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By Grigory Yavlinsky

Turning the Window on Europe Into a Door

St.Petersburg Times, May 24, 2002

AFTER Sept. 11, there was an abrupt shift in Russia's foreign policy. Despite the course that was still being pursued last summer- symbolized by Korean leader Kim Jong Il's trip across Russia in an armored train - and in the face of the opinion of the so-called political elite, President Vladimir Putin unreservedly supported the United States in its fight with Osama bin Laden's terrorists and the Taliban.

The initial reaction to developments in New York and Washington, coupled with the decisions taken by Putin within a fortnight of Sept. 11, represented a serious change in the value system of the Russian authorities. On Sept. 24, at a meeting between Putin, the leaders of parliamentary factions and the State Council presidium, one of the participants advocated supporting the Taliban, while 18 participants proposed that Russia preserve neutrality vis-a-vis the United States fight against terrorism. Only two participants said that Russia should take part in the anti-terrorism coalition. Effective and multi-faceted support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan was a direct result of the Russian president's own independent decision.

There was, of course, a tactical logic to this decision. The Taliban regime, with its links to terrorist groups in Central Asia and the Caucasus, posed a direct threat to Russia's security. Possibly for the first time in history, the country had the opportunity to resolve at least one of its many problems through diplomatic means and through using the military strength of another state.

However, tactics are not the be-all and end-all. The September decision and subsequent related ones may serve as the basis for establishing a strategic line that will allow Russia to survive as a modern, sovereign state in the 21st century. I am, of course, talking about this country making an unambiguous move toward the West.

After Sept. 11 and Russia's foreign policy shift, the logical question arose: Has there been a change in the West's attitude toward Russia? So far, not really. Behind the speeches and actions of Western representatives, the former mistrust, incomprehension and fear still lurk.

It should be recognized, however, that there are, in fact, weighty reasons for such mistrust. For the West, Russia remains unpredictable, and this unpredictability is a reflection of the internal problems of the Russian authorities and of the elites. Changes in foreign policy have not had an impact on the course to build a "managed democracy" within the country. Russia lacks real freedom of speech. There is no mass media capable of systematically providing a majority of the population with coverage of key issues that differs from that generated by the authorities. Elections - regional elections in particular - have been transformed into an empty ritual of appointing a pre-selected candidate.

Finally, the events in Chechnya also make Russia unstable and unpredictable. The situation has reached a deadlock. The only solution would require a the holding of a conference involving all interested parties and chaired by Putin, to determine the proper way to regulate the situation there, on the basis of the Russia's constitution and laws. But there has been no movement in this direction.

Does this mean that the West should wait until Russia matures and is able to manage its problems by itself, whereupon it will call the West and say: "I am ready, will you accept me?" No. This will never happen, and there is no time to waste waiting for it. Developments are such that the West should recognize Russia as a member of the Western community today. Russia should be taken on board warts and all.

To accept Russia, the West must adopt at least two theses. First, it should recognize the existence of a very important priority for Russia - the security of existing borders separating Russia from the most unstable, dangerous and unpredictable regions in the world. Second, the West's understanding in principle, and willingness in practice, to admit Russia as a fully-fledged member of all of Europe's economic, political and military structures in 15 to 20 years' time are needed.

A first step in this direction could be the signing of a document on military and political union between Russia and the United States during U.S. President George W. Bush's visit to Russia this week. In form, this could be an agreement, memorandum or treaty. Most importantly, it should qualitatively differ from a politely formulated cooperation within the framework of NATO, or some agreement covering only arms issues.

The fight against the present terrorist threat differs from the military science of the past century. Without Russia's help, this fight cannot be won. In addition to purely military tasks - and today Russia unfortunately can only play a very limited role (indeed, this is an area it seems the United States can genuinely handle on its own) - help is needed in providing: diplomatic support and sanctions against those harboring terrorists; intelligence information; assistance in monitoring financial flows and detecting the sources and methods used to finance terrorists; guarantees of nonproliferation of various types of weapons and technologies; and many other things as well.

And, finally, political support is also very important. Military actions alone, deprived of such support, are futile and never ending.

Without a doubt, Russia has a major interest in containing the terrorist threat. However, this is not the only issue. The post-Sept. 11 foreign-policy course is obviously beneficial to Russia, and is the only possible course from the perspective of the country's medium-to-long-term interests.

A fully-fledged union with the United States and the West could facilitate the consolidation of genuine democracy in Russia as well as enabling the fuller realization of the country's endogenous potential. This may be the only way to ensure that reforms in Russia are brought to fruition - reforms that have been conducted in such a way over the past 10 years that they seem to have completely exhausted people's appetite for them.

A union with the West is most definitely what Putin wants, and in the current circumstances, his political will is pretty much sufficient. He has support and public opinion on his side.

Since Sept. 11, Russia has sent very clear signals to the West through concrete actions. All of this has been done in spite of the position and opinion of virtually the entire presidential entourage, many Foreign Ministry officials, many politicians and the military. Putin has extended a hand to the Western world, and this has been noted.

However, it is possible that nothing serious will happen. The opportunity for a strategic rapprochement between Russia and the United States (or, more broadly, the Western world) that opened up after Sept. 11 remains in a very fragile state.

It would be all too easy to substitute a serious, modern political process with the well-known Soviet politics of detente: the counting of warheads and statements regarding the "victory of Soviet-Russian diplomacy in the fight for peace between Russia and the United States."

Detente as a foreign-policy concept in the current situation, however, is absolutely useless. Therefore, if talks this week conclude with an agreement on disarmament, on NATO, on the Jackson-Vanik amendment and some general declarations, it will mean that the opportunities that opened up after Sept. 11 will have been squandered and that everything will revert to its previous form (to the type of agreements that were signed in the 1970s).

Realizing the new opportunities should be the personal responsibility of the leaders of Russia, the United States and the European countries.

The huge divergence between the foreign and domestic policies of the Russian government cannot last for very long, and the options are limited. Either domestic policy will be brought into line with the foreign policy course or, on the contrary, the decisions taken after Sept. 11 will turn out to have been a temporary zigzag subject to correction.

Under the first scenario, Russia will gradually become a European country in terms of democratic procedures, economic development and living standards.

Under the second scenario, the symbol of Russia's foreign policy will once again become the armored train with which authoritarianism feels comfortable.

However, it is necessary to understand that Putin cannot be absolutely certain that a document on partnership will be signed, and even if it it is, we must have doubts about the extent of its implementation and the real extent of support for Russia's course toward the West. This is why he does not burn his bridges and retains his former entourage in case he needs to retreat.

In the case of such a retreat, it is not clear what Putin's position power base will be. A repeat of the putsch of 1991 cannot be ruled out in such a case.

However, today there is still a chance. Putin can make a most important decision by opening the door to Europe for Russia, and not just a window.

Grigory Yavlinsky is the leader of the Yabloko party. This comment is excerpted from an article published in Obshchaya Gazeta last Thursday. The full English text can be found at www.eng.yabloko.ru

See also:
www.sptimes.ru

St.Petersburg Times, May 24, 2002

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