| After Sept. 11, there was an abrupt shift in
Russia's foreign policy. Despite the course that was still being
pursued last summer, symbolized by Kim Jong Il's trip across Russia
in an armored train, and in the face of the opinion of the so-called
political elite, President Vladimir Putin unreservedly supported
the United States in its fight with Osama bin Laden's terrorists
and the Taliban.
The initial reaction to developments in New York and Washington,
coupled with the decisions taken by Putin within a fortnight of
Sept. 11, represented a serious change in the values system of
the Russian authorities. On Sept. 24, at a meeting between Putin,
the leaders of parliamentary factions and the State Council presidium,
one of the participants advocated supporting the Taliban, while
18 participants proposed that Russian preserve neutrality vis-a-vis
the United States fight against terrorism. And only two participants
said that Russia had to take part in the anti-terrorist coalition.
Effective and multi-faceted support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts
in Afghanistan was a direct result of the Russian president's
own, independent decision.
There was, of course, a tactical logic to this decision. The
Taliban regime, with its links to terrorist groups in Central
Asia and the Caucasus, posed a direct threat to Russia's security.
Possibly for the first time in history, the country had the opportunity
to resolve at least one of its many problems by diplomatic means
and using the military strength of another state.
However, tactics are not the be-all and end-all. The September
decision and subsequent ones may serve as the basis for establishing
a strategic line that will allow Russia to survive as a modern,
sovereign state in the 21st century. I am, of course, talking
about this country making an unambiguous move toward the West.
After Sept. 11 and Russia's foreign policy shift, the logical
question arose: Has there been a change in the West's attitude
toward Russia? So far, not really. Behind the speeches and actions
of Western representatives, the former mistrust, incomprehension
and fear still lurk.
It should be recognized, however, that there are in fact weighty
reasons for such mistrust. Russia remains unpredictable for the
West, and this unpredictability is a reflection of the internal
problems of the Russian authorities and the elite. Changes in
foreign policy have not had an impact on the course to build a
"managed democracy" within the country. Russia lacks
real freedom of speech. There is no mass media capable of systematically
providing a majority of the population with a view on key issues
that differs from the authorities' position. Elections, in particular
regional elections, have been transformed into an empty ritual
of appointing a pre-selected candidate.
Finally, the events in Chechnya also make Russia unstable and
unpredictable. The situation has reached a deadlock. The only
way out would require a conference on political regulation of
the situation there, on the basis of the Russian Constitution
and laws, involving all interested parties and chaired by Putin.
But there has been no movement in this direction.
Given such developments, we should not be surprised that other
countries would like to exploit us wherever possible and do not
want to consider us as serious partners, let alone as allies.
Does this mean that the West should wait until Russia matures
and is able to manage its problems by itself, whereupon it will
call the West and say: "I am ready, will you accept me?"
No. This will never happen, and there is no time for waiting.
Developments are such that the West should recognize Russia as
a member of the Western community today. Russia should be taken
on board warts and all, just as it is. To accept Russia, the it
must accept at least two theses. First, the West should recognize
the existence of a very important priority for Russia -- the security
of existing borders separating Russia from the most unstable,
dangerous and unpredictable regions in the world. Second, the
West's understanding in principle and willingness in practice
to admit Russia as a fully-fledged member to all of Europe's economic,
political and military structures in 15 to 20 years' time are
needed.
A first step in this direction could be the signing of a document
on military and political union between Russia and the United
States during U.S. President George W. Bush's visit to Moscow
this week. In terms of the form, this could be an agreement, memorandum
or treaty. Most importantly, it should qualitatively differ from
a politely formulated cooperation within the framework of NATO,
or some agreement covering only arms issues.
It should be a joint declaration: on a common understanding
of freedom, democracy and human rights as fundamental principles
for the 21st century; on common priorities and threats; and on
mutual security guarantees in case of terrorist or military aggression.
