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A Russian perpective by Alexei
G. Arbatov, Vice-Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the State Duma, November 2001
The tragic events of September 11th 2001 should have started
the new era of world politics and US national security strategy.
Indeed, perceptions of the new changed order of international
security priorities for the civilized world, the sympathy towards
the victims of the massacre and the condemnation of the barbaric
act were overwhelming. Also impressive was the degree of cooperation
in the antiterrorist operation against Osama ben Laden and Taliban,
built in the shortest possible time between the West, led by the
United States, and Russia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Central Asian
states (foremost Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), with political support
by China, India and Iran.
However, two months later after the "Black September",
the weaknesses of the coalition and deficiencies of the operation
are becoming more and more evident, as well as the confusion and
inconsistency of the United States and other major players in
adopting a new security strategy and still less in implementing
it.
1. Legal and political framework of anti-terrorism policy.
As any ad hoc coalition the present one is quite fragile and
is not based on a clear common definition of the threat or common
understanding of joint interests and means of fighting for them.
There is no accepted universal definition of "international
terrorism" in the international law, or any UN-approved or
other multilateral convention on countering it, which might be
compared to definitions of "aggression", "self-defense",
"peace-keeping" or "peace-enforcement".
Luckily, the subject of retaliation is Taliban, based on the
territory of war-ravaged Afghanistan, not recognized internationally,
discredited by its extremist policy and barbaric behavior, and
not affiliated closely with any great world or regional power
(except Pakistan and Saudi Arabia relatively manageable by Washington).
Hence uniting against it was rather easy. The case would be very
different would the obvious base of the terrorists be Iran, Iraq,
North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Pakistan. Or would the target
of such horrendous act be one of West European countries, Russia
or Japan. Repeated US indications of its plans to hit other suspected
regimes already strains the coalition and may split it if such
plans are implemented.
Lacking a recognized definition of "international terrorism",
its "harboring states" and legitimate targets and means
of retaliation, American arbitrary choice of scapegoats among
the states disliked by Washington anyway, is raising the question
about the legitimacy of hitting other states, suspected of supporting
terrorist organizations, but friendly to the United States (Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Albania, Jordan etc.).
Many secessionist ethnic or religious movements in various parts
of the world employ terrorism as their method of fighting against
superior governmental forces, many of them have international
ties and foreign funding and some of them are fighting against
really oppressive authoritarian regimes (i.e. Curds and Shiites
against the regime of Saddam Hussein). Are all of them to be declared
as international outcasts and to be treated as targets of retaliation
by antiterrorist coalition? Or is the United States and its Western
allies to be the judges and executioners of such cases?
A selective attitude towards terrorist organizations and their
paramilitary forces, as well as to the states harboring them,
based only on American political preferences, cannot provide a
long-term foundation for the international antiterrorist coalition
or its allied strategy. To the contrary, such policies of the
United States may turn the fight against terrorism from a major
uniting international factor into a great new point of international
discord, leading to a confrontation between great world and regional
powers and even straining the Western alliance itself.
2. Implementation of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan.
Another serious problem is that the new look at security induced
by the events of September 11th seems still to be quite superficial
and yet unable to bring really deep revision of the old policies.
This relates to several countries, including Russia, but is primarily
reflected in the actions by the United States.
Washington should be given credit for making effort to secure
authorization by the UN Security Council for conducting its operation,
in contrast to American earlier disregard for the United Nations.
The two adopted resolutions provide some legal framework for the
use of force, although opinions differ as to how long and at what
scale this war would stay within the bounds of legitimacy. Nonetheless
in planning and implementing the military operation the United
States keep to its tradition of unilateralism of the 1990's at
best consulting its NATO allies and informing Russia, but not
doing any joint planning or coalition war-fighting.
Partially this may be explained by the fear of intelligence leaks,
but mainly, no doubt, by US willingness to keep maximum freedom
of action in using its overwhelming power, selecting targets and
countries for attack and conducting negotiations with whatever
counterparts on conditions of Washington's preference.
This is why, aside from Great Britain and few other allies (Australia,
Japan) other US partners and Russia are not in a hurry to join
the fighting, confining its support to political declarations
and some indirect material cooperative actions. Moreover there
is a growing concern in some West European states, Russia, China,
India and Iran about the practical goals of US operation and its
diplomacy on the post-war settlement in Afghanistan. This is already
seriously detracting from the military effectiveness of the operation.
Ben Laden's formations and other terrorist organizations in Afghanistan
cannot be routed out without destroying Taliban army and political
leadership. Taliban, in contrast to Slobodan Miloshevich or Saddam
Hussein, cannot be brought to its knees only by high altitude
air bombardment or cruise missiles - if only for lack of cost-efficient
targets in Afghanistan and total disregard for civilian casualties
by Taliban. It may only be defeated on the ground by large-scale
offensive combat operations, which neither of major powers is
willing to contemplate for obvious reasons. The only remaining
alternative is to arm, train and advice the Northern Alliance
to do the job with close air support of the antiterrorist coalition
and with the help of its selective special (commando) actions
on the ground. Implementing such campaign from aircraft carriers
in the Arabian Sea or from the bases in the Persian Gulf area
is too far away.
