| The developments of May 9 in Grozny really shocked the
Russian political
class. This is not simply a strong epithet. The moral and psychological
consequences of the act of terror which took away the lives of the president
of Chechnya Akhmat Kadyrov and several heads of the republic are obvious.
All the assurances of the Russian military that the situation in Chechnya
was under control and normalising quickly and the forces of the militants
had been gradually reducing have been depreciated. The leaders of the
separatists Maskhadov and Basayev are still elusive, and the official head
of the republic is killed during the festivities of a national holiday.
Finally the idea that there has been no normalization of the situation
in
Chechnya and the militants still have the initiative may prevail in public
opinion.
The political consequences of these developments seem even more unpredictable.
It is obvious that this threatens to disrupt the whole process of peaceful
regulation in Chechnya, including the referendum on the Constitution of
the Republic and presidential elections, which were all conducted for
one man Akhmat Kadyrov. And all the more or less important political figures
were ousted from the political scene of Chechnya to eliminate any obstacles
to the person backed by the federal centre put. Consequently it will be
very difficult to find a replacement for the killed leader of the republic
from Kadyrov's competitors who were previously turned down by the Kremlin.
And if such a replacement is finally found, a new problem will emerge:
how to fit the powerful clan of the assassinated president, who served
as the basis for Moscow s policies in Chechnya for the past few years,
in the new political landscape.
However, the consequences of the tragic events in Grozny are not reduced
to the Chechen dimension only. It is even more difficult to figure out
how the assassination of Kadyrov will influence to Russian policies in
the Caucasus in general. Obviously there has been a relative stabilization
of the situation in Chechnya where Kadyrov played no small role in the
complicated diplomatic maneuvers undertaken by Moscow in its desire to
normalize relationships with the present Georgian authorities, including
during the resolution of the Adzharian problem. Therefore we can assume
that inevitable changes in Chechnya which will happen there after Kadyrov
s death will this or that way affect Russia s relationships with the neighbouring
Caucasian states, and probably Moscow s approach to the most acute problems
of the region- the Abkhazian and the South Ossetian problems.
It is likely that the issue as to what should be done with the naughty
republic in the Northern Caucasus may cause new conflicts at the top of
Russian politics. As previously far from all the residents of the Russian
political Olympus liked Kadyrov. Some influential people thought that
when
Kadyrov demonstrated his loyalty to Moscow and intimidated people by
asserting that without him the republic would fall into chaos, he was
in
actual fact accumulating huge resources in his hands, which would in future
open up opportunities for Chechnya to preserve only formal dependence
from
Russia. Now the supporters of the tough line in relationships with Chechnya
may say that the stake at the constitution of the Republic and local elected
executive authorities was not justified. It is no coincidence that some
Russian politicians have already made statements on the viability of
introducing direct presidential rule in Chechnya. This is unlikely to
appeal to people expecting to regulate the conflict through Chechens loyal
to Moscow and building with their help a Chechen statehood within the
Russian Federation.
It may be claimed that the influence of different opinions in the top
political circles in Moscow on Chechnya in Russian domestic politics should
not be exaggerated. It is an important issue, but it touches upon only
one
aspect of the domestic political life of the Russian state. However, those
who think like this should not forget that the history of Russia, like
that
of other countries, is built on a huge number of examples when local
conflicts inside ruling elites finally lead to serious changes in domestic
political course.
We should not ignore a conclusion or a lesson which should logically
be
drawn from all the developments and which, one would like to believe,
the
Russian political elite will learn. In politics, especially in transitional
periods, betting on specific individuals, even those who seem very reliable
and professional, rather than on institutions, is always a high-risk
strategy. One unpredicted accident and you have to start everything again
from scratch. Therefore the most efficient way to attain the goal, either
peaceful regulation or socio-economic reforms, is to bet on precisely
verified balances of forces and real interests represented in society
rather
than on good executors.
The author is a political scientist, expert of the Moscow Carnegie Centre
See also:
War
in Chechnya
|
