeting in Canada to prepare a G-8 summit -- said today
that a speedy ratification of the Moscow Treaty on strategic offensive
weapons would be desirable. Is this true?
A: On strategic offensive reductions.
Q: Reductions, right. The Russian
version uses the word potential, but I think there is no such
word in English.
A: It exists in English, but it has
a slightly different meaning.
Q: I am going to ask you as a member
of the State Duma and a member of Yabloko, plus as deputy chairman
of the Defense Committee, will you personally vote for the ratification
of this treaty and urge your comrades in the Duma, in the faction
and in the committee to do the same? Or do you have reservations?
A: I have very serious reservations.
But now that we have ourselves weakened our positions at the talks
so seriously, I could formulate our conclusions with regard to
this treaty as follows: this is better than nothing. Now that
we have no START-2 Treaty -- it is dead and we may forget it --
now that the 1991 START-1 Treaty is still there, but it no longer
reflects present-day realities and existing levels of strategic
weapons, it's better than nothing. However, there are big problems
with this treaty, as it does not establish counting rules or the
procedure for dismantling and destroying systems, or verification
procedures. To some extent we may depend on START-1 which the
sides have agreed to observe till the year 2009 when it expires,
but not on everything. On the other hand, torpedoing the ratification
of this new treaty would mean living with a seriously weakened
position.
We may ratify it provided that these questions are clarified so
that we know how to count these 2,200 warheads, how to verify
that the sides really cut warheads to this level.
Q: I was listening to you and trying
to understand whether this treaty is more of a political document
to you and to experts in this field or not?
A: It's a 100-percent political document.
Actually let's say it is a political treaty by 99 or 90 percent.
Moreover, given such a strict and serious sphere as strategic
weapons, it is more a gentleman's agreement at this point. The
sides have agreed to reduce their nuclear warheads from 6,000
now to about 2,200. However, they did not have enough time to
agree on what will be included in this number and how these strategic
weapons will be reduced. It's a gentleman's agreement that was
named a treaty for political reasons. To become a treaty, it is
necessary to conduct additional consultations and agree on these
issues. The ratification will make it possible to do so. And if
we also adopt a reasonable development programme for our strategic
weapons, this will stimulate American interest in serious negotiations.
Anchor: Thank you very much. We were
talking to Alexei Arbatov, Vice-Chairman of the State Duma Defense
Committee and a deputy of the Yabloko faction.
See also:
The
ABM Treaty | 