Conducting massive and prolonged military actions from Pakistan
is impossible because of the fragility of its domestic situation
and the threat of fundamentalist uprising and extremists gaining
access to nuclear weapons.
India is not a viable option either because of geographic and
terrain reasons, as well as because of the threat of destabilizing
Kashmir and disenchanting Pakistan and other Muslim nations. Iran
is still less possible since the United States was too arrogant
to do anything serious in recent times to improve relations with
this country and to overcome past grievances. Neither Pakistan
nor Turkey would be happy about such rapprochement.
Hence the only base for US (or US-British) combat operations
would be Central Asia - primarily Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. That
would have to deeply involve Russia both politically and militarily.
The transit of supplies would have to go through Russia's air
space and ground communications (and Kazakhstan's since Turkmenistan
is neutral).
Besides, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are having very tense relations,
as are the respective ethnic groups in the Northern Alliance.
For the United States to rely fully on Uzbekistan would not be
wise, since this would estrange Tajikistan and Tajiks in Afghanistan,
while Uzbek units of the Northern Alliance (commanded by general
Rashid Dustum) are militarily quite weak and relatively few in
numbers.
3. Russian position, domestic views and concerns.
Moscow has been repeatedly hinting at its willingness to give
Washington broader support, besides sharing intelligence information,
providing air corridor for humanitarian cargo, participating in
rescue operations and supplying arms to the Northern Alliance.
It's possible to speculate that Russian leadership, despite strong
domestic opposition, would be ready to provide robust military
advice and direct air cover to anti-Taliban forces, as well as
coordinate air and missile strikes at Taliban with the United
States.
This would be virtually an allied relationship. However, neither
Washington, nor its NATO allies seem to be ready for such a breakthrough.
They fear implications of this new relationship for other Western
interests: i.e. NATO extension, BMD/ABM Treaty problems, Russian
foreign debt, the war in Chechnia, rivalry over Caspian oil shelf
etc. This would also mean for Washington reaching consensus with
Moscow on post-war settlement in Afghanistan (taking into account
the interests of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as well), which may
take a lot of effort to bring Pakistan on board, straining relations
with this principal American partner in the region.
Russian leadership has probably gone as far as possible in cooperating
with the West and much further than could be expected from President
Putin, judging by his previous cautious middle-of-the road policy,
based on a bureaucratic consensus (i.e. his positions on the national
anthem and symbols, land reform, budget policy, the military reform
etc.). The majority of Russian public opinion, parliament, mass
media or military bureaucracy does not support his line on the
antiterrorist campaign, although there is little open opposition
to Vladimir Putin due to the general curtailment of any political
opposition to Russian President after the middle of the year 2000
(last presidential elections in Russia).
Part of this internal opposition to cooperation with the United
States is due to great-accumulated mistrust and hostility to US
unilateral policies and force employment of the 1990's (NATO expansion,
military action against Yugoslavia, arbitrary strikes at Iraq,
rejection of the ABM Treaty, START-2 and follow-on strategic agreements,
CTB Treaty etc.). In many cases US policy towards Russia was deliberately
formulated in most arrogant and insulting ways. So a common question
is: why should Russia now help Americans?
Another reason is the unwillingness of a large part of Russian
political elite and strategic community to go for much closer
cooperation, much less some kind of alliance with the West - for
its domestic and foreign policy implications.
Finally, there is a wide-spread fear in the society of another
involvement into a quagmire of a counterinsurgency war after bitter
experience in Afghanistan in 1979-1989 and two bloody and campaigns
in Chechnia in 1994-1996 and 1999-2001, as well as a fear of terrorist
attacks on Russian civilians. A popular concern is that the United
States would bomb out and fly away, why Russia would stay to deal
with the disrupted wasp nest. Hence Putin's cooperative strategy
is tolerated for the time being, but in case of mishaps or US
arbitrary actions the pressure would be enormous for a radical
policy reversal.
Political conservatism of the West is understandable. However,
it means exactly that September 11th has not brought a fundamental
revision of the old security interests or policies. The new threat
is being addressed within the framework of old priorities or with
their minimal corrections. This also relates to the US propensity
of unilateral planning and implementing military actions, giving
no more than a lip-service to the UN Security Council authorization
for the use of force, preserving options of arbitrary decisions
to hit other states (if only to make up for dubious efficiency
of operations in Afghanistan).
