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Moderator: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the International Press Centre. My name is Harry Bodan. I'm the Club President. Before introducing our speaker, I would like to remind you of some upcoming events.
I would like to remind our guests, if you have any questions for our speaker, that there will be a question-and-answer session immediately after the introduction. If you have any questions, please raise your hands, identify yourselves and your organisation. We will allow as many questions as time permits. In addition, transcripts of today's news will be available to Club members.
Today's guest is Grigory Alexeyevich Yavlinsky, Chairman of the Center for Economic and Political Research. Yavlinsky graduated from the Moscow Plekhanov Institute of Economics in 1984. He served as chairman of the department in the Ministry of Labour after a stint with the State Committee for Economic Reform under the USSR Council of Ministers. In 1990 Yavlinsky was appointed deputy prime minister of the Russian government and subsequently as adviser to the President. In 1991 he was appointed to the Presidential Political Advisory Council and deputy chairman of the Committee for Operational Management of the Economy.
Yavlinsky founded the Center for Economic and Political Research, which is a private independent think tank and has served as chairman since 1990. Will you please give a big welcome to Grigory Yavlinsky.
Grigory Yavlinsky: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I prefer to answer questions immediately. This is not the right time for speeches. Tomorrow you will hear more speeches of the type you want. That is why I would like to start with your questions. This is also due to the fact that I never know what events people know about and what they don’t know.
Question: In your opinion is there any need for a referendum or what are the chances of Yeltsin winning the poll? And if he does, what would you do as a consultant?
Grigory Yavlinsky: As far as I understand, the legal outcome of the referendum is impossible, simply because the Constitution states that the referendum must be declared by the Supreme Soviet. And that would resemble a vote for political life. So if we cannot have a legal outcome, we will have the moral support of the President, if it happens as real support.
But it is not clear whether the President even in this sense would be able to win. In any case, one can add that he has recovered. Several political figures have considered this concept. We can only gain public support... So I doubt whether this vote could be very useful. In any case I think that in the current situation it would be a very dangerous undertaking. Also the regions may take part in a very different way. And as you know, just now the situation in the Russian regions is very different.
Again observe the economic parts of the programme of the President declared in his Address. One can see that it is very hard to find there something really attractive professionally. This also raises the question why it was impossible to do these things before. Or why if it proved impossible then, it is possible to implement them now. So in any case I am sure that such an approach to finding a solution is politically dangerous at present.
Q: You mentioned three percent unemployment this year. However, I think that this figure may be contested. My question is: do you think that the West’s support for Yeltsin is misplaced?
Grigory Yavlinsky: This is a very complicated question. It needs a step-by-step explanation. First of all, in my opinion it is necessary to recognise that the understanding of the main figures of developments today and last year is now precise. Secondly, generally speaking any support is usual for the President, the country and the reforms.
The question is how to implement them today. We have to recognise that the statement by certain individuals that they are great Yeltsin supporters and they are trying to influence political developments here is a slight exaggeration because their influence in our present conditions on developments is not so great.
First of all, you have to take into account the general assertion that despite the fact that Russia was a superpower, the impact of foreign aid was so substantial on the mentality of the people to move them to support politically a leader who can assert that he can obtain credits, money or whatever. The example of Gorbachev provides evidence to the contrary. He received lots of loans, but this was not very important for the people. Besides I always want to emphasise what is even more important. As we have no private sector, the people cannot see any real direct link between this financial support and their lives, as the people feel that all this money will be provided to the government and disappear somewhere.
When you have people working in the private sector who feel that the loans are for them, these people are interested in such support. But you have no such people at all in the country... You can't expect the people to be very supportive, as they simply don't understand what you are going to do with that money, where this money is this and where this money will go.
Another point is that to be serious we have to remember that it happens on the first of April, a big holiday which you have in the United States. On this big day 24 billions were declared. Now if you ask Americans what is happening, they will say “we have given the Russians 24 billions and they are still a disaster.”
And if you ask the Russians the same question, they will ask: ”Where is this money, anyway? We got a Marshall plan, where is the Marshall plan, and where is the money? “
So, that makes the people less trustworthy of this issue about aid. And that is why the aid does not play a substantial role in our politics.
