1. Lukashenko and Yeltsin: Twins, Brothers?
A strict legal approach governing the
signing of the union treaty is the only alternative to
political voluntarism rife with harsh consequences for
the peoples of both countries. We can explain what we
are talking about, by turning to the problem of the presidential
proxies of Lukashenko and Yeltsin.
On October 27, 1999, the Yabloko faction
refused to listen to Lukashenko's speech in the State
Duma. This is easy to explain: a parliament that respects
both itself and its country should not grant a platform
to a man appropriating power through legal manipulation.
This is how we assess Lukashenko's actions,
when he extended his presidential term by adopting the
Constitution on a referendum in autumn 1996. If Russia
considers itself a civilised country, it must refuse to
recognise such a way of prolonging the term of office,
where the electorate could only really vote for one candidate.
Proxies can only be confirmed at free
elections. Byelorussia did not hold any such elections.
Consequently, after July 20, 1999, Lukashenko was transformed
from president into a private individual who illegally
holds onto power.
Yabloko principally rejects the possibility
of signing a Union Treaty between the two states with
a private individual. First of all, any citizen and/or
ruling body (of a RF subject) can through court prove
the legal invalidity of such a union. Secondly, such a
union would fail to achieve international recognition
and, consequently, would not be able to conduct any foreign
policy. And thirdly, and this is probably most important
here: by endorsing the usurping of power by Lukashenko,
the majority in the Duma create the pre-requisites for
the same actions by Boris Yeltsin.
Allegations that Yeltsin is going to use
some sly trick to retain power after 2000 have been circulating
for a long time now. If he makes such an attempt, the
parties who rendered such a warm reception to Lukashenko
on October 27 cannot object to it. For why shouldn't Yeltsin
do the same thing that was welcomed in the case of Lukashenko?
Yabloko will not be among these parties.
2. In favour of a union which does not
involve tricks and liesYabloko fears that the adventure-populist
version of the union will turn out to be an infringement
of Russia's national interests. Such an infringement has
already occurred. The customs' union between our countries
functions in such a way that Russia cannot check if the
volume of goods flowing into Russia through the Byelorussian
border with third countries corresponds to payments transferred
to Russia by Byelorussian customs.
According to expert estimates, Russia's
budget annually loses several dozens billion roubles.
The majority in the Duma has constantly asked where we
can obtain money to pay wages to budget employees, teachers
and doctors. At the same time it has hypocritically endorsed
the huge black hole in the customs' union with Byelorussia.
If a number of articles of the official draft treaty come
into force (for example, on credit, monetary and tax policies),
then Russia's losses will be disastrous.
This irresponsible approach with a clear
anti-Russian stance is countered by Yabloko's alternative
- a draft Agreement on the Economic Union between our
countries that Yabloko devised as early as 1997. This
document differs principally from Yeltsin-Lukashenko's
text: the official draft proposes the simultaneous construction
of a whole range of the political and economic institutions
of the Union without analysing the technical details of
this process; Yabloko's draft presents a detailed plan
for building joint economic mechanisms, so that further
political integration has a firm basis.
In other words, Yeltsin and Lukashenko
want to build immediately all parts of the building very
rapidly and roughly. Yabloko proposes starting with the
foundation and basic elements, built in accordance with
all the requirements of the art of construction.
3. Yeltsin-Lukashenko's draft represents
a path to legal chaos and political arbitrariness
At first sight the draft Agreement, published
in the Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper, represents ordinary
legal hack-work. Let us take, for example, the point on
dividing jurisdiction between the Union and the participating
state. The draft drives us onto a bulky and perplexed
legal system that will look as follows on Russian territory:
Today relations between the RF and its
subjects are too confused. The entry into force of the
Agreement will bring even more disorder. For example,
according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation,
the tax policy falls under the joint jurisdiction of the
RF and its subjects. However, under the Agreement it falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union state.
The list of differences could be continued.
Russia will not be able to conduct its own budget policy,
which will be a derivative form of the Union's; at the
same time the tax revenues will be still received by the
national budgets of Russia and Byelorussia, which will
subsequently pay agreed deductions to the Union budget
(Article 31, Para 2).
It remains unclear how the Union will
develop and adopt its own budget under these circumstances.
At least not in the revenue part: that will depend totally
on the will of the national parliaments.
Here we witness a very strange division
of jurisdiction: revenue policies are handled by the Union,
while expenditure policies (including expenditure on the
maintenance of the organs of the Union) remain within
the jurisdiction of the states.
In other words, the Union will decide
how to earn money, and its constituent states will decide
how to spend it. We can only wish that anyone other than
the Russian and Byelorussian nations live with such a
system of state finances.
The political part of the Agreement looks
less absurd. Here we can detect someone's firm and persistent
will. The citizens of the RF are virtually offered the
chance to test the experience of their Byelorussian neighbours,
who have been living in an authoritarian regime decorated
by the entourage of the Soviet era. The Supreme State
Council (SSC) is declared to be the "supreme authority
of the Union State" (Article 33, Para 1), whereas
the Parliament of the Union State represents only "a
representative and legislative authority", devoid
of any rights to control the SSC. The SSC has the competence
to "decide the most important issues pertaining to
the development of the Union State" (Article 34,
para 1).
This means that its jurisdiction is virtually
unlimited. The SSC is also granted the right "to
issue decrees, resolutions and directives within its jurisdiction
(Article 34, Para 3). Thus, instead of the laws on the
most "important issues", we will have decrees
and directives of the SSC.
At the same time the SSC enjoys the right
of legislative initiative (Article 42, Para 1). But does
it need it, if it can easily pass a decree or directive?
The political system of the Union stipulated in the draft
Agreement resembles too closely that of Byelorussia and
is far more barbarian in nature than the present Russian
system. A collective boss represented by the SSC gains
power, which exceeds considerably the present proxies
of both the State Duma and the President of the RF. All
this contradicts the present Constitution of the Russian
Federation.
I do not want to use strong words here,
but I cant help feeling that the Agreement in its present
form is conscientiously targeted at establishing a state
of legal chaos required both by Yeltsin and Lukashenko
to implement their deeply personal political plots.
