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By Zarina Khisamova

Spring army conscription

Expert, April 29, 2002

The authorities and the media continue vehement battles about alternative civil service, the terms of army service, and cancellation of student conscription deferral. The heaviest of the spring campaigns is under way, spring conscription. Military enlistment registration offices and the police are chasing young men who are avoiding their "sacred duty". Simultaneously, operations to round up deserters - those whom enlistment offices manage to force to don a uniform and take up an automatic weapon - are being carried out in different places. Now, these young men have something to fight with the authorities.

One out of nine conscripts from last autumn's intake has a criminal record; at the time of recruitment, almost half of the new conscripts neither worked nor studied; 20% do not have a secondary education. The statistics on drug addiction, alcoholism, and poor health among these young men vary from unfortunate to monstrous.

The top brass ask: "Where can we find good soldiers?" and cite statistics: 85% of young men have student conscription deferrals. This year the list of students entitled to a deferral was expanded to include trainee priests, this year's school leavers, and trade school students under twenty years old. Besides, 40,000 young men are avoiding military service: that is the equivalent of three and a half divisions.

The numbers, strength, and combat ability of the Russian army constitute a military secret and we can only refer to assessments and statistics only - however, the army needs urgent reinforcements.

At present, Russian society is discussing four alternatives to resolve the conscription issue. For obvious reasons, the plan suggested by General Staff has the best chance of implementation. However, there is no such plan at present. There is only a decision of the Security Council as of November 2001 on cutting the Russian Armed Forces by 600,000 people by 2005. By this time, the army will consist of a million servicemen, including 542,000soldiers and sergeants. The Ministry of Defense Ministry assumed the obligation to present a detailed plan for the army reform to the president only in 2004.

Overall, the position of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff is clear. Firstly, they will try to retain the two-year term of army service - as a last resort it may be reduced to 18 months. Secondly, alternative civil service should be presented as unattractively as possible. In these terms, Duma deputies completely support the top brass - they have already passed in the first reading a law establishing the length of alternative civil service as four years.

Thirdly, the military insists on abolishing most conscription deferrals connected with education. They propose retaining this privilege only for institutes and universities included on a special list - which has still not been composed to date - the so-called state education order.

In addition, there should be no haste. According to Colonel General Vladislav Putilin, the reform is to be carried out in three stages. First of all a preparatory stage, which is to last until 2004. The second is to be an executive one and is "to be carried out by 2008-10", while the terms of the "final stage have still to be determined."

This is about all the Russian military leaders say about conscription reform. The conclusion is simple: to date it has nothing to do with reform: this is simply a forecast. However, this forecast is likely: the army will contract to a million owing to the impending demographic crisis and mass exodus from the army.

Before starting - or not starting - the reform, Russian generals suggest experiments. For instance, at present 15% of the Pskov 76th aviation division consists of contract servicemen, by mid-2003 this service will be completely voluntary. The military say: "This experiment will show how we should transfer the Armed Forces on a contract basis and how much it will cost." They demanded 2 billion rubles for the Pskov experiment, with most of the expenditure to be made on building houses for contract servicemen.

According to General Staff calculations, the transfer of one division on a contract basis will cost 500 million rubles. Today, a soldier for a fixed period of time costs the state 16,800 rubles a year, while a contractor costs 46,800 rubles a year.

The military say that this is all very expensive, and the country cannot afford such expenditure. Our country is indeed poor: however, if you perform the calculations: The difference in maintaining a solider for a fixed period of time and a contractor comes to 30,000 a year. Consequently, if we now replace 400,000 recruited soldiers with contractors, which is necessary to implement the planned army cuts by 2005, spending on maintenance of the army will grow by 12 billion rubles a year. If we add non-recurrent spending on transforming for instance a hundred divisions on a contract basis, we will have 50 billion rubles more. Overall, it will cost 62 billion rubles - $2 billion to be clearer - which is less than a quarter of the present military budget of the country and about a third of the amount spent directly on maintenance of the army. It should also be noted that all this expenditure will last for several years.

Suggestions of the Yabloko party.

Sometimes, discussions about military reform suffer strange transformations. For instance, when speaking about army reform, the main "pigeon" of the country, humanist and protector of human rights Grigory Yavlinsky acts like a real "hawk". He suggests a sharp growth in military spending -from 2.6% to 3.5% of GDP - with a simultaneous reduction in the army to 800,000 people. According to Yabloko members, this would make it possible to halt conscription immediately and switch fully to voluntary army service on a contract basis. From the very first day of the reform, all servicemen from soldiers to top officers will have double salary, while retaining all their privileges. If the military budget is increased in this way, it will make it possible to abruptly change the ratio of army budgetary items: at present 70% of the military budget is spent on army maintenance and only 30% is spent on a technical upgrade of the army. Whereas the ratio under the Yabloko project will come to 50/50.

Actually, the most interesting point of this programme is the suggestion to use the Russian-speaking population of the CIS as a resource for a contract-based army. So those willing to accept Russian citizenship will be able to obtain it through army service.

The Union of Right-Wing Forces (SPS) hired the Transitional Economy Institute (ITPE) to prepare a military reform programme. ITPE analysts calculated the cost of implementing the proposals of the Defense Ministry and Yabloko, and concluded that the first alternative, a relatively cheap one, would not resolve the problem of transition to a professional army in the near future. The second alternative, a rather expensive one, does not take into account maintenance of the mobilization reserve at a certain level.

The ITPE plan stipulates mixed army conscription. In autumn 2002, young men will be recruited for a two-year term for the last time. There will be no conscription next spring at all. From autumn 2003 new recruits will undergo a six-month course of military training in special training centres. Afterwards, those willing to continue army service will conclude a three-year contract, which is to be extended or not, depending on the will of soldiers and their commanders.