There is a third point that I would to emphasise: the lack of strategic vision about future development in the Russian Federation and in the former Soviet Union. No doubt a lot of workers have no vision for 10-15 years and have no answers to questions about the role of Russia. I fully understand that the leaders of the United States and other countries don't want to interfere. This is the best answer for their side. But in that case I would like to ask the following question: why they are holding these meetings and what they are going to discuss, if they don't want to interfere?
It is not such a big problem to say to the President: "Mr. President, we don't want to interfere, but in our opinion, as friends we can say that you must take these steps for both your health and ours. Because we want to use this money in Russia and not lose it in Russia. And we are responsible to our taxpayers, so we want to use this money in the most effective way possible.” So, today I don't think that the West is prepared to be effective enough.
Q: The Times, London. Could you tell us your opinion on the approach of the Civic Union to the present crisis? And to the Congress tomorrow? Can you see any possibility for a compromise between the Civic Union and Yeltsin, particularly regarding the plebiscite?
Grigory Yavlinsky: First of all, I want to say that I believe that the Civic Union is not playing such an important role making compromises or even pushing the parties in the direction that the West points. Certainly, the main problem in the Civic Union is that it is very hard to clarify what is the main idea, what to do. Simply to state in the present circumstances that the state should be more involved in the economy says absolutely nothing. It is not rational talk. The problem is that they have not clarified the main issue: what they want to do. And this has happened before: it looks as if people are more concerned about political infighting simply for ministerial portfolios, rather than the key issues in terms of economic changes. So that is why I feel that it is wrong to exaggerate their role in developments.
Q: You said there is not much in the government’s economic programme that you find attractive. How do you assess the effort to accelerate the privatisation of enterprises? Do you have an alternative?
Grigory Yavlinsky: First of all, I want to clarify one issue. The statement by the President concerns only parts of the programme. It is very hard to provide a full picture about the programme, based on the two or three points that he mentioned. So, I was speaking more in light of the political statement of the President, rather than about a substantial economic programme – which is in my opinion a very different thing entirely. Let me get back to privatisation: I was not saying that this is a bad thing. I was simply saying that there was nothing new here. And I was saying that I would take control and would be more persistent. I have a question. I was speaking about the connection with the statement that was made. And so I asked why this could not have been two months ago, three months ago, a year ago. It could have been done. I also want to say that you can do such things even without declarations. Or, if you want to make a declaration, you do not need to announce a state of emergency or something similar.
Because it is not something special. It is exactly what needs to be done. It is required and has been required all this time. Certainly it is not enough simply to talk about privatisation. But privatisation also includes very substantial professional issues that need to be discussed, if you want to ensure that it is effective.
Q: What would you do if you were in Washington negotiating the economic package during a summit? How would you handle things differently than Mr. Kozyrev? What results would you like to see from the summit? On the economic side?
Grigory Yavlinsky: First of all, it's necessary to underline that my position and that of Mr. Kozyrev differ slightly - also because Kozyrev is in the government and he enjoys very clear and understandable government support at this crucial moment. I would approach this issue from another angle. I would try to figure out and put on the table the real problems we have at the moment. I am saying that all those stages of preparation, all those recommendations that he would lose, simply give them to us. Here once again we will see a mess. There are legal and economic issues as well. And political issues. I would say that we need a clear answer to the very complicated and difficult issue of Russia’s disintegration. Without a clear vision about the main direction of that help, all other issues would be ineffective. That is very important.
When I ask the government about its vision going forward, about the concept you support and your vital interest in these developments, the approach to be taken depends on the answer. But also certainly from the economic point of view, I would say, certainly the issue of debt servicing is very important and also these crucial imports are very important and such kind of support is very important.
And if you consider mass support and large amounts of money, you need to draw up a strategy. I would go to the President and say: “Look Mr. President, last year we worked fine. We applied a standard approach and failed. Are you ready just now to discuss with us another type of approach to achieve the same solutions. Maybe we are just closer to our reality, to actual developments in Russia.
For example, do you want to support the currency in Russia? You certainly have to find an answer. How do you civilise the currency when you have ten central banks operating in the same currency and fighting each other. How can you do this when you have ten budgets which are not coordinated at all? What are you going to do? At one stage we attempted to stabilise the currency of a country that doesn't exist? Everybody who wants to try a second time round, can try to do so with their own empire, but not with Russia.
So we have now to find another approach. In other conditions I would simply try to explain and then try to find an appropriate response. For example, I would suggest holding a serious debate of the current situation here including the government, but not only the government, as it is understandable that the government is in a very specific position. The government is using any forms of support that you could not even imagine, but they can imagine. However, today we also have to find something more substantial and more long-term.