The fight against the present terrorist threat differs from
the military science of the past century. Without Russia's help,
this fight cannot be won. In addition to purely military tasks
-- and today Russia unfortunately can only play a very limited
role (indeed, this an area it seems the United States can genuinely
handle on its own) -- help is needed in providing: diplomatic
support and sanctions against those harboring terrorists; intelligence
information; assistance in monitoring financial flows and detecting
the sources and methods used to finance the terrorists; guarantees
of nonproliferation of various types of weapons and technologies;
as well as many other things.
And finally, political support is also very important. Military
actions alone, deprived of such support, are futile and never
ending.
Besides direct support in fighting terrorism, if the United
States signs a union with Russia, it will finally be able to eliminate
OPEC's monopoly on the world oil market and, consequently, put
an end to its energy dependence.
Without doubt, Russia has a major interest in containing the
terrorist threat. However, this is not the only issue. The post-Sept.
11 foreign policy course is obviously beneficial to Russia, an
is the only possible course from the perspective of the country's
medium-to-long-term interests.
A fully-fledged union with the United States and the West could
facilitate the consolidation of genuine democracy in Russia as
well as enabling the fuller realization of the country's endogenous
potential. This may be the only way to ensure that reforms in
Russia are brought to fruition -- reforms that have been conducted
in such a way over the past 10 years that they seem to have completely
exhausted people's appetite for it.
A union with the West is most definitely what Putin wants, and
in the current circumstances, his political will is pretty much
sufficient. He has support and public opinion is on his side.
Since Sept. 11, Russia has sent very clear signals to the West
through concrete actions. All this has been done in spite of the
position and opinion of virtually the entire presidential entourage,
many Foreign Ministry officials, many politicians and the miitary.
Putin has extended a hand to the Western world, and this has been
taken note of. The United States now understands that it should
not push this hand away and is thinking about the possibility
of reaching strategic agreements.
However, it is possible that nothing serious will happen. The
opportunity for a strategic rapprochement between Russia and the
United States (or more broadly the Western world) that opened
up after Sept. 11 remains in a very fragile state. It would be
all too easy to substitute a serious modern political process
with the well-known Soviet politics of detente: the counting of
warheads and statements regarding the "victory of Soviet-Russian
diplomacy in the fight for peace between Russia and the United
States."
Detente as a foreign policy concept in the current situation,
however, is absolutely useless. Therefore, if talks on May 23-26
conclude with an agreement on disarmament, on NATO, on the Jackson-Vanik
amendment and some general declarations, it will mean that the
opportunities that opened up after Sept. 11 will have been squandered
and that everything will revert to previous form (to the type
of agreements that were signed in the 1970s).
Realizing the new opportunities is the personal responsibility
of the leaders of Russia, the United States and the European countries.
The huge divergence between the foreign and domestic policies
of the Russian government cannot last for very long, and the options
are limited. Either domestic policy will be brought into line
with the foreign policy course or, on the contrary, the decisions
taken after Sept. 11 will turn out to be a temporary zigzag subject
to correction.
Under the first scenario Russia will gradually become a European
country in terms of democratic procedures, economic development
and living standards.
Under the second scenario, the symbol of Russia's foreign policy
will once again
become the armored train which authoritarianism feels
comfortable with.
However, it is necessary to understand that Putin cannot be
absolutely certain that a
document on partnership will be signed, and even if it it is
must have doubts about the
extent of its implementation and the real extent of support
for Russia's course toward
the West. This is why he does not burn his bridges and retains
his former entourage in
case he needs to retreat.
In the case of such a retreat, it is not clear what Putin's
position will be and what his
power base will be. Also a repeat of the putsch of 1991 should
not be excluded in such
a case.
However, today there is still a chance. Putin can make a most
important decision by
opening the door to Europe for Russia, and not just the window.
Grigory Yavlinsky is the leader of the Yabloko party. This
comment is excerpted from
an article published in Obshchaya Gazeta on Thursday. The full
English text can be
found at www.eng.yabloko.ru.
See also:
full text:
Grigory Yavlinsky.The Door to Europe is in Washington. Obschaya
Gazeta, May 16, 2002
as publised
at
www.themoscowtimes.com
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