| The Honorable Yuri P. Shchekochikin is a member
of the Russian State Duma
and the vice-chairman of its Committee on Security, and a leading
figure
within the liberal Yabloko party. He spoke with In the National
Interest
editor Nikolas K. Gvosdev after President George W. Bush made
his speech
before the United Nations General Assembly.
Shchekochikin expressed concern at the course of American policy,
saying
that he fears President Bush is making "a classic mistake"
in his approach
to Iraq. Unilateral U. S. designations of other regimes and leaders
as
"enemies, partial enemies, partial friends, or true friends"
carries with
it the seeds of an anti-American backlash. Shchekochikin felt
that Russian
public opinion, not simply among traditionally anti-American sectors
(leftists, the elderly) but across all classes, would recoil from
any
assertion that the United States has the right to attack Iraq
on its own,
even if Iraq is in violation of UN resolutions. Indeed, he noted
that
until recently, the Bush Administration appeared to place little
value on
the UN system as a means for finding a solution. After having
displayed
scant trust in the UN system, why should the other members of
the UN trust
Bush and his assessments that Saddam Hussein is the enemy of the
international community? In other words, Shchekochikin intimated
that
broad sectors of the international community are not going to
be convinced
that Hussein poses a threat to international peace and security
simply on
the assertion of the American president.
Shchekochikin stressed that Russia is committed to the war on
terrorism,
but reiterated a long-standing demand that the United States provide
conclusive proof that Iraq is linked to terrorists or is engaged
in open
support of terrorism. In the year since the tragic events of September
11th, he noted, the American intelligence community appears to
have been
unable to clearly demonstrate such a link.
Asked whether he sees any parallels between President Bush's
speech on
Iraq and President Putin's comments regarding Georgia, Shchekochikin
answered with an emphatic yes. "As Iraq is for you, so Georgia
is for us,"
he noted. The Bush Administration, he emphasized, cannot turn
a blind eye
to what is happening in Georgia, ignoring Russian concerns about
the
transit of fighters and funds from Georgia into Chechnya. If the
United
States dismisses Russian concerns, Putin has no incentive to support
Bush
with regard to Iraq. Shchekochikin worries that such disagreements
could
then prevent Russia and the United States from working together
to find
constructive settlements that address their concerns vis-a-vis
Georgia and
Iraq, opening the possibility that each country may conclude the
only
alternative is to launch unilateral military operations, which
he fears in
both cases (whether Russian action in Georgia or U.S. action in
Iraq)
could escalate into major conflicts.
Indeed, Shchekochikin advises the Administration not to rule
out
negotiations as a way to find a peaceful solution to the Iraqi
crisis,
noting that despite the links between the Chechen separatists
and
international terrorism, especially Al-Qaeda, the Russian government
last
fall opened up a dialogue with the Chechen leadership in an ongoing
attempt to try and end the fighting. He feels that the United
States
should not and cannot ignore the opposition of most of the international
community to military strikes against Iraq. He also reiterated
that if the
United States ignores the concerns of other states, again raising
the
question of Russian complaints against Georgia's harboring of
suspected
terrorists, it cannot then expect that other states, including
Russia,
will support its efforts with regard to Iraq.
Shchekochikin was not at all certain that Russia would automatically
support (or at least refrain from vetoing) new UN resolutions
authorizing
use of force against Iraq. In 1990, he observed, the situation
was
different. Iraq had invaded and occupied another sovereign state,
Kuwait.
There was a clear reason and justification for coalition military
action.
Now, there is little support for pre-emptive action. Shchekochikin
was
doubtful that a majority could be obtained in the Security Council,
and
cited a prevailing mood in Europe that the situation with Iraq,
even if
not ideal, was stable. Moreover, he voiced doubts as to whether
a
successful campaign could be mounted, if Saudi Arabia and Jordan,
America's traditional allies in the region, also mounted vociferous
opposition to U. S. action.
Shchekochikin's final words of caution was that the United States
not
undertake a course of action vis-a-vis Iraq without full knowledge
of the
potential consequences. He does not share the expectations of
some in the
Administration who feel that a military campaign against Baghdad
would be
of short duration, instead raising the specter of a long and bloody
campaign. Moreover, "American boys are not suited to be colonial
soldiers"--in other words, Washington is not prepared to
shoulder the
burdens of a long-term occupation and reconstruction of Iraq.
See also:
the original at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/
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