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New approaches have been developed during constructive
dialogue with Russian public organisations and reflect the modern
role of civil society in international cooperation aimed at reducing
nuclear defence programmes.
The public in Russia is very cautious about any initiatives
connected with nuclear energy sector and nuclear weapons. The
population is very negative about any ideas concerning the construction
of new nuclear facilities. This attitude is based on quite reasonable
technological fears and significant "administrative"
factors including:
- the high concentration of nuclear objects in some areas of
Russia,
- the corporate nature of decisions adopted by the atomic ministry
and absence of efficient state and public control,
- an under-developed system of social guarantees for the population.
All this obviously does not facilitate understanding by the Russian
population of the US initiatives in support of nuclear conversion
programmes. Thus, both rank-and-file citizens and a number of
politicians can hardly differentiate between the projects of gratuitous
aid from the US and commercial projects involving American businessmen.
The following projects may serve as vivid examples here:
- the attitude of both experts and politicians to the "know-how"
deal is not unambiguous: often such programmes are regarded not
as aid in the conversion of armaments, but rather as a system
for supplying the US atomic energy complex with Russian uranium
at dumping prices. Here the citizens think quite reasonably that
huge amounts of money from this deal vanish without trace into
the depths of the Ministry for Atomic Energy of the RF. Some of
these funds may well be allocated implementation of international
projects of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, in particular to the
construction of a nuclear power station in Iran.
- The "Non-Proliferation Trust" initiative (NPT) and
recommendations from the Livermore laboratory on the organisation
of a depository for spent foreign nuclear fuel in the Krasnoyarsk
Area are viewed negatively as a commercial project aimed at bringing
profit to a group of people at the risk of turning Russia into
an international nuclear waste dump.
- People are in general positive about the utilisation of nuclear
submarines under the "Nanna-Lugara" programme, but raise
considerable concerns about the handling of nuclear waste by the
Ministry of Atomic Energy.
Public organisations and citizens oppose initiatives which,
in their opinion, increase nuclear risk and the threat of radiation,
instead of reducing them. Such a list includes:
- the recycling of spent nuclear fuel as a source of plutonium
and radioactive waste that seeps into environment, open water
reservoirs on the banks of which people live,
- the continued functioning of reactors for the development
of military plutonium,
- imports of spent nuclear fuel into the country,
- the creation and development of the technology of mixed uranium-and-plutonium
fuel (MOX-fuel).
The public is in favour of a complete halt to nuclear reactors
for the production of plutonium for military purposes.
All this activity will inevitably lead to an increase in plutonium
production, which will adversely affect solutions to the problem
of non-proliferation of military nuclear materials. Thus, it should
be stressed that in this case the interests of Russian society
and the US position on this problem coincide.
To continue the conversion process, we should create the conditions
for ensuring that it is irreversible: the most important element
here is dialogue with society. Otherwise the narrow interests
of lobbyists and the Ministry of Atomic Energy will win, and the
final goal - demilitarisation - will not be reached.
Lack of trust in the activities of the Ministry of Atomic
Energy and the inefficiency of the conversion programmes are attributable
the ministry's structure. The same department joins together
cash flows from state financing for nuclear weapons, incomes from
the nuclear power sector and international trade with technologies
and materials. The ministry also receives financial aid for conversion
programmes. All this happens under conditions of top secrecy at
the same production sites.
The secrecy regime often covers the use of funds for the wrong
goals, negligence, as well as corruption in the Ministry of Atomic
Energy. This concerns the top officials. For example, owing to
an investigation conducted by the State Duma Commission for the
Fight with Corruption, the Minister for Atomic Energy E.O. Adamov
was dismissed from his post in March 2001. In January 2002 the
Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation published the results
of an audit into the financing and implementation of the special
federal programme "Treatment of Radio-Active Waste and Spent
Nuclear materials, Their Utilisation and Burial for 1996-2005".
The audit disclosed a number of violations of financial discipline
and instances of irrational use of funds. In particular, it was
disclosed that no report existed on the spending of USD 270 million
by the Ministry of Atomic Energy which had been received as international
aid to implement projects for the treatment of radioactive waste.
Such a situation will continue until the financial flows for
military production and enterprises of the nuclear fuel industry
are divided.
This combination of flows conceals the subsidising of electricity
production at Russian nuclear power stations and the financing
of dual- purpose research.
A vivid example of such a double approach is provided by the
construction of energy-substitution facilities for the military
plutonium production reactor at the Mining-and-Petrochemicals
Complex, which has dragged on for many years.
The production facilities of the Mining-and-Petrochemicals Complex
were modernised with funds received from the USA. Now they are
successfully used for energy supplies to isolate military plutonium
from a functioning reactor. Consequently the USA has in actual
fact financed a military programme instead of a conversion programme.
The nuclear reactor continues to supply heat to the city where
the workers of the complex live. The Ministry of Atomic Energy
does not envisage stopping the reactor in the short term and is
instead considering its conversion or the construction of a new
reactor, which when combined with the production of isolated plutonium,
does not change the crux of the matter. However, even if an energy
replacement heat power station is built, it will be owned by the
Ministry of Atomic Energy (although it will be built with US aid).
The facilities of such a heat power station, considering the real
demands of Zhelezhnogorsk city, will be redundant and are intended
to supply energy for the spent nuclear fuel recycling plant (i.e.
again to isolate plutonium) and an uranium and plutonium fuel
production plant for Russian, Chinese and Iranian nuclear power
stations.
Similarly the provision of physical protection for nuclear and
radiation objects under the Ministry of Atomic Energy cannot be
considered satisfactory. The narrow departmental approach, coupled
with a lack of procedures for averting terrorist access to the
objects, has given rise to criminal complacency, which I witnessed
at first hand. We discovered that a group of armed people could
easily penetrate the depository preserving 3,000 tons of nuclear
waste. Such a penetration could lead to large-scale nuclear and
radiation disaster, or theft of a significant quantity of nuclear
materials.
All these problems will continue snowballing instead of being
cut until the system of international aid for nuclear conversion
programmes are no longer channeled for immediate disposal by the
Ministry of Atomic Energy.
Only new financing approaches for conversion nuclear projects
can change the situation in Russia.
Russian-American cooperation is carried out in the interests
of two nations and cannot be performed without the direct participation
of both the Russian and American public.
- Funds for conversion projects should be granted on a tender
basis. Their recipients should not be simply "enterprises
of the Ministry of Atomic Energy", but rather teams of specialists
specially formed to implement specific conversion projects and
responsible for their implementation.
- A financing decision should be adopted by a joint "Russian-American
Tender Commission" involving not only nuclear industry experts,
but also deputies at different levels and representatives from
public organisations in both countries.
- Government officials in Russia and the USA should merely guarantee
implementation of adopted decisions.
To implement this initiative, it is necessary to create a
Russian-American "tender commission for nuclear conversion
programmes", consisting of a "transparency commission"
which would join together both specialists and representatives
of the public and politicians. Tender-based reviews, involving
the presentation of projects before a general council of experts
and financial control of the projects under such a commission
should provide efficient and transparent usage of the funds. The
public nature of such a commission and public trust in the commission
would be guaranteed by its openness to the mass media in both
countries.
Such an initiative could become the next step in the establishment
of mutual trust and demilitarisation of Russian-American relations.
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