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The Russia Journal

Gordon M. Hahn
No Foes? Think Again

February 15, 2002

No opposition to Putin?

A consensus has emerged among Russia observers that under Putin and his "managed democracy" there is no opposition to the Kremlin. This chimera has achieved the virtual unanimity of political correctness, but it is factually incorrect.

Putting aside the misnomer "managed democracy," this mistaken view is a result of false expectations of opposition activity created by the revolutionary politics of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The demonstrations to the Soviet regime, unconstitutional maneuvers on the part of the Yeltsin regime and its opposition in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, as well as the violent street marches by the red-brown opposition during those years, have misled many.

Observers now assume that opposition politics is by definition total, uncompromising and extraconstitutional and includes public disobedience, even violence. Today's post-revolutionary politics involve more quiescent modes of opposition defined by Russia's mix of semi-democracy and soft authoritarianism.

Voices on left and right

As in any democracy, Russia's opposition politics include the parliamentary activity of political parties, protests and court challenges. Examples come from both left and right.

The Communists worked hard to muster a majority in the Duma to block the adoption of the new Land Code. Joining with the trade unions, they also won some changes in the Labor Code before it was passed last year. Communists are also increasingly strident in condemning the Putin administration for what they see as a continuation of "shock therapy" economic reforms.

From the right, the Yabloko party has led strong democratic opposition to Putin's media and domestic-security policies, including the organization of demonstrations in defense of NTV, TV6 and accused spy Grigory Pasko. Any muting in Yabloko's opposition is a result of the Kremlin co-opting its economic prescriptions, like the 13 percent flat tax and business deregulation. The Union of Right[Wing] Forces, or SPS, along with other more radical organizations, has joined Yabloko in many protests, but it plays both sides of opposition. Putin's semi-authoritarian politics, combined with neo-liberal economics, explain SPS ambivalence. Recently, several prominent leaders split from SPS to join Boris Berezovsky's new opposition party, Liberal Russia, which suggests that for many SPS members this ambivalence seems a cynical ambiguity. It also underscores that just as Putin's neo-liberal economics intensify leftist opposition, his forays into semi-authoritarian politics provoke rightist opposition.

The clearest signal of vigorous opposition from left and right came last week when the leaders of Yabloko, SPS and - lo and behold - the Communist Party signed an unprecedented joint declaration in defense of TV6. That the Communists joined with liberals to defend free speech is a sign of vital opposition and, more importantly, perhaps, the democratic acculturation of anti-democratic forces. Nothing could consolidate pluralism and democracy better.

Rivals from the regions

Another point of consensus is that Putin's federal reforms quashed opposition to the Kremlin in the regions. In fact, dozens of governors and other regional politicians have condemned Putin's federal reforms and other policies.

There are numerous, albeit disjoined, regional opposition forces. Sverdlovsk Governor Eduard Rossel, who has been attacking the Kremlin's fiscal centralization policy and the Unity and Fatherland parties, has proposed upgrading his regional party, Transformation of the Urals, into a federal party that would defend regional interests. In the Sverdlovsk legislative elections set for March, the pro-Kremlin forces are the opposition running to unseat the pro-Rossel majority.

Novgorod Governor Mikhail Prusak, originally a strong Putin backer, turned cooler toward the Kremlin after the federation reforms. He leads the Democratic Party of Russia, which could be a vehicle for regional opposition. Long-time Putin nemeses, including St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev, Krasnoyarsk Governor Alexander Lebed and President Mintimer Shaimiyev of Tatarstan, may be exploring a regionally based opposition coalition. Lebed and recently Shaimiyev founded their own regional parties.

Radical opposition forces are stirring as well. The nationalist Tatar Public Center opposes the Kremlin as well as Shaimiyev for his compromises with Moscow on Tatarstan's sovereignty. Its branch in Bashkortostan recently declared a partnership with Berezovsky's Liberal Russia.

Legislatures, not streets

Still, legislative and judicial means, rather than radical street politics, dominate oppositionist activity to Putin's policies. Take federal reform. Chuvash President Nikolai Fyodorov, along with the republican legislatures of Adygeya and Sakha (Yakutia), has protested this reform in the Constitutional Court. They are challenging all three federal reforms, including the appointment of senators to the Federation Council, the creation of seven federal districts and the institution of federal intervention.

The last allows the president, the courts and the Duma, in various combinations, to end the terms of regional chief executives and legislatures should they persist in producing laws that violate federal legislation. Fyodorov dropped the case when it opened last week, but Adygeya and Yakutia are moving forward. The Communists and Yabloko are preparing a draft law requiring that senators be elected, not appointed, to the Federation Council.

Cryptic opposition

As in authoritarian regimes, opposition at times involves covert bureaucratic delay and sabotage. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have been manipulating their courts against federal-court decisions to resist Moscow's drive to harmonize their constitutions and laws with federal law. Putin's deregulation measures, natural-monopoly restructuring plans and military reforms are also meeting stiff resistance from civilian bureaucrats and military officers.

Much of the bureaucracy, both civilian and the so-called "siloviky," are fighting Putin's "surrender" of Russian interests in Central Asia to the "global hegemony" of the United States in the war against terrorism.

Whether you are sitting in Moscow or in Washington, it would be a grave mistake to wager that there is no opposition in Russia.

(Dr. Gordon M. Hahn is The Russia Journal's political analyst and a visiting research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.)

The Russia Journal, February 15, 2002

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