Nizhni Novgorod oblast is one of the largest and most economically developed regions in Russia; it is ranks seventh in terms of population and shares the seventh spot with Samara oblast in terms of industrial production. Covering an area of 74,800 square kilometres, the region is bigger than such "model" Europeans countries as the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium. Apart from salt and peat deposits and dwindling stock of timber, the region has no substantial reserves of natural resources at its disposal. The oblast has a varied industrial base: the machine- building sector, concentrated in the regional centre and other cities as well, accounts for the largest share. Approximately one-third of the oblast's production base is occupied by defense enterprises. The region's machine- building, glass-making, chemical, and metallurgical enterprises are closely linked to enterprises of other sectors, located in many regions of Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and neighbouring republics and regions. Russians account for approximately 95% of the region's population of 3.7 million people. Tatars (c. 70,000) are the next largest ethnic group. Ukrainians, Mordovians, Chuvash, and Jews are also fairly numerous. Urban residents accoutn for at least 77% of the overall population. The region has witnessed a population decline over the past three years. A particularly critical demographic situation has occurred in rural localities. Nizhni Novgorod (founded in 1221), with a population of 1,445,000 (as of January 1, 1992), became Russia's third largest city after Moscow and St.Petersburg even before World War II. If the outlying cities of Dzerzhinsk, Bor, Kstovo, Gorodets, Zavolzhe, Pravdinsk, Balakhna and Volodarsk are included, Nizhni Novgorod constitutes one of the largest urban agglomerations, with a population of about 2.5 million. Nizhni Novgorod's special role during varying periods of Russia's history has been determined by the region's extremely advantageous economic and geographic location. Founded at the confluence of the Oka and Volga rivers as a bridgehead for campaigns against the Bulgarians before the Mongol-Tatar invasion, the city played a key role in uniting the Volga lands during the time of Ivan the Terrible. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Nizhni Novgorod citizens, Minin and Pozharsky, united the Russian lands. They constitued the basis of a strong state for three centuries. During the development of capitalism in Russia, Nizhni Novgorod, with its famous trade fair, became one of the country's largest commercial centres: it even determined international grain prices. Industrialization also affected this city first: an automobile factory, the largest enterprise in the country, was built there. Nizhni Novgorod is a significant cultural centre, where various music competitions are traditionally held. The resting place of the relic of St. Seraphim Sarovsky has once again become one of the major pilgrimage destinations for Russian Orthodox believers, while the Islamic cultural centre created in the town of Medyany now plays a similar role for Russia's Moslems. Finally, the humanitarian and democrat Andrei Sakharov, whose ideas on Russia's reorganization still await their time, worked many years in the oblast, and was subsequently exiled there. The economy of the Nizhni Novgorod oblast is extremely dependent on supplies of metal, fuel, energy, and raw materials for its chemical industry. Supplies of at least thirty types of products are crucial to the oblast's economy, including are raw materials for the chemical industry's continuous production cycle. At the same time, the disintegration of traditional intra-regional economic ties of Nizhni Novgorod oblast, principally with former CIS republics, continues. It is being adversely affected by interrupted supplies of metal from Ukraine, and agricultural equipment from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In view of the need to preserve economic ties, the intra- regional contacts department of Nizhni Novgorod oblast's committee for material resources began circulating in February 1992 proposals to all regions in the republic and countries of the former USSR, in a bid to establish bilateral economic agreements. By August 10 1992, 28 two or three-year agreements (open to extension) had been signed, including one agreement with Kazakhstan's Taldy-Kurgansk oblast. The latter agreement greatly helped the region buy grain. A unique five-year agreement on economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation, stipulating that the region acts as a fully-fledged entity of the federation, was signed with regions in Kazakhstan. So far few regions in Russia regions have established bilateral ties with Nizhni Novgorod. Only the Novosibirsk, Smolensk, Belgorod, and Novgorod oblasts initially proposed the signing of such agreements with Nizhni Novgorod oblast. By August 10, 1992 no agreement had been signed with Tatarstan. The stance of the Ural regions is puzzling: not one of them responded to Nizhni Novgorod's proposal for bilateral contacts. Interest in the preservation of ties prompted Nizhni Novgorod oblast to become one of the initiators of the Greater Volga regional association for economic collaboration. The Association was created on the instructions of Boris Yeltsin, dated June 10, 1991, "On the Formation of the Greater Volga Association for Economic Interaction Between the Republics and Oblasts of the Russian Federation Volga Region". Even now, however, the status of such associations (there are up to 10 of them) has not been approved. At the moment, the Association unites 12 regions of the Volga and Volga-Vyatsk economic regions (excluding Kirov oblast) with a population of over 20 million (13% of Russia's total), and occupies a key (central) location in European Russia. The Association's executive directorate is domiciled in Samara. Each region has an authorized representative to the directorate. Twelve working groups, assigned to separate regions, have been formed for the fundamental directions of economic activity: - development of the construction industry and production of building materials (Nizhni Novgorod oblast); - external economic activity (Nizhni Novgorod oblast); - collection and processing of scrap metal (Nizhni Novgorod and Samara oblasts); - production of agricultural machines and equipment (Volgograd oblast); - development of the food industry (Ulyanovsk oblast); - solution of ecological problems (Astrakhan oblast); - solution of energy problems (Samara oblast); - elaboration of economic programmes and provision of related information (Samara oblast); - formation of market structures (Samara oblast); - supplies of foodstuffs and other goods (Samara oblast), etc.

