How effective are the present-day Russian leadership's actions on the most pressing problems, how appropriate in relation to reality and are they yielding the expected results, considering the complexity of the tasks and the condition of the state? Doesn't much of the regime's programme amount to merely a cover lacking content? This is exactly what distinguished the last period of the Union bodies' rule, and we know full well how this ended up. What lurks behind the numerous treaties, declarations, resolutions, negotiations, decrees, receptions, visits, delegations, etc.?

There are different aspects of policy - the state system, the army, ethnic problems, crime, and international relations. We do not propose to examine all of them, but will touch upon only a few - those by which it is possible to somewhat judge the state of the rest. Let us take a look at:

- relations with adjoining republics and at relations with republics and territories which are part of Russia;

- relations with the West;

- organization of the economic reform;

- relations with conservatives.

At first glance there are solutions to all the problems:

* in with the adjoining republics - the CIS and the corresponding package of documents;

* in relations in Russian Federation - the Federation Treaty and the addenda to it;

* in relations with the West - what the government describes as the new Marshall Plan to the tune of 24 billion dollars;

* in respect to the organization of the economic reform - the Declaration of the 6th Congress of People's Deputies adopted under government pressure;

* in relations with conservatives - the government's victory at the Congress.

Regrettably, analysis has shown that most of the above solutions are practically ineffective. The problems have been "closed" as it were, but there are no positive results. Instead, there are myths worthy of making up an "Anthology of Modern Russian Mythology".