So, we have to answer for a start the issue of the kind of financial and banking infrastructures that we have to create here to be able to use your money... Without this, there is no sense in all these things. And some other things like that. And that is what I am going to say. I think that Russia will exist beyond the Tokyo summit. In other words we have to prepare not only for the summit in April, but also for the summit in Tokyo. This can be done. We have three or four months. As you know, I once had the experience of preparing for a G-7 meeting in London. So I know that it is possible to prepare for a summit in three or four months time in a very (inaudible) way to prepare with the Western experts for this task. And it is very important to make this a joint effort. Otherwise, you end up playing chess with yourself, which is not very interesting.
Q: Did you?
Grigory Yavlinsky: Sorry?
Q: Did you play chess on your own?
Grigory Yavlinsky: Me? Yes I did, because Mr. Gorbachev took to the summit the other programme which had been prepared by Mr. Medvedev, who was in charge of the ideological sector in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. And after three months of working in the United States and talking with Bush and other people, and bringing this programme here… then Mr. Gorbachev tried to merge a hedge and snake. And I refused to play such a game. I said to my counterparts in the United States that I wouldn't come, that would be a signal to you indicating my disagreement. That was my position. I am trying to stick to positions which I consider to be right. Even when the people deviate from this point, I stay resolutely there.
Q: Moskovskiye Novosti. What do you think of the psychology of the people? The psychology of the Russian people formed over the past 75 years. The reforms that are going too fast...
Grigory Yavlinsky: From the very outset when I tried to draft a “500 Days” plan, I was absolutely convinced that psychologically, the main task was to prepare for a free exchange of information. Today after the last year of reforms which failed, we ended up with a 3,000 percent inflation rate and so on, and so forth. However, the people did not go on one real strike throughout the year, which would appear to indicate the people’s understanding that these steps need to be taken.
Today the people discuss another kind of problem. They are not discussing whether a particular position, for example, is necessary or not. They are discussing another kind of problem. They are discussing how to engineer this privatisation process. Certainly, there is a conservative view to his issue. Certainly, there is a view which makes sense with all this privatisation. But I want to bring up the way people are discussing privatisation. Even if you went to the very conservative Congress of People’s Deputies, you would never hear people say: “We want to restore the State Planning Committee. We want to restore state orders. We want to restore something like central planning system." No!
The people are saying: "We want credits! We want lower taxes! We want more rights in foreign trade!" But that is market behaviour, by the way. Even in the Congress this is viewed as market behaviour. You can't expect Congress to demand stabilisation. I don’t believe that you could have a Congress here or in any other country where the people would say: "We don't want credits. We want very high taxes." And so on. Nobody is saying that. And this is very important. This means that the mentality is moving slowly in the right direction. That is why I am upset that the people’s belief in the democratic process is being eroded. Because they are retreating now. Or at least that the people feel that they retreat. Because a lot of promises were made and the promises were piled on top of each other. A big noise was made. And the people felt very uncomfortable. And still you have a feeling that they are ready to support the same line. Even the parliament does not say: “We are going to change the economic reforms”. Certainly that was in the details. But you ask me about the mentality, about the psychological point of view.
Nevertheless I want to say -- 200 years ago United States started creating a state and power. And there you can see. Everybody can be rich. That was the main concept. And that is working even today. In Russia they are attempting to inspire the people with a national slogan: "A deficit-free budget" – which is strange. As nobody in Russia knows what the terms budget and deficit mean. And that is why nothing worked last year. So this is how they count on psychology.
Q: Switzerland. Plenty of economic reforms, proposals and concepts have been discussed over the past few years. What immediate economic measures in this situation would you recommend to the government as the most important steps to stop a further decline and collapse of the economy?
Grigory Yavlinsky: I am not sure that I will be able to explain now everything that needs to be done. This list is being sent to Washington. But I will try to summarise the issues that I consider to be most important. Firstly we need to provide to provide a real, clear-cut answer about developments with financial institutions: who is in charge of what, how many central banks work with the rouble, where is the rouble zone, who is in the rouble zone, who is out, what is that. What is going on here.
Let us consider what is happening within Russia. We have 20 national banks already. Certainly, they are not moving forward like real central banks, but are instead making obstacles for the real Central Bank. For example, when Tatarstan National Bank conducts different policies to the budget and intra-state policy – this creates a mess! For they have adopted the same currency.
