| Prepared by Ingrid Staudenmeyer
Herbert Scoville Peace Fellow
On July 19, the Russian American Nuclear Security
Advisory Council (RANSAC) held the final meeting in its 2002 "Seminar
Series" for Congressional staff on key issues in the U.S.-Russian
nuclear relationship. This seminar addressed issues related to
the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and Russia's international
nuclear cooperation. Particular attention focused on Russian reactor
sales and other nuclear and high technology assistance provided
to Iran and other countries of concern, proposals for Russian
imports of foreign spent nuclear fuel, and other issues affecting
Minatom's future.
Remarks by Robert J. Einhorn, Senior Advisor,
International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies
As in any diverse society, there are many forces at plan in
Iran. Some are driving the country forward; others are holding
it back. Despite the momentum towards democracy, freedom, and
openness, most of the elements of Tehran's foreign policy about
which we are most concerned -- including the acquisition of destabilizing
weapons systems -- have not improved to the degree that many in
the international community would have hoped.
Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missile delivery systems continues unabated, and has even accelerated
in the last few years. Despite its formal adherence to international
arms control and nonproliferation treaties, Iran maintains active
programs to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as
well as the long-range missiles to deliver them. Iran is seeking
aggressively to acquire equipment, material, and technology from
abroad in an effort to establish the capability to produce non-conventional
weapons indigenously and thereby to insulate those weapons programs
from outside pressures.
Even if democracy succeeds in Iran, there is little to suggest
that its quest for weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery
systems will end. As long as Iran believes that its arch-rival
Iraq is pursuing WMD, that U.S. forces in the region constitute
a major threat, and that its own non-conventional programs bolster
its aspirations for influence in the Gulf region and leadership
in the Islamic world, there will be pressures in Tehran, whoever
is in power, to persist on the dangerous course on which it is
now headed.
A number of supplier states have abandoned potentially lucrative
sales to Iran's nuclear program. In 1997 China terminated work
on a uranium conversion facility in Iran and agreed not to engage
in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran after completing two
small projects that posed no direct proliferation concern. As
a result of efforts by then-Vice President Gore and Secretary
Albright, Ukraine likewise took a major step when it decided that
it would not supply electricity-generating turbines originally
contracted for by a Russian firm for the new Bushehr nuclear power
plant in Iran. The Czech Government also recently made a decision
not to supply components for the turbine hall of this plant.
Russia remains the one significant exception to this virtual
embargo on nuclear cooperation with Iran. The most visible nuclear
cooperation between the two countries is Russia's construction
of the 1000-megawatt nuclear power reactor at Bushehr. The United
States has opposed this project, not because it believes such
a light-water reactor under International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards itself poses a serious proliferation threat, but because
of concern that the Bushehr project would be used by Iran as a
cover for maintaining wide-ranging contacts with Russia nuclear
entities and for engaging in more sensitive forms of cooperation
with more direct applicability to a nuclear weapons program.
While refusing to halt the power reactor sale, the Russians
have argued that they are just as opposed as the United States
to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. At the highest levels,
Russia is committed to limiting its nuclear cooperation with Iran
to the Bushehr reactor project during its construction period.
Despite these repeated assurances, Russian entities -- most
of them subordinate to the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom)
-- have engaged in extensive cooperation with Iranian nuclear
research centers that is outside the bounds of the Bushehr project.
Much of this assistance involves technologies with direct application
to the production of weapons-grade fissile materials, including
research reactors, heavy-water production technology, and laser
isotope separation technology for enriching uranium. Russian assistance
to Iran's nuclear program has accelerated in the last few years
and could significantly shorten the time Iran would need to acquire
weapons-usable fissile material.
Einhorn proposed a strategy for U.S.-Russia cooperation to better
manage the Russian-Iranian partnership:
Russian assistance to Iran should be limited to Bushehr exclusively,
and only include providing fuel and training for the project.
- Russia has the responsibility of providing the fuel for the
project as well as responsibility for the proper storage and
disposal of spent fuel at the project's conclusion.
- Russia should encourage Iran to adhere to the IAEA Protocols.
- Russia should press Iran to publicly declare its nuclear
capabilities.
Einhorn noted that the United States could use U.S.-origin spent
fuel which Russia wants to import as leverage to help seal the
agreement with the Russians. He explained that these steps are
consistent with the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement (which currently
lays out the U.S.-Russia understanding on Russian-Iranian cooperation),
they grandfather in the Bushehr project responsibilities, and
set the foundation for further cooperation in the future.
