Yesterday the Duma delegation of the YABLOKO
faction handed Andrei Sharonov, RF Former
friends make the worst enemies. Obviously, following this reasoning,
it has been predicted that the party being launched by Duma speaker
Gennady Seleznev will be a dangerous competitor for the Communist
Party (CPRF). This aspect of Seleznev 's undertaking is interesting
for analysts and journalists. Consequently,, the embarrassed Seleznev
is regularly forced to deny any plans to split the CPRF. Moreover,
he claims that he is not encroaching on the electorate of Communist
leader Gennady Zyuganov, as his party will have its own voters.
Quite naturally, nobody believes these promises - as it is unclear
how Seleznoyv 's party can prove useful, other than by competing
with the CPRF.
Seleznoyv 's promises may be feigned,
and he may aim to achieve what is expected of him (if the Kremlin
expects it); but in reality, the plan's chances of success are
diminishing, as the Duma speaker is creating a party that is not
needed by Russian society.
We already have a party in power (or
at least close to power, like United Russia, which has yet to
achieve the status of ruling party). One party is already striving
to replace the one in power, simultaneously disrupt the established
system and change the direction of social development: the communist
party has been carrying out this function. Usually, the two main
parties have small satellite groupings to suit "conventionally
loyal" and "conventionally oppositional" voters. In Russia these
parties are the Union of Right-Wing Forces and Yabloko,. What
else do we need to complete our political spectrum? Once you add
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the spectrum appears over-saturated.
All the main niches are occupied, and
novices can only expect to obtain a few seats. Change will only
be possible if a party appears capable, for instance, of performing
the function of thecommunists better than the original. In other
words, it should also be a "party of social protest", a party
for those dissatisfied with the current regime; but it should
clearly be more successful, and doesn’t have to be left-wing.
There have been two attempts to fill this niche: firstly by General
Alexander Lebed, and then the Luzhkov-Primakov bloc. They managed
to undermine the CPRF's monopoly on the "protest vote" (thanks
to Fatherland - All Russia, the Communists failed to obtain a
majority in the present Duma). However, these were temporary rivals,
created artificially through election campaign strategies. The
CPRF faced no other, more serious threats.
It is apparent from his statements that
Seleznev doesn't intend to do Zyuganov's work. The cause of the
conflict between them was that Seleznev wants to be a loyalist
left-winger, while Zyuganov has stubbornly adhered to his old
approach. Thus, Seleznev is attracted to the centre; he is looking
for a niche close to United Russia rather than the CPRF. The problem
is, however, that too many parties are currently attracted to
the centre. As well as United Russia and Seleznev 's party, you
also have the Party of Life, the People's Party, the social democrat
parties led by Mikhail Gorbachev and Konstantin Titov, and many
other political formations. Worst of all Yabloko has suddenly
started drifting in this direction. Since the latecomer centrists
either lack a voter support base or are insufficiently loyal to
the regime and cannot follow the leader, as in the case of Yabloko,
they will be forced to split the votes which the "elder centrists"
from United Russia had viewed as their own. According to our sources
(see issue 143, July 17, 2002) the SPS and Yabloko are already
prepared to negotiate sharing single-mandate districts with United
Russia, just as they did in the Moscow Duma elections.
See also:
Duma
Elections 2003
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