Announcing a policy towards modernisation in Russia President
of Russia put himself in line with a number of Russian rulers-reformers
who aspired to perform radical transformations in the country.
Some specific traits of this policy resemble those of his
predecessors. The President understands modernisation primarily
as acceleration of scientific and technological development.
With some reservations about the need for political reform,
the latter look like a number of quite shallow and very systematic
activities...
Thus, Mr.Medvedev’s rhetoric reproduces a historical Russian
stereotype of the "catching up" modernisation. Throughout
several centuries the Russian state (except for the great
reforms of Alexander I) tried to borrow Western advanced technologies,
while resisting or neglecting progressive socio-economic relations.
However, it was possible to solve the problem of borrowing
the technologies that were taken out of their socio-economic
context, only by means of violence over the society, i.e.,
by means of either authoritarian or totalitarian modernisation.
In the 18th century the violence on behalf of the state could
help to create a serfs-based industry, which could at least
partially respond to the challenges facing the country. In
the 20th century the state could with the help of totalitarian
methods to create a modern heavy industry. However, some time
after these industrial and technological breakthroughs revealed
hopeless backwardness of Russia in the development of political,
economic and social institutions which in the 20th century
led to the collapse of the state twice. It is generally impossible
to build an economy of knowledge and high technology with
the help of feudal serfs or totalitarian slaves some political
forces and governing clans always want to turn the citizens
of Russia into. The resource violence in conducting modernisation
in the 21st century is not only pointless, but even has exhausted
itself. Thus, at present the reformers should focus their
attention mostly on modern socio-economic relations, rather
than the much desired technologies. The development of these
socio-economic relations could serve as an impulse towards
development of high technologies. But not vice versa.
However, understanding of these realities is not traced in
the President’s speeches. Which means that he has a vague
idea of the obstacles in the way of real modernisation in
Russia. Without this understanding there is no sense to announce
a course towards large-scale transformations.
There are quite many factors for hindering of this hypothetical
modernisation process. I will only innumerate those which
I consider the most significant, such as:
1. the elite oriented towards stagnation;
2. the oligarchic structure of property rights;
3. inertia of the totalitarian past.
Stagnation of the elite. Modernisation is
impossible if the elite does not want changes. Most of the
Russian elite is afraid of the changes because of the threat
of losing their property and income, they accumulated for
the past 20 years. There are a lot of discussions at present
about what type of modernization should be conducted: a democratic
or an authoritarian. However, both these types have one common
condition: the elite should change, the elite of stagnation
should be replaced by the elite of development. Change of
elites takes place naturally during revolutions, therefore
their modernization is inevitable.
In the case of democratic modernization, replacement of elites
takes place at elections, while in the case of authoritarian
modernisation this task is implemented by a dictator. He cleans
out the state apparatus not only of his political opponents,
but also those aimed at the enrichment with the help of their
posts. And his staff reserve comes from non-elites. If he
leaves the old corrupt state bureaucracy, or replaces it with
new staff, albeit corrupt, then it is not authoritarian modernisation,
but a dictatorship of stagnation, many of these we have seen
in Africa and Latin America. In China, this role of elites
"renovator" is played by a rotation mechanism built
into the system of institutions of the Chinese Communist Party.
Our elite listens to the President’s speeches about modernisation
in the Kremlin greeting them with applause, as the elite knows
that no rotation and no renewal, moreover no the real fight
against corruption will endanger it. As despite all the statements
about modernisation, authoritarian rule of stagnation rather
than authoritarian rule of development continues functioning
in our country.
The oligarchic property structure. Our elites
do not need modernisation, as it has property to lose then.
The main thing the elite values so much is its dominating
position in the system of economic governing, when its representatives
control the largest part of the national resources. This is
the main social result of privatisation so extravagantly implemented
in 1990s and largely conditioning the slow down of the development
and hindering modernisation.
The structure of property rights in Russia resembles an inverted
pyramid: the higher is the social hierarchy status, the more
property and property rights is granted, the lower is the
status - the less of both one can enjoy. That is why the
Rechnik cottage village, where ordinary people live, rather
than a posh Fantasy Island where ministers and oligarchs live
is being demolished.
The inhibition factor means that with such an inverted pyramid
there is no niche for the development of a sound middle class,
which in most of the countries in transition was the key social
carrier of the modernisation project. It’s true that the first
impulse should be given by the elite, however, if this impulse
lacks a powerful social carrier, modernisation will turn out
to be an "elite" modernisation and will quickly
subside.
A successful modernisation is, as a rule, a product of cooperation
between the renewed elite and a dynamically developing middle
class. The elite, certainly, creates the conditions for such
development providing access to property control over income
generating property for broad social layers. Such an alliance
forms a vanguard of a "bourgeois" nation which we
have never had in our history. And it is impossible to create
a stable foundation for long-term social progress without
it.
The inertia of the totalitarian past in the Russian
society. The country paid an extremely high price
for the communist modernisation. However, the past tense is
inappropriate here, as the country continuous paying it today
too. The forced industrialisation cost us not only millions
of lives and people’s fates, but also demolishing of the society
as a system of social networks forming a complex organism
capable of its independent life. In the course of industrialization
the social capital of a traditional society (the peasant culture)
was destroyed, while the social capital of the industrial
society – the civil society - was deliberately destroyed.