Remarks by Igor Khripunov, Associate Director,
Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia
Because of its shaky economic and industrial infrastructure,
which like many other Russian industries has been undercut by
Russia's economic hardships, Minatom is fighting for survival
in both conventional and unconventional ways.
Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran began with a formal agreement
in 1992. In addition to a contract for completing a partially
built reactor at Bushehr, Minatom has also been receptive to a
recent Iranian request to conduct a feasibility study for building
three more--although smaller--reactors. The total cost is estimated
to range from $3 to $4.5 billion.
Bushehr is expected to be completed in 2003. The plant will be
run by a Russian-Iranian team, which Minatom plans to set up this
year. Meanwhile, approximately 30 Iranians are receiving operational
training at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant. (As part of
the umbrella cooperation agreement, Minatom is also training Iranian
physicists and mathematicians at the Institute of Engineering
and Physics.)
Russia has also been assisting Iran in developing a uranium mine
with a capacity of 100-200 tons of ore. (In comparison, the Soviet
Union extracted 30,000 tons of ore annually; Russia currently
mines about 3,000 tons.) Iran hopes to persuade Russia to build
a uranium enrichment facility and an isotope enrichment plant.
The Iranian government continually refers to a similar project
undertaken by Russia in China to justify its requests for these
projects.
U.S. intelligence reports also suggest that Russian nuclear scientists
are secretly advising Iran on how to produce weapons-usable heavy
water and nuclear-grade graphite.
Despite protests from the United States, there is virtually no
opposition in Russia to the existing and potential deals with
Iran. The public, as well as most non-governmental organizations,
seem to assume that cooperation with Iran is focused on non-defense
projects and that Iran's civilian nuclear program will not be
converted to military objectives.
Russia also has contracts to build new power plants in China
and India. These projects are politically significant, because
they strengthen Russia's hand in putting together partnerships
with two major countries that can act as counterweights to U.S.
power.
As noted, Russia is building an enrichment facility in China,
and provides fuel for China's nuclear power plants. It also sells
natural uranium to China, trains Chinese physicists, and supplies
technology for the processing of spent nuclear fuel.
Russia's commercial activity with India covers the transfer of
nuclear propulsion technologies and hardware for possible use
in India's submarine program, the use of plutonium for power generation,
the development of a uranium-thorium fuel cycle, and other projects.
And then there is Cuba, once a Soviet satellite. Although it
is highly unlikely that Russia will ever raise the money to complete
the long-abandoned nuclear power plant at Juragua, a Russian-Cuban
commission is still reviewing the option. Meanwhile, on-and-off
negotiations have been held with Indonesia over a Russian proposal
to build a small floating nuclear power plant.
Minatom has been considering ways of expanding Russia's national
power grid in order to export electrical power to Europe, China,
South Korea, and Turkey. The latter would be offered a deal involving
Ukraine as a third partner. Under this deal, Russia would supply
Ukraine from its own nuclear power plants, and Ukraine would then
export a comparable amount of electricity to neighboring Turkey.
Minatom is increasingly charged with taking on new functions,
which, in the absence of adequate funding, threaten to undercut
its effectiveness in dealing with previously assigned roles. With
the resources and influence of the Minatom's (Ministry of Atomic
Energy) defense component diminishing, the shots are now interestingly
being called by a new brand of leaders in the Ministry representing
the civilian component.
Minatom's growing reliance on exports has led to serious friction
with the United States, particularly in regard to Russia's nuclear
contracts with Iran. The dependence of this key Russian industry
on foreign markets threatens to distort the normal supplier-recipient
relationship, leaving Russia no other choice but to make painful
and sometimes internationally unpopular decisions in order to
win contracts.
There is a dangerous precedent for this in Russia: the emphasis
on the export of conventional weapons. In order to survive, the
defense industry has had to sell state-of-the-art weapons systems,
often disregarding national and international security considerations.
The Soviet Union sought to maintain a wall of separation between
itself and the West. However, today's Russia is increasingly tied
to the West, financially, economically, technologically, and even
culturally. The current generational transition in Russia will
make those ties irreversible. These conditions give some room
for optimism. The presence in Russia's nuclear industry of dynamic,
meaningful, and well-publicized Western programs and investment
projects could be a prerequisite for steering the steadily worsening
situation in the nuclear industry away from a disastrous outcome.