So the first question, as was the case back in 1991, can be summed up as follows: How do you create a workable, at least logically workable, banking system? Certainly you can say, there are no people. We are speaking about this issue. First of all we have to start with logic. This thing must work from a logical point of view. And it must be clear how to organise things This would be the first step.
Second step -- it is necessary, certainly, to say immediately that Russia differs today from the country that existed previously. We have to distribute power between the central authorities and the regions. Immediately, as soon as possible, to avoid rendering this process chaotic. The situation is very different. That is why the people point to who is supporting Yeltsin, who is not. This also derives from the past. From this point. Because one governor received something from the government, while another governor did not receive anything. This leads to a contradiction between them and renders the situation unstable politically.
But we will still come back to economic issues. Only one thing must be preserved in any case. I would put it like this: at the very least the monetary issue must be preserved. The monetary issue must be heavily centralised in a very stable order. In a very strong way. Many other issues must be distributed to avoid corruption and many other things. And certainly we simply must give the people the right to do something. Avoid creating difficulties all the time. This is the second issue.
The third thing that I would want to try and do. We have to restore free trade between all the countries of the former Union. Because we are one union together. So we have to establish a payment union immediately and we have to open borders. In any case we are overmonopolising power. When we create borders between the republics, we are pushing this monopolisation far more than in the past. So it is not workable. And I want to add that one needs to state very clearly what one plans to do. As this also concerns the issue of technical credits to other republics. For example, the government criticises the Central Bank for issuing credits to the other republics. I have a question. Why are they criticising them? If the enterprises in Ukraine stop, the enterprises in Russia would immediately come to a halt. That is why they issue credits there. Because these factors are very closely linked. Because the whole country was built like one factory: this is the key problem.
I have a number of jobs on a very long list of what needs to be done. They should all be top priority. I would apply specific criteria for this list. And my criteria would be irreversibility. This is what we failed to do last year. We have to say that this is due to our political situation. Attributable to developments today in our country. Why is the opposition acting in this way? For nothing irreversible has been done.
They felt that they had acted as in the past. That is why! I would start by making irreversible changes. As institutional changes. I would start with small-scale privatisation as quickly as possible, with land reform and demonopolisation. That would be the main goal of my immediate steps. And these steps would be performed very persistently.
The next goal would be to adapt the economy to a high rate of inflation. Certainly, inflation is a disaster. There is no question about that. But
I want to have an answer to the following question: is it realistic to try and overcome inflation at any cost? I believe not. I prefer to say: we must establish a lot
of preconditions before we can achieve real stabilisation. I would name the following preconditions: we must immediately separate state enterprises from the state
budget. As soon as possible. Otherwise, you can't achieve financial stabilisation in a centre which belongs to the government. Simply because it is part of the
government. When you achieve financial stabilisation or undertake austere financial policies in the private sector, these steps are clear to everyone. However,
when everything belongs to you and you are responsible for everything and Russians come to you, it is very hard to do that to yourself and is senseless
as was the case last year. Before taking this step, we have to live in this period of time.
We must say that we are trying to implement a policy which would manage inflation. We have to manage inflation. We have to reduce the level of inflation. We have to prevent our move to hyperinflation. For these reasons we have to take some measures. One of them is to establish a floating income policy exchange rate. The government must say very clearly: the rouble is bound to depreciate. This is clear. But it will be beyond our control. We wouldn't see the rouble depreciating in the way it is today. We could say that the rouble will fall ten percent over three months and no more. And add that we are going to support all other things.
This is why we need the stabilisation. This is also a long story on how to create an infrastructure to prepare for this type of stabilisation. If Russians have such kind of workable system to use this stabilisation, you can support it. -- But first of all we must get at least twenty percent of this money ourselves.
Q: Won't you use it to make gold reserves?
Grigory Yavlinsky: The gold issue is one of my favourite issues. This is a very important concept: it derives from the underlying components behind the idea of so-called adjustments to the economy. The aim is not to allow inflation simply to ruin everything first and then prepare for everything. And the next step would be to prepare the preconditions for real stabilisation when it is possible, including the separation of enterprises from the state budget, institutional changes, clarifications of developments in our financial institutions and so on.
