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You can hear the remarks at: http://www.ceip.org/files/events/events.asp?EventID=445]
Grigory Yavlinsky was elected to the Russian Duma in 1993 and
was one of the founders of the Yabloko faction. Yabloko is one
of the principal democratic parties in Russia and was established
as a formal party in the Russian Duma in December 1998. Mr. Yavlinsky
has been a leading liberal voice in Russian politics for the past
ten years and a critic of the Russian government's crackdown on
independent media, excesses in Chechnya, and corruption. He has
twice run for the Russian Presidency, in 1996 and in 2000.
Mr. Yavlinsky began his remarks looking back six months to the
summer of 2001, describing it as a time when there appeared to
be no hope for liberal democrats or pro-Western forces in Russia.
Media restrictions were increasing, the war in the Northern Caucasus
was continuing with no apparent end, and Russia's foreign policy
appeared to be oriented as much towards North Korea, Cuba, Iran,
and Iraq as towards rapprochement with the West.
September 11, 2001 was a turning point. Yavlinsky credited Russian
President Putin with unequivocally offering Russia's support to
the United States with despite little domestic support for this
policy among political elites. Yavlinsky believes that Putin's
bold step has placed him ahead of the Russian bureaucracy. While
Yavlinsky believes Putin made the right choice, he sees a risk
for Putin if he remains ahead of the elite consensus on foreign
policy. Yavlinsky indirectly referenced former Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev's position in 1991, which ended in the August 1991 coup.
Of course, on the surface, political elites have subsequently
fallen behind Putin and voiced support for his pro- U.S. stance.
Yavlinsky examined the reasons behind Putin's choice. Tactically,
Russia was also an enemy of the Taliban, and in the summer of
2000, Russia had threatened to strike terrorist training camps
in Afghanistan. At the strategic level, the United States and
Russia share common interest on a variety of security issues and
problems in the world. Yavlinsky quickly listed ten: the Balkans,
the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Pakistan-India conflict, the
possible collapse of Indonesia, tensions over Taiwan, wars in
Africa, the environment, international crime and drug trafficking,
North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. All of these issues, he asserted,
require Russian cooperation to solve, and there is a confluence
of U.S. and Russian interest over many of these security challenges.
Yavlinsky believes the next step must be a qualitatively new
relationship between the United States and Russia that should
be solidified in a written document. Too often, the United States
and other Western countries have focused on a particular leader
or group of politicians to support. Inevitably when this group
or leader falls apart, so have U.S. - Russian relations. To avoid
precisely this scenario from occurring again, the U.S. must treat
Russia as a country and strategic ally and not merely look to
Putin. While good personal relationships are helpful, and perhaps
even a precondition, they are not sufficient.
Yavlinsky briefly mentioned the internal problems that Russia
must deal with on its own. He remarked that a stable relationship
with the West required an understanding by Russia on basic freedoms
and civil liberties. Some challenges for Russia include: the independence
of the media and freedom of speech, the independence of the judiciary,
the freedom of elections from manipulation, and a system where
political ties are not a prerequisite for doing business in Russia.
Yavlinsky referred to Russia as a quasi-democracy - a Potemkin
village democracy - where the government's manipulation of public
opinion by electronic media is so great that it restricts public
choice.
Yavlinsky does not believe these problems should stand in the
way of a new U.S. - Russia relationship. Not only would a new
relationship help stabilize world hot spots, but also it could
lead to cooperation on important strategic issues to the United
States. Development of Russia's vast oil reserves and its ability
to prevent OPEC from monopolizing oil prices could alleviate a
vital U.S. security concern. Yavlinsky also mentioned Russia's
commitment to non-proliferation and the potential for U.S. - Russian
relations to stabilize China as benefits of a new relationship.
Yavlinsky indirectly hinted that while many problems can not be
solved without Russia, should U.S.-Russian cooperation breakdown
this would be to the detriment of many vital interests of the
United States.
Yavlinsky also laid out a blueprint of what needed to happen
for the relationship to move forward. The first step was Russia's
support of the United States after September 11. The second step
is an articulated framework describing the new relationship and
providing mutual security guarantees, particularly the security
of Russian borders. The third step is the introduction into the
Russian government of new cadres that support a pro-Western approach
to foreign policy. Yavlinsky stressed the importance of moving
forward now rather than continuing to wait. He pointed out that
Putin was sending strong signals to the United States of his desire
for a stronger relationship, with a number of recent policies
including: the closure of military bases in Cuba and Vietnam,
the patient and balanced reaction to U.S. withdrawal from the
ABM, and the balanced reaction to the possibility of NATO expansion
into the Baltics. Also, public opinion in Russia has shifted significantly
in favor of partnership and alliance with the United States as
a result of September 11 and the U.S. - Russian cooperation in
Afghanistan.
During the question and answer period, questions for Yavlinsky
centered on what Russia wanted and what it could reasonably expect
from the United States given current political realities. In response,
Yavlinsky emphasized that Putin was not looking to bargain nor
was he seeking any quid pro quos. Rather Putin was allying himself
with the West for pragmatic reasons - because it was in Russia's
strategic interest to do so. If the United States could not move
beyond a personal relationship towards a qualitatively different
relationship with Russia, both Russia and the United States would
be stalemated with the status quo. While not a disaster, Yavlinksy
stated that a lack of forward progress could lead to a swing backwards
and could imperil Putin domestically.
On a final note, Yavlinsky answered a question in response to
the current TV-6 political saga that is currently grabbing headlines
in Russia and the Western press. Yavlinsky stated that the situation
for independent media was the worst it has been since 1991, and
that this was a deep problem for Russia. However, he was quick
to stress that it was Russia's problem to deal with and that it
should not stand in the way of moving forward in U.S. - Russian
relations.
Summary by Marc Fellman, Program Associate, Russia & Eurasia
Program.
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Carmen MacDougall
Vice President for Communications
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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