4. Politics in and around Afghanistan.
Moreover, determined to exterminate ben Laden and his main organization
Al-Quaida, Washington still has reservations about fully destroying
Taliban (which is inseparable from Al-Quaida and Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan) out of concerns about post-war settlement and peace-reconstruction
in Afghanistan, as well as about relative influences of external
powers on Kabul. This inconsistency makes it easier for Taliban
and Al-Quaida to withstand US-British air raids and to bargain
for eventual compromise.
The three main dangers with respect to the current operation
are:
- Destabilization of Pakistan and Islamic extremists' access
to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
- The split of the antiterrorist coalition due to unilateral actions
of Washington or excessive collateral damage of air strikes
otherwise inefficient in crippling Taliban.
- Taliban's attack to the north across the borders of Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan, which would make Russia, fight on the ground
without any guarantee of US protection, participation or serious
assistance.
As of now, the way coalition, led by the USA, is acting - it
is neither prepared to meet any of these contingencies, nor capable
to decisively defeat Taliban
The United States, Russia and some other countries may come out
of this war either in much closer relations to go on suppressing
terrorism - or with much greater controversies, which would make
terrorism invincible in the long run. Despite some amazing initial
progress, as the time goes by, the coalition is loosing momentum
and making insufficient efforts to ensure the former and prevent
the latter. What should be done to change this?
In the short term the United States should abandon its unilateral
mode of operation and involve Russia in the decision-making process
on defining political and strategic goals of the operation in
Central Asia, as well as military planning and, if need be joint
combat actions. The world has really changed after September 11th,
if all of a sudden in the most important US security issue Russia
has become the main potential American partner - much more important
for doing the job, than all other NATO members or other US formal
allies. This reality must be recognized both in practical Washington's
policy and in formal agreements.
Indeed, if Russia is to get deeper in this war, it would need
US (or Western) security guarantees analogous to North Atlantic
Treaty Article V, at least related to the present operation in
Afghanistan in case Russia becomes a subject of terrorist retaliation,
as presently threatened by Islamic extremists.
The cowardly and unrealistic idea of separating Taliban from
terrorist organizations, or distinguishing between "bad"
and "good" Talibs should be abandoned as well. Taliban
political regime and army must be destroyed, while alternative
moderate Pushtu organization should be created as an alternative
to Taliban and as a participant in future Afghan peaceful settlement.
Washington and Moscow must closely cooperate to bring together
Tashkent and Dushanbe and their respective proxies in Afghanistan,
as well as to arm and train them for counteroffensive to defeat
Taliban's army on the ground. The two great powers should cooperate
in setting the infrastructure in Central Asia to provide the Northern
Alliance close air support (may be joint US-Russian-British) and
other forms of military assistance.
It is necessary to prepare for possible destabilization of Pakistan,
primarily by planning to evacuate or destroy its nuclear weapons,
ballistic missiles and research-production-testing facilities.
Washington should make urgent efforts to improve its relations
with Iran and India (in which Russia could give it a good help)
as alternative partners in Central and Southern Asia, in case
Pakistan is destabilized.
The mid- and long-term policy should aim at elaborating and adopting
a legal framework for defining "international terrorism"
and ways to deal with it. Possibly a permanent UN structure to
monitor this problem would be useful, as well as regional organizations
in NATO, EU, CIS etc. If there is an international convention
on this subject, it must be ratified by all states, while those
opposing it should be subjects for international sanctions, as
well as regimes, proved to be harboring terrorists.
Traditional alliances and bilateral relations should be revised
from the point of view of who is harboring and funding international
terrorists. Some terrorists cannot have immunity only because
great powers or their allies protect them.
More aid and assistance in economic development has to be provided
to post-war Afghanistan and other countries of this kind to fight
poverty and ignorance, fuelling extremism, and to give other ways
for earning money, than drug business.
The process and regimes of non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems must be made much more
stringent and unbiased as to its application to some states. India
and Pakistan should be pressured into joining CTB, provided that
the United States ratifies this treaty.
Russia and the United States should agree to deep cuts in their
strategic offensive weapons (down to 1000 warheads or less), while
introducing amendments to the ABM Treaty to permit extensive testing
of new technologies for possible future joint deployment. In the
meantime, the two powers and their allies could start developing
theater antimissile defense system to protect Europe (including
Russia), Asian Russian territory and US allies in the Far East.
Other countries may be invited to join the project if they eliminate
their missiles of medium and shorter range (as defined by INF
Treaty).
This may seem as a toll order indeed, but such steps cannot be
seen as excessive - if only the notion of a new "post-September"
era of international security is something more than pompous political
declarations.
Alexei G. Arbatov
See also:
the original at:
http://www.ceps.be/
International
Anti-Terror Coalition
Russia
- US Relations
Russia
- EU Relations
AMB
Treaty
NATO
expansion
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