Our point with this programme is to establish some kind of industrial policy, not in the sense of making a new Gosplan (Ed. the State Planning Committee of the USSR), with the same people sitting round the table and making decisions in the same old ways. Repeating what we had before. There are no real criteria: this can only lead to corruption. There is no other way of ascertaining who is not important. Everybody has a hundred thousand people working there, everybody is making something which is necessary, and you find the criteria to do that. So I would apply another approach that would resemble more the private sector, involving the use of private resources.
Also I would come back to substantial issues with the IMF and try to clarify a couple of issues. First. This has never been demonstrated by central planning. This is the starting point, never. As was the case in Poland and subsequently in Czechoslovakia. It was created by central planning. Created. Created for seventy years from scratch. What does this mean? It means that the roots of different way of thinking are very deep and we can't suddenly initiate a stabilisation programme. As we have to prepare the country for such stabilisation. Our stabilisation programme includes more preparation phases than any other. Certainly, I want to say that Russia is not an undeveloped country. It is “misdeveloped” country. And the UN should create a department for “misdeveloped “countries. In order to obtain a more precise understanding of developments here.
To be serious, I am going to say that it is necessary to clarify to the people there and to the other financial institutions what Russia means, what is our real demand and what needs to be done. For example, nobody is denying that privatisation is needed and very crucial. And this concerns large-scale privatisation, certainly, and not only small-scale privatisation. But how can you implement privatisation in our case?
We have whole cities that belong to enterprises. Two hundred thousand people employed by one enterprise. Today the housing and all the infrastructure belongs to the same enterprise. The property is listed on the final balance sheet of this enterprise. In other words the enterprise is providing social facilities. I can tell you that, for example, in the regions where I am working, they pay 80-90 percent of the profits to subsidise housing. Who is going to invest in such an enterprise? Who is going to buy shares? It makes no sense. By the way the local authorities can't support them, as they have no money. This is not mentioned. Only the bureaucrats can say: “give it to the local authorities”.
So before you start issuing shares or privatising an enterprise, you have to start by splitting them up-- you have to separate this social structure from those enterprises. And only then should you take the next step of breaking these big enterprises into pieces. You can only initiate real privatisation after taking this step. Dozens of similar things need to be done first, before we could initiate real privatisation. We certainly need support to take this step. We would do this anyway, but it is easier to implement if you have some support, and the support would be more effective. So this is also a very important issue. And I would also ask what they had in mind when they tried to stabilise the currency in the Central Bank: maybe they have some secret. It is necessary in any case to coordinate the efforts of the banks for using the rouble. So, that is another point of the programme.
Q: Will you also try to get rid of the head of the Russian Central Bank? Would you agree with Mr. Fyodorov that he is sabotaging the government's monetary policy?
Grigory Yavlinsky: First of all, I want to say, certainly, Mr. Fyodorov has more experience than me, because he has been working with the Central Bank every day. However, generally speaking, when the people were saying last year that the policy of the Central Bank had been sabotaged, I had a question as an analytical observer: last year there were three payment crises. And the bank asked Gaidar: “Mr Gaidar, are you going to start bankruptcy procedures or not? Because we have a terrible payments crisis. There are only two ways out - either we initiate bankruptcy proceedings or we have to give them credits. Gaidar didn’t respond to that question. And the bankruptcies didn't start, as you know. So the Central Bank started to give credits, because otherwise the banking system would have collapsed.
Q: It strikes me that you are saying very little about what will happen tomorrow when the Congress opens. Does that mean that you do not perceive any big significance in developments with Yeltsin?
Grigory Yavlinsky: I consider developments tomorrow to be extremely significant, as a decision of the Congress to impeach the President is fraught with danger. In my opinion this would be very dangerous. This is the main thing that concerns me: I am extremely worried about tomorrow. In my opinion, tomorrow will be a very crucial day. If they lose all kinds of political nous, they will push the president to impeachment, which will create a very dangerous situation in the country. So I hope they will have enough political nous not to do that.
Q: Do you think that compromise is possible?
Grigory Yavlinsky: What sort of compromise?
Q: Could you tell us what compromise you would prepare?
Grigory Yavlinsky: This question requires more detailed discussion. What kind of compromise? Can you tell me clearly what the positions of the President are? What are the positions of Khasbulatov? Can you state them clearly in black and white? Where they need to find a compromise. Which issues in politics and economics?
Q: Well, I think the executive should control the Central Bank.
Grigory Yavlinsky: Sorry, the Central Bank is already part of the government.
