| Before speaking about the Russian
Ministry of Nuclear Power (Minatom
) and its international initiatives, I would like to make a few
introductory
remarks about the department. The nuclear complex in Russia was
developed
during the Cold War years with the primary goal of ensuring nuclear
parity
with the US: all Minatom activities were subordinate to this task.
The USSR aimed to produce a larger number of nuclear warheads
than the US:
consequently a considerable volume of weapon-grade uranium and
plutonium was
required for that purpose. For a number of reasons plutonium was
preferred.
A special system of plutonium production at so-called “industrial
reactors”
was created in the USSR and still functions today. Their purpose
was not
industrial but military. At the moment one such reactor operates
in
Krasnoyarsk Territory, with two more reactors in Tomsk Region.
Operational
facilities produce weapon-grade plutonium in the same places.
During the past decade Minatom has persistently avoided termination
of
production. The US funds safety measures, physical protection
and
radioactive waste processing. It definitely encourages Minatom
to continue
plutonium production.
Plutonium production was in the focus of both military and civilian
activities of the nuclear power sector in the USSR and now in
Russia. The
Chelyabinsk region houses a spent nuclear fuel facility processing
spent
fuel from nuclear plants and submarines. The plutonium generated
is
accumulated on special storage sites. Meanwhile the US funds the
construction of a storage facility for weapon-grade plutonium
just hundreds
of metres away from its continuous production. This paradox is
attributable
to the traditional attempts of Russian nuclear specialists to
increase the
volume of plutonium, which is a definite sign of Cold War mentality.
Closed nuclear cities in the USSR were a favorable environment
for educating
Soviet specialists in the spirit of nuclear rivalry. Most of these
specialists were not prepared for life in the new economic circumstances.
Many specialists have ended up in business and left the secret
laboratories.
Today no more young specialists sign up for those enterprises
and elderly
staff keep holding on tight to the out-of-date myths of the Cold
War.
It should be noted that Minatom is the only department in Russia
that has
not undergone reforms. In other words it remains a dual-purpose
department,
i.e. working for both civilian and military purposes. The official
document
entitled “Strategy for the development of the nuclear power
sector in Russia
in the first half of the 21st century” states that “nuclear
technologies for
the period will remain the basis for defense capacities in Russia”.
The dual purpose of Minatom enables its new managers to use the
shield of
secrecy to implement commercial projects. For example, in 2001
the Nuclear
Power Minister Mr. Adamov was forced to resign, as the State Duma
Commission
found him guilty of corruption and dubious connections, including
those with
American businessmen and officials.
Given the complete confidentiality of Minatom, its international
projects
cannot be exempt from corruption either. According to a recent
report from
the Audit Chamber, Minatom reports fail to account for USD 270
million of
foreign aid money allocated for the treatment of radioactive waste.
In these
kinds of situation nobody can guarantee that foreign aid was not
partially
retransferred to other projects, including military ones. Foreign
resources
can be spent on the most unexpected projects. Who would have thought
ten
years ago that part of the resources for the HEU-LEU deal would
have been
allocated for the construction of nuclear power plants in China
and India?
Today the plutonium orientation of the nuclear sector in the
USSR is
replicated by a strategy of the so-called “plutonium energy”
sector
development. This term refers to replacement of the thermo-reactors
with
fast-neutron reactors. The intention to produce plutonium in large
volumes
remains unchanged.
This strategy requires the enormous financial resources that
the Russian
budget lacks. Consequently nuclear managers in Russia are so enthusiastic
about obtaining resources from spent fuel import to Russia from
other
states. As a result last summer they managed to lobby amendments
to Russian
legislation permitting the import of spent fuel for processing
and storage.
The goal is very simple: to build plutonium-fueled reactors for
the money
gained from the import of spent fuel and to build spent fuel processing
plants whose real purpose will be plutonium generation.
Society will not hear about the spending of money from those
deals, while
future generations of Russians will sustain real expenditure for
imported
spent fuel processing.
These problems are acute today. The Audit Chamber regards the
situation
regarding the treatment of radioactive waste by Minatom as “critical”.
I
found out for myself that physical protection of nuclear storage
facilities
is at the lowest level, when I penetrated one of them without
proper
authorization.
The irresponsible attitude of nuclear power officials towards
safety issues
becomes apparent from their plans to build a surface storage in
Krasnoyarsk
Territory with the capacity to store about 30,000 tons of spent
fuel in five
years. As you know, similar plans exist in the United States,
but the issue
here concerns deep underground storage in Ukka Mountain. Even
these plans
caused a public protest that delayed their implementation by 20
years.
Minatom plans to locate the storage in facilities with flooded
basements,
which freeze during cold winters, when the floors and ceilings
almost
collapse, and rusted welds.
The goal of Minatom is to build a plant to process spent fuel
and extract
plutonium. This processing will generate a huge amount of radioactive
waste.
Owing to the contamination caused by the activities at the plant
“Mayak”,
over 500,000 people have suffered in the Southern Urals Region.
About 10,000
live in a territory, which should only be inhabited under specific
restrictions. The population of Chelyabinsk Region drinks water
from wells
containing plutonium. Children swim in a river where a spent fuel
processing
plant dumps its liquid radioactive waste.
These facts have had a significant impact on public opinion,
which strongly
opposes the possibility of spent fuel imports into Russia. According
to a
public opinion poll, initiated by the independent research centre
ROMIR,
91.3% of the population in Russia oppose such imports. Representatives
from
local business in the territories where it is planned to carry
out nuclear
activities oppose Minatom’s decision. Agricultural producers
perceive the
decision as a direct threat to their business.
Two years ago environmentalists managed to obtain about 2.5 million
signatures in support of a referendum against the possible import
of spent
fuel. This year people from Krasnoyarsk Territory have gathered
more than
100,000 signatures in support of a local referendum banning the
construction
of new nuclear facilities in the area. However, Russian officials
banned the
holding the referendums, as they could forecast the result of
democratic
will. Protest actions have been held all over the country. Russians
strongly
oppose Minatom’s plans, perceiving them as an attempt by
highly
industrialized countries, above all the US, to get rid of their
dangerous
nuclear waste at the expense of Russia. The decision to import
spent fuel is
considered evidence of cynicism among Russian officials who take
decisions
contradicting the will of people. Representatives from independent
Russian
mass media often disclose the corrupt and anti-democratic plans
of Minatom.
However, to deliver its messages Minatom uses the mass media that
are state
regulated and controlled by the Kremlin and never allow the opposition
to
speak out.
Today a campaign to take a decision allowing Russia to import
spent fuel is gaining momentum in the US. To summarise the aforementioned,
this decision will have the following negative consequences:
- Minatom will gain funds, which will mostly be either stolen,
used to manufacture new plutonium including weapon-grade plutonium
or in the best case scenario to build new nuclear facilities.
- The huge number of cases of radioactive contamination will
be complemented by new ones connected with the storage, processing,
and disposal of hundreds of thousands tons of imported radioactive
waste.
- In supporting the decision to export spent fuel into Russia,
the United States will undermine its authority as a democratic
country.
See also:
YABLOKO Against Nuclear Waste Imports |