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The Association's regions account for 21% of the republic's agricultural produce (on average in 1986-1990) and 16% of its manufacturing (during the first half of this year). More than 60% of the republic's aviation sector and 80% of its automobile production are carried out in the region. Industrial production over this period fell 10.6% in the association's regions as a whole (and 13.5% in Russia as a whole). According to regional breakdown, the corresponding figures look as follows: Kalmykiya - Khalm Tangch, 3.5%; Samara oblast, 6.4%; Republic of Tatarstan, 7.9%; Nizhni Novgorod oblast, 8.5%; Ulyanovsk oblast, 9.9%; Saratov oblast, 10.9%; Volgograd oblast, 13.2%; Republic of Mordova, 14.9%; Penza oblast, 16.8%; Astrakhan oblast, 16.7%; Chuvash Republic, 19.6%; and the Republic of Mariy-El, 25.6%. The example of the Greater Volga association indicates the artificiality of the inter-regional economic ties set by the command and distributive system. The economic structures of the republics and oblasts were set up to duplicate, rather than supplement one another. Nizhni Novgorod, Samara, Ulyanov, and Saratov oblasts, and Tatarstan -- the oil- processing, petrochemical, automobile, and aviation industries, to say nothing of military machine-building, were simultaneously developed in all these regions -- are very close in terms of industrial profile. Paradoxically, at the same time of agricultural equipment is on the whole not produced in this prominent farming region. Despite the availability of a natural economic axis for the region (the Volga River), the region has supply ties with the Astrakhan oblast (for 96% of table salt, which happens to be available in abundance in Nizhni Novgorod oblast), Tatarstan (30% of polyethylene, which could easily be produced in Kstovo), the Republic of Mordova (80% of cement), Ulyanovsk oblast (10% of textiles), and Volgograd and Penza oblasts (tanning materials, 12% and 11% respectively). The economic interests of the Association's republics and regions dictate the need for expansion by incorporating timber regions such as Kirov and Kostroma oblasts, establishing close ties with the oblasts of Western Kazakhstan, and in particular by involvement in the development of the Tengiz oil deposit, which is believed to be a genuine alternative to the dwindling reserves of Tyumen oblast. "New stages" of the reform in the foreseeable future could lead to an economic and social crisis. The extent of the crisis in Nizhni Novgorod oblast will depend on the willingness and capability of its administration to resist the unfavourable "external environment" and develop along the chosen direction and away from the socio-political situation which has arisen in the oblast. As we said earlier, the Nizhni Novgorod oblast is, according

to an entire series of socio-economic indicators, typical of other Russian regions. Socio-political developments are no exception in this sense either: the general atmosphere of crisis in the country is leaving a stamp on the socio- political processes at a local level as well. The population of Nizhni Novgorod oblast, as indicated by sociological research carried out locally, is characterized by a rejection of politics, disillusion over the past year (since August 1991), absorption in personal affairs, and growing distrust, albeit at a slow rate, in the authorities in general. A significant decline in their standard of living -- first and foremost, undoubtedly, its social and daily aspect -- has been noted by at least 70% of the residents of Nizhni Novgorod. Three years ago, 10% less of the city's dwellers believed this to be the case. Almost 80% of them are preoccupied with survival in the face of economic chaos. Depsite this factor, however, as well as such a pessimistic outlook on the present socio-economic situation, most people in the oblast have no desire to return to the past, a Communist past which was more prosperous in many respects. Neither the deputies nor their electorate believe that the government aims to protect the interests of wide groups of workers; they do not believe that the government reflects and defends their interests. The deputies' lack of faith in the central authorities is largely personified: they express distrust more frequently than the population as a whole, in Gennady Burbulis, and virtually as often in Yegor Gaidar. Both the population and the deputies maintain a psychological division between the President and his government. President Yeltsin continues to enjoy a higher rating than the government. At the same time, during the summer Yeltsin's popularity rating dropped significantly. He faced a negative rating of over 50% and his positive rating dropped to 24%. As the rating of the central authorities has dropped, the trust of Nizhni Novgorod citizens in the local administration has grown. During the summer, this was reflected by a new trend: the popularity of the head of regional administration no longer depended on the President's rating. Whereas the governor's rating in June- July remained virtually unchanged, the President's rating fell to its lowest level. In autumn, the local authorities already enjoyed a better rating than the central government. The influence of the local authorities is steadily increasing in their regions, as is reflected by public opinion. The population has come to realise the master of their fate. Mass consciousness is aware that the oblast is becoming more and more autonomous.