Q: It is with the government because the guy sits there. I think that the president should have legislative initiative. I think he should be able to...
Grigory Yavlinsky: ..The president has legislative initiative.
Q: Yes, but the parliament does not, or takes its time, or does not...
Grigory Yavlinsky: Listen, I'm sorry for interrupting.
Q: You answered my question? I gave you an answer! You are not even listening: that is why you are having the crisis today.
Grigory Yavlinsky: Sorry.
Q: Well, I think that parliament with a functioning government amplifies the decrees or legislative initiatives of the President and transforms them into law, so that you obtain a bankruptcy law. I don't think that this is happening. I think that this is what the economic fight is over...the political fight is more related to ambition. And who wants the damn place.
Grigory Yavlinsky: Sorry again for the interruption. That is what my interruption caused, because these are very painful questions and quite heated. First of all I want to say that in any case these are important issues that you raise. There are no issues that should push the country to the brink, left having to make a choice between this president and the Congress. And I cannot think of any one issue which should lead the president to say to the country: I need more rights or I resign. There is no substance for that. All these questions you raise may be important, even when I am saying just now that the guy, as you said, Gerashchenko is in the government, the bankruptcy law has already been adopted and many other issues have been resolved. But the institute of power does not have enough power to implement these measures. This may be the main question. Take, for example, the land issue..
A law on private ownership of land was adopted long ago. There was a ten- year period when you couldn't sell or buy land. But it was adopted at the beginning of '92 and even earlier. And the same Congress probably also realised that the executive authorities simply wouldn’t do anything. So my point is that I can't see where they have to make a real compromise in economic issues.
Even if they find a solution, the Congress will try to push the Central Bank to issue credits, but any congress in such a situation would do that. And it is up to the President to find a way of preserving reforms. Decide how to move forward and what steps need to be taken. I can’t even see a serious problem with the political issues. When the President says: “I plan to index private accounts” or something similar, this can be done without any kind of special rules or special responsibilities. I also saying this as someone who has followed Yeltsin all this time.
Nevertheless, I agree with some steps and some other things. I want a leader who moves in the direction that I really want. And I believe that millions and millions of people are dependent on such a President. That is a fact. I have big questions to the President: Are we really allowed to create a situation where we could lose everything. He is saying: give me all the power or I will resign. What is this all about? What we are going to do? What is this about?
He has had all possible powers for a year and a half. He could do whatever he wanted to do. What happens? You know what happens. So in my opinion the President must understand that millions and millions people are standing near him and that every step he takes is not simply a step of one individual, it is a step of a President who is responsible for these people and their children.
And the fight is not only to die, the fight is to win. And not to place all society every two months on the line: everything or nothing. This is not workable. That is why it is so hard for me to answer questions about compromise and the basis for such compromises.
I am going to ask the President: Why hasn’t he addressed parliament all year? Why? He was in parliament once or twice last year. He did not make parliament do hard work. This was his fault. Because at the beginning of last year he never actually came there. There would be no problems if he had come to parliament once a month and pushed e parliament right way. Khasbulatov is incomparable with him... simply incomparable! But he was absent. He should have worked work with parliament and pushed parliament.
Yes, parliament is conservative, but the country is conservative. This is his country: he sought to be President in this country, not in France. And this is the parliament you have. The parliament elected him chairman in 1990, established a Constitution for him to be a President: then he was elected President, was supported during the coup, was supported with the decision to arrest the people behind the putsch. He then destroyed the Union and in October-November was granted by the congress all the responsibilities for any kind of reform. All congress supported him and maybe gave him too many responsibilities.
Certainly, when prices have skyrocketed 20 times, it begins to become difficult to continue the reform programme, but this is nothing strange. This is not very strange, and there were no rallies. The last congress did not talk about impeachment. So be cautious, you are the President and the people are behind you. Don't go away, maybe that path would be more difficult or less difficult. Most importantly, he is the only person at the moment who can guarantee the democracy and freedoms we obtained from Gorbachev! So that is my main point and my main wish -- to say: "Be more cautious and at the same time be more persistent in implementing economic reforms".
And these reforms would overnight establish the requisite conditions for our success.
See also:
The Russian debt (Hot issues)
To a 10 year anniversary of the "500 Days" Programme
Grigory Yavlinsky, The Solution Lies in the Details, Standard & Poor's Crediweek, March 10, 1999
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