No opposition to Putin?
A consensus has emerged among Russia observers that under Putin
and his "managed democracy" there is no opposition to
the Kremlin. This chimera has achieved the virtual unanimity of
political correctness, but it is factually incorrect.
Putting aside the misnomer "managed democracy," this
mistaken view is a result of false expectations of opposition
activity created by the revolutionary politics of the late 1980s
and early 1990s. The demonstrations to the Soviet regime, unconstitutional
maneuvers on the part of the Yeltsin regime and its opposition
in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, as well as the violent
street marches by the red-brown opposition during those years,
have misled many.
Observers now assume that opposition politics is by definition
total, uncompromising and extraconstitutional and includes public
disobedience, even violence. Today's post-revolutionary politics
involve more quiescent modes of opposition defined by Russia's
mix of semi-democracy and soft authoritarianism.
Voices on left and right
As in any democracy, Russia's opposition politics include the
parliamentary activity of political parties, protests and court
challenges. Examples come from both left and right.
The Communists worked hard to muster a majority in the Duma to
block the adoption of the new Land Code. Joining with the trade
unions, they also won some changes in the Labor Code before it
was passed last year. Communists are also increasingly strident
in condemning the Putin administration for what they see as a
continuation of "shock therapy" economic reforms.
From the right, the Yabloko party has led strong democratic opposition
to Putin's media and domestic-security policies, including the
organization of demonstrations in defense of NTV, TV6 and accused
spy Grigory Pasko. Any muting in Yabloko's opposition is a result
of the Kremlin co-opting its economic prescriptions, like the
13 percent flat tax and business deregulation. The Union of Right[Wing]
Forces, or SPS, along with other more radical organizations, has
joined Yabloko in many protests, but it plays both sides of opposition.
Putin's semi-authoritarian politics, combined with neo-liberal
economics, explain SPS ambivalence. Recently, several prominent
leaders split from SPS to join Boris Berezovsky's new opposition
party, Liberal Russia, which suggests that for many SPS members
this ambivalence seems a cynical ambiguity. It also underscores
that just as Putin's neo-liberal economics intensify leftist opposition,
his forays into semi-authoritarian politics provoke rightist opposition.
The clearest signal of vigorous opposition from left and right
came last week when the leaders of Yabloko, SPS and - lo and behold
- the Communist Party signed an unprecedented joint declaration
in defense of TV6. That the Communists joined with liberals to
defend free speech is a sign of vital opposition and, more importantly,
perhaps, the democratic acculturation of anti-democratic forces.
Nothing could consolidate pluralism and democracy better.
Rivals from the regions
Another point of consensus is that Putin's federal reforms quashed
opposition to the Kremlin in the regions. In fact, dozens of governors
and other regional politicians have condemned Putin's federal
reforms and other policies.
There are numerous, albeit disjoined, regional opposition forces.
Sverdlovsk Governor Eduard Rossel, who has been attacking the
Kremlin's fiscal centralization policy and the Unity and Fatherland
parties, has proposed upgrading his regional party, Transformation
of the Urals, into a federal party that would defend regional
interests. In the Sverdlovsk legislative elections set for March,
the pro-Kremlin forces are the opposition running to unseat the
pro-Rossel majority.
Novgorod Governor Mikhail Prusak, originally a strong Putin backer,
turned cooler toward the Kremlin after the federation reforms.
He leads the Democratic Party of Russia, which could be a vehicle
for regional opposition. Long-time Putin nemeses, including St.
Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev, Krasnoyarsk Governor Alexander
Lebed and President Mintimer Shaimiyev of Tatarstan, may be exploring
a regionally based opposition coalition. Lebed and recently Shaimiyev
founded their own regional parties.
Radical opposition forces are stirring as well. The nationalist
Tatar Public Center opposes the Kremlin as well as Shaimiyev for
his compromises with Moscow on Tatarstan's sovereignty. Its branch
in Bashkortostan recently declared a partnership with Berezovsky's
Liberal Russia.
Legislatures, not streets
Still, legislative and judicial means, rather than radical street
politics, dominate oppositionist activity to Putin's policies.
Take federal reform. Chuvash President Nikolai Fyodorov, along
with the republican legislatures of Adygeya and Sakha (Yakutia),
has protested this reform in the Constitutional Court. They are
challenging all three federal reforms, including the appointment
of senators to the Federation Council, the creation of seven federal
districts and the institution of federal intervention.
The last allows the president, the courts and the Duma, in various
combinations, to end the terms of regional chief executives and
legislatures should they persist in producing laws that violate
federal legislation. Fyodorov dropped the case when it opened
last week, but Adygeya and Yakutia are moving forward. The Communists
and Yabloko are preparing a draft law requiring that senators
be elected, not appointed, to the Federation Council.
Cryptic opposition
As in authoritarian regimes, opposition at times involves covert
bureaucratic delay and sabotage. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have
been manipulating their courts against federal-court decisions
to resist Moscow's drive to harmonize their constitutions and
laws with federal law. Putin's deregulation measures, natural-monopoly
restructuring plans and military reforms are also meeting stiff
resistance from civilian bureaucrats and military officers.
Much of the bureaucracy, both civilian and the so-called "siloviky,"
are fighting Putin's "surrender" of Russian interests
in Central Asia to the "global hegemony" of the United
States in the war against terrorism.
Whether you are sitting in Moscow or in Washington, it would
be a grave mistake to wager that there is no opposition in Russia.
(Dr. Gordon M. Hahn is The Russia Journal's political analyst
and a visiting research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford
University.)
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