Remarks by Sergey S. Mitrokhin, Member of the
Russian Parliament (State Duma), Yabloko Faction; Co-Chairman,
Russian-European Inter-parliamentary Working Group on Russian
spent nuclear fuel imports
Mitrokhin began by noting that the nuclear complex in Russia
was developed during the Cold War years with the primary goal
of ensuring a nuclear parity with the United States, and that
all Minatom activities were subordinate to that task. Russia has
always given preference to plutonium for the production of nuclear
warheads, and the so-called "industrial reactors [plutonium
production reactors]" which are still functioning today.
Plutonium production was the focus of not only the military,
but also Minatom's civilian sector. In the Chelyabinsk region
there is a spent nuclear fuel facility which processes spent fuel
from nuclear plants and submarines. The plutonium generated by
this facility is accumulated and stored at special storage sites
near the facility. Meanwhile, only hundreds of meters away from
the production site, the United States is funding the construction
of a weapons-grade plutonium storage facility. Mitrokhin explained
that this new site is actually encouraging Russian nuclear specialists
to increase plutonium production, and this only preserves Cold
War mentality within the Russian nuclear complex.
The closed nuclear cities of the USSR were a favorable environment
for the upbringing of Soviet specialists in the spirit of nuclear
rivalry. Many of them, however, are not prepared for life under
the new economic conditions, and have found themselves floundering
in their attempts to adapt. Today there are very few young specialists
wanting to work in the nuclear industry, and the older generation,
lacking fresh ideas and mentality, maintains the out-of-date myths
of the Cold War.
The intent to produce large volumes of plutonium, particularly
through continued civilian reprocessing, remains unchanged within
Minatom and the Russian nuclear establishment. This goal requires
enormous financial resources which the Russian budget currently
lacks. This is why nuclear managers in Russia are so enthusiastic
about obtaining resources from spent fuel imports. Last summer,
legislation permitting the import of spent fuel for processing
and storage was successfully passed in the Duma.
As a consequence of this spent fuel processing project, however,
Mitrokhin emphasized that he (and his party) believe that it will
generate a huge amount of radioactive waste and pose a nuclear
safety hazard. At the Mayak plant in the South Ural region, more
than 500,000 people have already suffered because of the contamination
associated with other nuclear activities. The population of Chelyabinsk
region drinks water from wells containing plutonium. Children
swim in rivers where a plant processing spent fuel dumps its liquid
radioactive waste.
Mitrokhin said that it is noteworthy to mention that Minatom
is the only department in Russia that has not undergone substantial
reform since the end of the Soviet Union. This means that it remains
a dual-purpose department, i.e. working for both civil and military
purposes. According to the official Russian document entitled
Strategy of Atomic Energy Sector Development in Russia in
the First Half of the 21st Century, "nuclear technologies
will remain the basis of defense capabilities in Russia."
The dual purpose of Minatom allows its new managers to use the
shield of secrecy to undertake a variety of commercial projects
without public knowledge or consent. Minatom's extensive secrecy
makes it very hard to audit the Ministry's international projects
and certify that they are exempt from corruption. Under the circumstances
of complete confidentiality in Minatom, its international projects
cannot be proven to be exempt from corruption. A recent report
by the Duma's Accounting Chamber points out that roughly $270
million of foreign aid money that was allocated for radioactive
waste processing is missing from Minatom records. In a situation
like this, no one can guarantee that the foreign assistance is
not being partially retransferred to other projects, including
those involving the Russian military.
The campaign to pass a decision allowing Russia to import spent
fuel is gaining momentum in the United States. According to Mitrokhin,
this decision will have the following negative consequences:
- Minatom will gain funds which will be used to manufacture
more plutonium (including weapons-grade plutonium) and to construct
new nuclear facilities.
- In addition to the huge number of radioactive contamination
cases already documented, thousands more will occur because
of the storage, processing, and disposal of hundreds of thousands
of tons of imported waste.
Thus, Mitrokhin concluded that a decision by the United States
to allow exports of spent fuel to Russia will carry very unfavorable
domestic repercussions for the Russian public and undermine its
authority as a democratic nation.
See also:
YABLOKO Against Nuclear Waste Imports |