According to the project's authors, such a system would make it possible to resolve several very serious problems. First, as the term of service is reduced so drastically, the number of draft-dodgers will also decline considerably. Second, there will be no harassment by older soldiers, as young recruits will enter and leave their training together. Third, the young men will not be sent to any combat zone against their will.

Professor Vitaly Tsymbal, head of the ITPE military economics research section, says that the rate of army reductions announced by the Security Council served as the basis for calculations: by 2005 there will be 542,000 privates and sergeants in the army. In his opinion, the number of recruits for a fixed term of service would be 142,000 young men, while the number of contract servicemen would increase from the present level of 150,000 to 400,000 contractors.

ITPE ordered the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM) to perform a national poll. Men from 18 to 28 were asked what salary would be enough to serve in the army. It transpired that 400,000 people would agree to sign a contract for 3,000 rubles a month; 900,000 Russian men would go serve in the army for 4,000 rubles a month.

Therefore, if the salary is fixed at 3,500 rubles a month (currently, it is higher), there will be more candidates than necessary. After increasing the salary to 4,000 rubles a month, the Defense Ministry would be able to hold contests, where two people would compete for one position.

ITPE also compared the cost of the two alternatives for reform. First, the project of the Defense Ministry, which stipulates that the reform of the conscription system should be ready by 2006, and the number of personnel should be reduced in accordance with the scheduled plan, as well as expenditure on maintenance of the military. The second is the ITPE programme, which stipulates that the real transformation of the army and transition to a mixed recruitment system would start in 2003. It transpired that the second alternative would require 37 billion rubles more over the next five years.

Vitaly Tsymbal mentions as a plus of the ITPE programme the fact that no changes to the Constitution need to be made to implement this plan, as the mandatory military conscription will be preserved.

Proposals from Garrev.

President of the Academy of Military Sciences Makhmud Gareev has a concept of his own. It represents a hybrid of the ideas of the Union of Right-Wing Forces and the General Staff. Gareev proposes a transition to a professional army on a contract basis over five to six years. In his opinion, it is necessary to determine primarily the basic, regular component of the Armed Forces responsible for implementing immediate combat tasks. According to the general, this component will gradually be transformed into a completely contract-based army over five to six years. Simultaneously, he suggests retention of the conscription system.

Gareev believes that conscription should not only be preserved, but also expanded: all unsubstantiated conscription deferrals should be cancelled. At the same time, the term of military service should be reduced to a year or eighteen months, and later to six to eight months. The military serving under a fixed period of service would consist of the so- called variable component of the Armed Forces, comprising special training centres for recruits. On the basis of decent financial incentives on graduation from a training course at the centre, about half of the young people would be able to sign contracts. Another component would acquire a military profession and retire, thereby filling the military reserve.

President of the Academy of Military Sciences does not agree with the General Staff, which suggests that only 40-50% of sergeants should serve by contract. According to Gareev, this category should be entirely professional, and sergeants should be prepared at special one-year schools. The author thinks that this project can only be implemented, if there is "adequate funding for the military budget", which amounts to no less than 3.5% of GDP. Therefore, here Gareev agrees with Yabloko. The authors of all four plans anxiously waited for the president's response in his annual address to parliament on April 18. As usual, Putin said something that did not satisfy anyone, represent an agreement with the position of the General Staff. However, in his words, this mechanism "should completely determine the whole mechanism for transition of army and naval conscription on a contract basis." So he was speaking only of a mechanism, while transition to the contract basis is a set decision and the generals will be unable to avoid reform.

Until recently, it seemed that the plan of the Union of Right-Wing Forces and ITPE was winning supporters: both the presidential administration and the Cabinet, and even the Defense Ministry, accepted this concept. The only stumbling block was the timing. The leaders of the Union of Right-Wing Forces and ITPE insisted that the reform should start in 2003, while the General Staff wanted a start in three to four years, extending over ten years. However, after calculating the possible increase in costs, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and deputy prime minister and Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin retreated. At a meeting with the president they stated that the 2003 budget would not have the money for this. The military again started persuading Vladimir Putin - and seemed to be successful - that a completely switch from conscripts from year to year would lead to a decline in the nation's defense capability. Finally, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the idea of transition to a mixed conscription system was nonsense. This means that over the next three years the Russian Armed Forces will have neither reforms nor normal life - there will be experiments costing considerable amounts of money.

It is easy to understand generals - they do not want the reforms, and cannot want them. It is not because of money - at present the nation is able to afford this not very expensive reorganization. It is not because of the necessity to build new training centres - the existing ones will receive no more than 60,000 people, while it is necessary to train 140-150,000 and to reequip the present ones. It is not because it is necessary to build new houses and improve the living standards of the Russian military. It is not even because today the army can exploit for free workers to build generals' villas and summer houses, which is very significant. Things are much more serious. For centuries the Russian army has been based on a cheap and powerless soldier who has been the cornerstone of the whole system. If this stone is taken away, if the Russian soldier suddenly starts demanding that contracts be fulfilled and his rights should be observed, and appeals not to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers but to the courts, then everything will fall apart, and the army will be destroyed.

This also makes it possible to understand President Putin: if the generals are against it, who will implement the reforms? However, this is the case everywhere: courts object to the court reforms, state officials are against the administrative reform; bankers are opposed to the banking sector reforms, and so on and so forth, right to the end of the list.

At present, there still is time to do everything gradually, without haste. And the words "political will and political support" are still the key words - no reforms can be carried out without them.

See also:
The Russian Army

Expert, April 29, 2002

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