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Removing the bandits and saving our own peoples' lives
 
By Grigory Yavlinsky, Chairman of the Yabloko Association
Yabloko Rossiyi, No. 50
November 20-26, 1999

Recent developments confirmed yet again the correctness of our stance. Owing to negotiations Gudermes was taken by our army without a single shot of gun fire, followed by Akhchoi-Martan. In August-September we discovered that if the local population supports the Russian authorities and the actions of the military, this leads to effective measures to overcome the bandits.

Finally this means that first of all the lives of Russian soldiers, officers and civilians will be saved. Secondly, it guarantees mutual understanding with the local population, the civilians of Chechnya and their support or at least neutral attitude to facilitate the removal of the bandit groupings at minimum loss and ensure security for the citizens of the Russian Federation.

To transform this development into a reality, we set six terms for Alsan Maskhadov on negotiations with him. Negotiations will take a maximum of one or two days. They must be absolutely open, clear and broadcast almost live on television.

If Aslan Maskhadov agrees to these terms, he must address the population of Chechnya and ask the people to help the Russian authorities remove the bandits on the territory of the republic. About one-third of the armed men subordinated to Maskhadov in this case will at least stop firing on our troops, if not help them. All this constitutes a way to reduce our losses.

If Maskhadov refuses, the Russian authorities will address the population of Chechnya directly, announcing that Maskhadov assumed in the eyes of Russia and the whole world responsibility for further developments. During a certain period of time, for example, a month, we admit through established corridors all the people from Chechnya who do not want to support the bandits and all the refugees. Then all the aforementioned six terms will be implemented by our troops independently.

And what should our troops do during this month? All the operations should continue - the positions are obviously maintained and consolidated, further moves are made in the directions envisaged by the leadership of the army.

Certainly, in our view, mass-scale bombings of everything and everyone are harmful and senseless. This does not guarantee defeat of the bandits, but leads instead to civilian casualties and destruction, which means that the people will again have nowhere to live and work, once Chechnya has been cleared of the bandits. In five or six years we will again get crowds of the unemployed, illiterate, but armed people ready for another war.

We should not conduct a wide-ranging assault in the mountains, as a partisan war in the highlands in winter will lead to mass losses in the Russian army, and no result will be achieved. Here, even more than in Gudermes and Akhchoi-Martan, we need to negotiate with the local population. As far as we know, the elder of many highland settlements are ready to support the Russian army.

Today the developments are such that we can reach our goals in the Caucasus and avoid mass losses. But this is only possible if military operations are correctly balanced with political methods. We understand and support the extremely hard and risky work of those Russian soldiers and officers, who really facilitate normal life in the settlements of Chechnya.

However, general developments there do not provide ample security for our country from a strategic perspective and are inherent with unjustified and wide-ranging risks. All the politicians who neglect proposals to hold a serious negotiation process should assume a large degree of responsibility. The price of such responsibility is borne by the lives of the civilians in Chechnya and Russian soldiers and officers, lives that can be saved.

ei Stepashin on Grigory Yavlinsky's proposals