The unity of the oblast and the stabilization of the overall socio-political situation undoubtedly promotes harmony between the regional council and the administration. This distinguishes Nizhni Novgorod oblast from many other Russian regions. Ethnic relations have also remained fairly stable. The three biggest minorities -- Ukrainians, Tatars, and Jews -- have already established social and cultural centres, as well as Sunday schools for children and adults, language courses, and libraries. Their effectiveness now depends only on the interest of individuals of a given nationality in learning their native culture. The revival of Russian culture has witnessed a different complex course. At least 70% of the oblast's population believe that Russia has its own historical path, independent of the West. In all 66% relate Russia's uniqueness to the particular spiritual inclination of its people, the mass rejection of acquisitiviness, and their eternal desire for truth, justice, and goodness. This Russian "national theme" has been cited more and more frequently in socio-political circles, and has been exploited by the most diverse political forces. The theme has now been manipulated by the so-called patriotic movements. The regional administration is currently confronted with the need to elaborate policies, which will help revive Russian culture and promote Russian self-awareness.

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According to the public consciousness, the revival of Russian spirituality is closely connected with the revival of the Russian Orthodox church. Only 2 monasteries and 169 associations of the Russian Orthodox Church function in the oblast. Additionally, the oblast has nine societies of Old Believers, over 30 communities of Christian Evangelist Baptists, and two communities of Seventh Day Adventists. Non-Christian religions are represented mostly by Moslem associations and the Jewish community. Islam is naturally the most influential. Thirty-two Moslem associations have been registered in the oblast, including 15 in the Krasno- Oktyabr region, an area which is densely inhabited by Tatars. In 1990, the increased number of Moslem associations led to the founding of a mukhtasibat in the oblast. Despite the absence of serious religious conflicts in Nizhni Novgorod oblast, religion poses a major problem for the local authorities: as in the past, the Russian Orthodox Church and other religions always appeal to the administration to resolve disputes. Russia's entire political spectrum is represented at least nominally in the oblast. However, closer examination reveals that the population remains fairly indifferent towards demonstrations of political party activity. Most of the population (c.75%) have no intention of joining any political party, 12% have not even considered the issue, 11% are aware of such a possibility, and only 2% answered unambiguously that they would like to join a party. The public does not reject in principal a multi-party system (only 3% are opponents) or the potential formation of such a system (such sceptics constitute only 8%). The public does not join political parties and movements for other reasons: 44% fail to see any point in such activity and a further 28% display no interest in the matter. The population is also very poorly informed about political parties and movements, their platforms and activities. Overall, they can recall slightly more often the democratic parties (principally the Democratic Party of Russia), the

Russian National Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and the Liberal Democratic Party; the latter are widely known for the activity of their leaders. The extremely low percentage of people who express any sympathy or antipathy for specific political organizations also attests to the absence of mass interest in party and political activity. The democratic parties are better known by the citizens of Nizhni Novgorod: the Democratic Party of Russia was the most recognized: 18% of those polled (equivalent to 51% of those who answered the given question) supported the party. The remaining parties enjoyed a significantly lower rating: the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, 7%; the Movement for a Democratic Russia, 6%; the Russian National Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 4%; the Liberal Democratic Party, 2%; and the Democratic Union, 1%. The Russian National Communist Party of Bolsheviks had the most ideological opponents: 20% of those polled rejected its principles. One might claim with a fair degree of certainty that the establishment of a multi-party system is not currently a mass political process. The party political struggles do not affect the actual interests of average citizens. Political self-determination of mass awareness is only beginning. It is too early to speak of any organized formation.

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