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According to our sources in various Duma factions, the current
plans for a Duma reshuffle essentially involve
cutting the number of committees. However, Duma deputies could reject
this reform - because it is opposed by
Yevgeny Primakov, leader of the Fatherland-All Russia faction.
Some Duma sources claim that Primakov is insisting that any changes
should not alter the present political
balance in the Duma, or at least alter it proportionally. In other
words, Primakov is demanding that "minor
factions," i.e. the Union of Right Forces (URF), Fatherland-All Russia
(FAR), Yabloko, Russian Regions, and the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), should gain control of some committees
– not only those which have been
controlled by the Communists until now, but also those belonging to
Unity.
Although deputies from these "minor factions" generally support
this position, they do not want to sacrifice
their present position for the sake of creating a right-centrist
coalition. Neither does Primakov seem eager to join
such a coalition, as he would play a secondary role. In that case, he
would lose his status of political patriarch,
which enables him to broker various consultations and compromises.
According to our Duma sources, most FAR
deputies disagree with Primakov and are trying to persuade him that
blocking the Communists is a sensible move.
People's Deputy group leader Gennady Raikov has said that if the working
group submits the draft plan to reshuffle
the Duma in April, Primakov's colleagues may manage to convince him to
support this measure.
Our sources also report that President Putin does not oppose a
transformation of the Communists into a
minority opposition. However, the President wants Gennady Seleznev to
remain speaker of the Duma. At the same
time, the President has still not made any public comments on a Duma
reshuffle. This means that he has probably
decided to let others carry out this operation, and then see what
happens.
But there are apparently a few serious obstacles to these plans to
reduce the left's influence in the lower
house. One of them is Unity's reluctance to share its committees.
The Communists will also be displeased, as they will lose control
of the most important committees. It is not
clear if the Duma will work more constructively after this has been
done. It also remains unclear whether normal
personal relations between deputies will be maintained after these
debates. Their relations are unlikely to remain
unaffected.
Another major obstacle is the ideological basis for the proposed
right-centrist parliamentary majority. This
coalition cannot be based solely on distribution of committees. It will
only be successful if it has a distinct political
and socio-economic programme. Meanwhile, it is an open secret that the
positions of FAR, the URF, Russian
Regions, and Yabloko do not always coincide with those of Unity and the
People's Deputy.
However, the present situation in the Duma suits the Kremlin and
the Cabinet far more than a stable working
parliament. This is because the Cabinet has submitted a bill on
privatisation to the Duma. According to our
sources, the bill restricts the Duma's authority in this area. In this
situation, the pro-presidential factions are likely
to form an alliance with the URF, whereas Yabloko and FAR would join
forces with the Communists.
The idea of restructuring the Duma is supported by Deputy Speaker
Liubov Sliska. We asked a number of
experts to comment on the need for a restructuring of the Duma.
Igor Bunin, Director of the Political Consulting Centre: This is
not about restructuring the Duma. It only
involves the redistribution of some Duma committees. A year ago, the
pro-government party allowed the
Communists to take the most important Duma committees, whereas the right
was practically left out of Duma
activities. This period is now over, and a number of urgent economic
problems must be handled. The Communists
are no longer allies; they will try to hinder the reforms planned by the
Cabinet. Therefore, the question of
eliminating the main political alliance in the Duma is indeed vital.
Georgy Satarov, Director of the Indem Foundation: First and
foremost, it is necessary to implement some
reforms to the party system. Reforms in the Duma may follow as a
result. It is necessary to amend electoral laws.
The problem is that when people vote for a party, they know only a few
of its leaders. This leads to the existence
of many silent groups in the Duma, who represent only their own
interests. Therefore, the present situation in the
Duma is a consequence of our electoral system.
Vyacheslav Nikonov, President of the Politika Foundation: Of course
it is necessary to reform the Duma. In my
opinion, the Kremlin committed a serious tactical error when it
distributed control of Duma committees only
between the Communists and pro-presidential factions. This outraged the
right wing, and put the Kremlin in an
uncomfortable position. Now it needs to pass a number of economic bills
which will not be supported by the
Communists, who head most of the economic committees. Therefore, the
Kremlin's initial strategy has come into
conflict with its current strategy, aimed at radical economic reforms. I
agree with Raikov that the Duma has too
many committees. However, it will be very difficult to change the
present structure of the Duma. It is possible to
dismiss Seleznev as speaker, or redistribute committees in favor of
other factions, but it is extremely difficult to
change the structure of Duma committees themselves. These committees are
functioning, and various groups with
various political and economic interests stand by them. Reorganising the
Duma is not in the interests of the
Communists, but it does suit those factions which failed to get any
committees when this Duma first convened.
This reorganisation will be beneficial from a legislative point of view.
And if the Kremlin initiates economic reforms,
this restructuring will benefit the Kremlin.
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