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Dmitry Kamyshev, Konstantin Smirnov

Russia’s First Political Crisis of the 21st Century is Over

Kommersant-VLAST, March 2001, No. 11, pp. 14-16

Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov did not attend the Duma debate on the no confidence motion last week, despite a personal invitation from Duma Speaker Gennadi Seleznev. On March 14, he attributed his actions to his belief that only one faction was out to get him – rather than the whole Duma. The prime minister was referring to the Communist faction, which initiated the no-confidence motion.

Nobody knows exactly what the president told Kasyanov to do. However, knowing Vladimir Putin's style, it is reasonable to assume that Kasyanov was told to make up his own mind.

Whether Kasyanov was right to ignore the invitation will become clear in May, when there is a cabinet reshuffle. At present, Kasyanov stands a fair chance of keeping his position; but no one can say with any degree of accuracy what will happen two months from now. Even a light blow or push can mark the difference between victory and defeat in politics. It would appear that Kasyanov created a new enemy on March 14: Boris Nemtsov, leader of the Union of Right-Wing Forces faction, who threatened the government with another vote of no confidence this autumn unless it launches the economic reforms promoted by the right-wing. In Nemtsov's opinion, if the right is in favour of something, it cannot be wrong. First and foremost, he demands that the cabinet implement three reforms: pensions, military, housing and utilities. Nemtsov was visibly angered by Kasyanov's refusal to turn up at the Duma for the debate on the vote of no confidence in his government. Nemtsov was heard to mutter, "I promise him serious problems." Nemtsov's determination to make life difficult for the Prime Minister was also supported by the leaders and Yabloko and Fatherland - All Russia.

Nemtsov's friends can't be taken very seriously. After all, the Union of Right-Wing Forces is not the largest faction in the Duma. Moreover, the Constitution says that the president, not parliament, can dismiss the Cabinet. However, it should be noted that not a single faction leader in the lower house had a kind word to say about Kasyanov during the debate. The RTR network provided live coverage of criticism of Kasyanov from the left (which is standard procedure, and could therefore be ignored) - and the right (which is worse, as the government’s economic policies are primarily supported by the centre and the right). This detail alone can only serve to weaken the prime minister's position in government battles to come.

In other words, even the failure of the no confidence motion proposed by the Communists will have dire consequences for the government.

The Unity faction is the real casualty of the whole crisis. Unity added fuel to the flames of the crisis, with its sudden decision to support the Communist motion, with the aim of disbanding the "unconstructive" Duma and securing a (highly debatable) victory for Unity at subsequent early parliamentary elections. Just one week later, Unity backed down.

As a result, even observers who are not very experienced in big- time politics came away with the impression that either Unity had blindly followed the orders of the Kremlin, which made a fool out of Unity; or the Unity leaders had come up with the idea on their own, and acted clumsily. It is hard to say which of these conclusions would be less damaging to Unity.

Moreover, the internal integrity of pro-presidential forces in the lower house of parliament was put to a serious test. Unity faction members openly criticised their leaders. The People's Deputy group - the most loyal element of Unity until now - went so far as to flatly refuse to vote for the no-confidence motion, and condemned its Unity allies.

At first sight, the Communists should be described as the winners. Indeed, they appear to have achieved their objectives. They got plenty of free media coverage, presented their radical supporters with undeniable evidence of their opposition – and simultaneously avoided any serious trouble, such as the actual disbandment of the Duma or dismissal of the government.

At the same time, it may well transport that this victory will be tainted. The scandal over the vote of no confidence provoked another wave of speculation about upcoming revisions to the agreement on the breakdown of leading positions in the Duma. This prospect is particularly likely now that Alexander Kotenkov, presidential representative in the Duma, and leaders of most factions, openly support a revision.

The left can say that it isn't afraid of anything and is prepared for such a turn of events (as the Communists are actually saying); but the loss of the positions of Duma speaker and heads of committees would constitute a harsh blow. After all, it is common knowledge that the Communists use the parliament's organisational and material resources to promote their own purposes and objectives. This is particularly true during election campaigns, when the Duma is essentially transformed into their campaign headquarters. No more access to the feeding trough will make it that much harder for the Communist Party to operate.

As for the "conditionally pro-presidential factions" (Fatherland - All Russia, the Union of Right Forces, and Yabloko), they surely benefited from the crisis.

Firstly, the right and the centre displayed some political resolve, which looked particularly praiseworthy against the background of Unity's unprecedented indecisiveness. They achieved this goal by steadily criticising the vote of no confidence and plans to eventually disband the Duma.

Secondly, Yabloko and the Union of Right-Wing Forces gladly took advantage of the platform provided by the Communists to promote their own programmes. Again, they did so at a time when Boris Gryzlov of Unity, perplexed by the speed and severity of the setbacks to his faction, refrained from making a full-length speech.

Thirdly, these smaller factions - victims of the January 2000 plot, when the three largest factions (the Communists, Unity, and People's Deputy) divided most Duma committees among themselves – now have a chance to even the score and deprive the Communists of the committees they now hold. If the revision does happen, these smaller factions will play a key role in the new ruling coalition; with the Communists in opposition, the President will be able to make the Duma pass the laws he needs and which are now curtailed without support from Fatherland - All Russia, the Union of Right Forces, and Yabloko.

It is particularly difficult to gauge how the Kremlin fared in the crisis.

On the one hand, the presidential administration was not openly involved in the no-confidence vote scandal. The president himself commented on the issue (via Seleznev) three days before the vote, when Unity was already hinting at the possibility of changing its initial position.

On the other hand, no one in Russia will believe that Unity could have voted for a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet without explicit orders from the Kremlin. In this case, an evaluation of the president's gains and losses depends entirely on the Kremlin’s actual goals.

If the presidential team was really seeking to disband the Duma and hold early parliamentary elections, these plans proved abortive.

If the idea of disbanding the Duma was just a red herring, meant to remind the Communists of their proper place in the greater scheme of things, the apparent defeat is actually a victory. Unity gave up its idea of supporting the vote of no confidence after Putin held a private meeting with Zyuganov - a meeting which the Kremlin says the Communist leader demanded. Most probably, Zyuganov expressed contrition during his audience with Putin; and the Kremlin decided that this was enough to call off the process.

Sources in the Kremlin say the question of disbanding the Duma is still open. They say that it will be raised again this autumn. The purpose is to split the presidential and parliamentary elections and establish a two-year interval between the major federal election campaigns.

See also:

Speech in the State Duma by the First Deputy Head of the Yabloko faction Sergei Ivanenko during the discussion of the draft resolution of the Duma “On No-Confidence Vote to the Government”
Moscow, the State Duma, March 14, 2001

Russian Duma Rejects Government No-Confidence Motion
By Ron Popeski, Reuters, March 14, 2001

Putin Faces Cabinet Upheaval
St Petersburg Times, #650, Tuesday, March 6, 2001

Declaration on attitude to the Government of Mikhail Kasyanov
The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, The State Duma of the Russian Federation, The Yabloko faction, February 20, 2001

Kommersant-VLAST, March 2001, No. 11, pp. 14-16

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