| AFTER Sept. 11, there was an abrupt shift in Russia's foreign
policy. Despite
the course
that was still being pursued last summer- symbolized by Korean
leader Kim
Jong Il's trip
across Russia in an armored train - and in the face of the opinion
of the
so-called
political elite, President Vladimir Putin unreservedly supported
the United
States in its
fight with Osama bin Laden's terrorists and the Taliban.
The initial reaction to developments in
New York and Washington, coupled
with the decisions taken by Putin
within a fortnight of Sept. 11,
represented a serious change in the
value system of the Russian
authorities. On Sept. 24, at a meeting
between Putin, the leaders of
parliamentary factions and the State
Council presidium, one of the
participants advocated supporting the
Taliban, while 18 participants
proposed that Russia preserve
neutrality vis-a-vis the United States
fight against terrorism. Only two participants said that Russia
should take
part in the
anti-terrorism coalition. Effective and multi-faceted support
for U.S.
anti-terrorism efforts
in Afghanistan was a direct result of the Russian president's
own independent
decision.
There was, of course, a tactical logic to this decision. The Taliban
regime,
with its links
to terrorist groups in Central Asia and the Caucasus, posed a
direct threat
to Russia's
security. Possibly for the first time in history, the country
had the
opportunity to
resolve at least one of its many problems through diplomatic means
and
through using
the military strength of another state.
However, tactics are not the be-all and end-all. The September
decision and
subsequent
related ones may serve as the basis for establishing a strategic
line that
will allow
Russia to survive as a modern, sovereign state in the 21st century.
I am, of
course,
talking about this country making an unambiguous move toward the
West.
After Sept. 11 and Russia's foreign policy shift, the logical
question arose:
Has there
been a change in the West's attitude toward Russia? So far, not
really.
Behind the
speeches and actions of Western representatives, the former mistrust,
incomprehension
and fear still lurk.
It should be recognized, however, that there are, in fact, weighty
reasons
for such
mistrust. For the West, Russia remains unpredictable, and this
unpredictability is a
reflection of the internal problems of the Russian authorities
and of the
elites. Changes
in foreign policy have not had an impact on the course to build
a "managed
democracy"
within the country. Russia lacks real freedom of speech. There
is no mass
media capable
of systematically providing a majority of the population with
coverage of key
issues
that differs from that generated by the authorities. Elections
- regional
elections in
particular - have been transformed into an empty ritual of appointing
a
pre-selected
candidate.
Finally, the events in Chechnya also make Russia unstable and
unpredictable.
The
situation has reached a deadlock. The only solution would require
a the
holding of a
conference involving all interested parties and chaired by Putin,
to
determine the proper
way to regulate the situation there, on the basis of the Russia's
constitution and laws.
But there has been no movement in this direction.
Does this mean that the West should wait until Russia matures
and is able to
manage its
problems by itself, whereupon it will call the West and say: "I
am ready,
will you accept
me?" No. This will never happen, and there is no time to
waste waiting for it.
Developments are such that the West should recognize Russia as
a member of the
Western community today. Russia should be taken on board warts
and all.
To accept Russia, the West must adopt at least two theses. First,
it should
recognize
the existence of a very important priority for Russia - the security
of
existing borders
separating Russia from the most unstable, dangerous and unpredictable
regions
in the
world. Second, the West's understanding in principle, and willingness
in
practice, to
admit Russia as a fully-fledged member of all of Europe's economic,
political
and military
structures in 15 to 20 years' time are needed.
A first step in this direction could be the signing of a document
on military
and political
union between Russia and the United States during U.S. President
George W.
Bush's
visit to Russia this week. In form, this could be an agreement,
memorandum or
treaty.
Most importantly, it should qualitatively differ from a politely
formulated
cooperation
within the framework of NATO, or some agreement covering only
arms issues.
The fight against the present terrorist threat differs from the
military
science of the past
century. Without Russia's help, this fight cannot be won. In addition
to
purely military
tasks - and today Russia unfortunately can only play a very limited
role
(indeed, this is
an area it seems the United States can genuinely handle on its
own) - help is
needed in
providing: diplomatic support and sanctions against those harboring
terrorists;
intelligence information; assistance in monitoring financial flows
and
detecting the
sources and methods used to finance terrorists; guarantees of
nonproliferation of
various types of weapons and technologies; and many other things
as well.
And, finally, political support is also very important. Military
actions
alone, deprived of
such support, are futile and never ending.
Without a doubt, Russia has a major interest in containing the
terrorist
threat. However,
this is not the only issue. The post-Sept. 11 foreign-policy course
is
obviously
beneficial to Russia, and is the only possible course from the
perspective of
the
country's medium-to-long-term interests.
A fully-fledged union with the United States and the West could
facilitate the
consolidation of genuine democracy in Russia as well as enabling
the fuller
realization
of the country's endogenous potential. This may be the only way
to ensure
that reforms
in Russia are brought to fruition - reforms that have been conducted
in such
a way over
the past 10 years that they seem to have completely exhausted
people's
appetite for
them.
A union with the West is most definitely what Putin wants, and
in the current
circumstances, his political will is pretty much sufficient. He
has support
and public
opinion on his side.
Since Sept. 11, Russia has sent very clear signals to the West
through
concrete actions.
All of this has been done in spite of the position and opinion
of virtually
the entire
presidential entourage, many Foreign Ministry officials, many
politicians and
the
military. Putin has extended a hand to the Western world, and
this has been
noted.
However, it is possible that nothing serious will happen. The
opportunity for
a strategic
rapprochement between Russia and the United States (or, more broadly,
the
Western
world) that opened up after Sept. 11 remains in a very fragile
state.
It would be all too easy to substitute a serious, modern political
process
with the
well-known Soviet politics of detente: the counting of warheads
and statements
regarding the "victory of Soviet-Russian diplomacy in the
fight for peace
between
Russia and the United States."
Detente as a foreign-policy concept in the current situation,
however, is
absolutely
useless. Therefore, if talks this week conclude with an agreement
on
disarmament, on
NATO, on the Jackson-Vanik amendment and some general declarations,
it will
mean
that the opportunities that opened up after Sept. 11 will have
been
squandered and that
everything will revert to its previous form (to the type of agreements
that
were signed in
the 1970s).
Realizing the new opportunities should be the personal responsibility
of the
leaders of
Russia, the United States and the European countries.
The huge divergence between the foreign and domestic policies
of the Russian
government cannot last for very long, and the options are limited.
Either
domestic
policy will be brought into line with the foreign policy course
or, on the
contrary, the
decisions taken after Sept. 11 will turn out to have been a temporary
zigzag
subject to
correction.
Under the first scenario, Russia will gradually become a European
country in
terms of
democratic procedures, economic development and living standards.
Under the second scenario, the symbol of Russia's foreign policy
will once
again
become the armored train with which authoritarianism feels comfortable.
However, it is necessary to understand that Putin cannot be absolutely
certain that a
document on partnership will be signed, and even if it it is,
we must have
doubts about
the extent of its implementation and the real extent of support
for Russia's
course
toward the West. This is why he does not burn his bridges and
retains his
former
entourage in case he needs to retreat.
In the case of such a retreat, it is not clear what Putin's position
power
base will be. A
repeat of the putsch of 1991 cannot be ruled out in such a case.
However, today there is still a chance. Putin can make a most
important
decision by
opening the door to Europe for Russia, and not just a window.
Grigory Yavlinsky is the leader of the Yabloko party. This comment
is
excerpted from
an article published in Obshchaya Gazeta last Thursday. The full
English text
can be
found at www.eng.yabloko.ru
See also:
www.sptimes.ru
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