The communist industrialisation turned out to be unfinished.
It created an industrial technological structure, but did
not allow to create a corresponding type of society. Moreover,
because of its violent mobilising nature, it created an extremely
ugly totalitarian type of society which within the framework
of the Stalinist-Bolshevik approach was regarded as a separate
type of industry, a kind of a social application to the heavy
industry.
Consequently, there formed a society which represented a
system of state institutions for public administration rather
than a system of social institutions. It was a society suppressing
the instinct of self-organisation throughout the lives of
three generations and cultivating a request for an organising
influence of the state. And this is virtually the form of
the society now, which is probably the most powerful factor
for inhibition of modernisation. The latter is impossible
under such an inert society - with a zero political and social
participation. Mass-scale apathy at elections - a phenomenon
standing in line with virtually absent trade unions, weak
nonprofit organisations, fictitious local self-government
and housing self-management, etc. The post-totalitarian society
represents a very convenient object for management by the
elite safeguarding the aforementioned inverted pyramid of
property rights. Such a society is susceptible of the vestiges
of totalitarianism, its distributive institutions, its cults
and symbols. In addition to this it is susceptible not only
of the dead but also the living leaders or their surrogates.
In such a form the totalitarian society is preserved through
the disfigured, but not eradicated mental complexes, that
have been formed by the totalitarian "engineers of human
souls."
Here we are appraoching the problem of overcoming the totalitarian
past, which was solved by all the countries in transition
from totalitarianism to democracy. And each case dealt not
simply with exposing of totalitarian leaders and parties,
but in parallel with this it dealt with eradication of the
social habits carrying the inertia of totalitarianism. We
have not virtually solved this problem. In such countries
as Germany and Japan, it was solved by the occupational forces.
Russia was facing this challenge as the need to “pull itself
out” of the totalitarian past “by hair” as [a protagonist
of children’s book] Baron Munchausen did. That is why this
difficult task was virtually ignored, including the reformers
1990s. In Germany totalitarianism was kept for 12 years, and
in Russia as much as 70 years! And this post-totalitarian
morass engulfed the weak democracy which was spread on it
with a thin layer with large holes.
However, it was a morass from the point of view of democracy,
but those who came to power considered it to be their serious
support. Many of the totalitarian complexes and rudiments
were in demand for strengthening Vladimir Putin’s power. And
on the opposite, the sprouts of the civil society were no
longer welcome, and were partially trampled down. Instead
of overcoming the totalitarian past, its partial restoration
took place under Vladimir Putin, which served as an effective
instrument of Putin's stabilisation, but today it has become
a factor enhancing further stagnation of the regime.
Vladimir Putin still remains the leader of such restoration
now sitting in a single tandem with the leader of modernisation
Dmitry Medvedev. Probably that is why all Medvedev’s words
about modernisation contain nothing about de-Sovetisation
de-Stalinization. In this dilemma - restoration versus modernisation
- the question of de-Sovietisation is the key one. Until a
consistent de-Sovietisaiton is conducted, Vladimir Lenin's
“project” will continue functioning and wining over. It has
already won over the Soviet Union and the next step will be
winning over Russia.
Three conditions for a full-fledged modernisation
Proceeding from the aforesaid, the ruling reformer in modern
Russia should do the following:
1) initiate rotation of elites, gradually, but steadily increasing
the segment of the "elite of the development" which
has to replace the "elite of stagnation" by cultivating
a new generation of officials and conducting anti-corruption
purges the state apparat;
2) gradually, but steadily transform the property rights
structure redistributing control over national resources from
the oligarchs to mass layers of medium and small owners; separate
the power from the business by all means well-known in the
modern world; consequently, weakened oligarchic clans should
be ousted from governing of the state and the economy by means
of legislative, political and apparat methods; the middle
class should be consistently and continuously with the help
of exclusively legal methods get all possible kinds of assets
(land and real estate), these assets should be taken from
under control of bureaucrats and oligarchs. One of the main
conditions of the Bolshevik modernisation was liquidation
of illiteracy, now it should be liquidation of lawlessness
of small and medium-scale owners.
Work in this direction will form at least “at a first approximation”
a basis for the middle class as an active social force, which
is a foundation for a stable democracy.
3) quickly and decisively begin implementing a comprehensive
system of measures for de-Sovietisation; in addition to exposing
the crimes of the past period, public consciousness should
be cleaned of the enslaving complexes, habits and stereotypes
of the past at simultaneous liberation of the civil society,
elimination of all the recent obstacles to its development.
Now about fair elections, independent court and many other
transformations needed in the process of modernisation. All
these institutions have to be formed. However, we should realise
that without movement along the abovementioned three streamlines,
they will all be either pending or will even make harm. Restoration
forces can win event at the most fair elections, and they
can again liquidate fair elections. An independent court can
not exist without a strong civil society, and judges regard
this public opinion as a benchmark in their decision-making,
etc.
By the way, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin had to face
all the three aforementioned problems in their time. But they
were not solved or the opposite decisions were taken like
in the Russian privatisation case.
And yet there has been no sign that Dmitry Medvedev is going
to solve these tasks.
Sergei Mitrokhin is the leader of the YABLOKO party
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