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The Kremlin's experiment aimed at creating a strong party system in Russia
is doomed to failure. Ironically, Vladimir Putin's soaring ratings are to
blame. This also means that the St. Petersburg liberals and top civil
servants, who rose to power on the back of Putin's landslide election
victory in 2000, will, sooner or later, have to go through the rigmarole of
registering with the Justice Ministry, just like all other political
parties.
With less than a year to go before the parliamentary elections, the
situation on the party political playing field is surprisingly calm.
The SPS (the Union of Right-Wing Forces) and Yabloko are still trying to
work out coalition agreements; United Russia is undergoing changes in its
spheres of influence; the Communists are, according to some reports,
cooperating with tycoon Boris Berezovsky, and according to others, are not
cooperating; at the same time a completely new party - SLON - has emerged,
founded by ex-Yabloko man Vyacheslav Igrounov.
However, all these developments have not had a radical impact on Russia's
political map. The media have long since lost interest in party life, on the grounds that the
real politics is carried out in the corridors of power and behind the
scenes.
And these so-called political "parties" are anything but; they do not
fulfill representative functions, do not facilitate communication between
the public and the authorities, and finally have no actual influence on the
powers-that-be.
On the contrary, the "parties" are more like an instrument of state power,
enabling it to imitate public politics and democratic procedures. Russian
parties are electoral machines and lobbying corporations, which have nothing
in common with traditional political parties, other than their names.
There are other kinds of parties in Russia, however, that are endowed with
real authority. They are shadowy, closed parties. Russian analysts call them
"elite groupings" - "the family" [Boris Yeltsin's 'old guard'], "St.
Petersburg power-wielders" and "St. Petersburg liberals".
These "parties" are incorporated in the power structure at all levels.
They have their leaders, their surrogate ideology, financial resources,
support groups and media outlets, but lack a social base.
Consequently here we have two types of pseudo-party: the public ones, which
have their ideologies, manifestos, leaders, electoral resources, but are not
integrated in the power system. Then there are the shadow parties, which
have the real power resources, but no representation in society.
"The torso" and "the head" of the party system are separated. And that
discrepancy - that gap between the authorities and the public - is the
source of many problems in Russian politics.
At the same time, this very discrepancy fuels Putin's popularity. He plays
the role of communicator between the public and power, replacing political
parties with himself.
Putin conveys the interests of society to the authorities. He exercises the
real power and in turn is able to transmit the power impulses to the public.
Putin has covered up the yawning gap in the Russian political system and has
been duly rewarded. But it is impossible and unreasonable to build the
entire system solely on Putin's rating. This is a temporary measure. In the
long run, without a normal party system, Russia is doomed for political
crises and disasters.
The only way to avoid these disasters is to inoculate "the head" and "the
torso", to legalize the shadow parties and bring them out into the public
political arena.
In this sense, at the last [1999] parliamentary elections there was an
opportunity to form such parities on the basis of Fatherland-All Russia and
Unity. The process was snuffed out, however, by their merger into the United
Russia Party.
Consequently, the present-day parties have been degenerating into electoral
lobbying corporations. Party politics is becoming a sham, and the entire
system of power is based more and more on shadow and administrative
instruments.
The combination of a Byzantine monarchy with pseudo-democratic institutions
cannot, by definition yield positive results or contribute to the country's
regeneration.
But the logic of the political process dictates that until a new crisis, any
significant changes in the established system are unlikely. Such a crisis
may occur with the results of the 2003 parliamentary elections, which could
prove far less predictable and "calm" for the Kremlin than they seem today.
See also:
State Duma elections 2003
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